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STOCKARD, ROBERT M. The United States Supreme Court and 
the Legal Aspects of Busing for Public School Desegregation. 
(1978) Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 225. 
This study was made to determine the legal basis of 
court ordered busing in order to desegregate public schools. 
The results of this study can add to the accumulated know­
ledge of school administrators/ school board members, and 
students when dealing with the problems of busing and pupil 
assignments for the purpose of desegregation. This informa­
tion can serve as a foundation of information upon which 
decisions might be based and policies formulated. The 
process involved was an in-depth study of significant United 
States Supreme Court cases, as well as certain lower court 
cases, that had been involved in the employment of busing in 
order to desegregate a school system. 
Research answered the following questions: 
1. What did the United States Supreme Court consider 
reasonable in cross-district busing? 
The United States Supreme Court considered busing as 
a reasonable tool for desegregation as long as restrictions 
included distance traveled, and the amount of time did not 
infringe on educational standards. Consideration was also 
made concerning the system's intent to desegregate since 
this required a remedy of considerable busing. 
2. What was required by the United States Supreme Court in 
busing across administrative lines in order to correct 
an inequity in a segregated school system? 
Administrative systems adjacent to a segregated 
school system were not involved in a remedy unless the sys­
tem had had a history of segregation. 
3. What was expected from the United States Supreme Court 
when a school system's white population had been signif­
icantly depleted? 
The study found that the United States Supreme Court 
saw no necessity in making annual adjustments to attendance 
lines once a system had adopted a plan for desegregation. 
4. How had the Supreme Court implemented busing in cases 
of de jure segregation? 
It was the finding of this study that the United 
States Supreme Court constantly ruled against any school 
system's having de jure segregation. The remedy usually 
included extensive busing in cases where the Court considered 
busing to be an appropriate remedy. 
5. How had the Supreme Court reacted to cases of de facto 
segregation? 
Research revealed that in cases prior to 1976, the 
Supreme Court required some busing as a punitive remedy. 
However, the latest cases having no history of segregation 
were not required to bus because of segregative housing 
patterns. The remedy was also restricted to an equivalency 
to the wrong. 
6. How had the Supreme Court ruled in cases where the 
intent to segregate by school officials was proven? 
The United States Supreme Court's philosophy included 
a consideration of the intent to segregate governmental 
agencies. When the intent to segregate was found, the 
extent of the remedy often included extensive busing as a 
remedy for highly segregated school systems. 
7. To what extent did the United States Supreme Court man­
date remedial plans to desegregate school systems? 
The Court's most drastic remedy included extensive 
cross-district busing. This extensive mandate resulted 
from proven intent to segregate by school systems. The 
extent of this remedy was found to be proportional to the 
intent of the school system. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades public education and social life in the 
southern states was predicated on the legal foundation of 
Plessy v. Ferguson1 s~*~ "separate but equal doctrine." This 
decision established social patterns for all areas of public 
life, including public schools. The doctrine of equal facil­
ities, being constitutionally valid as long as equal, placed 
most school systems in the South with two separate systems— 
that is, one for Negro students and one for white students. 
This principle had been questioned continuously 
throughout the early and mid-twentieth century. Small 
judicial inroads were made that gradually gave the Negro 
graduate student some limited form of equality for admission 
2 to all-white institutions. However, little was done for the 
Negro public school student. 
The actual breakthrough came with the Brown decision 
3 of 1954. Here in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
the United States Supreme Court stated that the "separate but 
^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
2Ibid. 
3 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
2 
equal" doctrine was no longer applicable. This landmark 
case mandated dismantling of the dual school system within 
the South. 
Attention of the Court turned from de jure segrega­
tion to the problems of larger school systems located in 
metropolitan areas. City housing patterns increased the 
complexities of desegregation. De facto segregation placed 
many school systems in legal jeopardy. Questions arose about 
school systems that had segregated communities and were 
concerned with the Court's position on de facto segregated 
school systems. The Supreme Court, once again, gave its 
answer in the form of cross-district busing in Swann v. 
4 Charlotte-Mecklenburg. 
The Court moved through a number of phases and plans 
in development of the present philosophy. The Supreme 
Court's desegregation philosophy originated with Brown I 
5 which prohibited segregation. Later the Court mandated 
6 
integration, and finally the present Court became somewhat 
tolerant of an all-white or all-black school if the situation 
resulted from housing patterns that were not influenced by 
4 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 482 (1954). 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
3 
7 public officials. By 1977, the Court only ordered extensive 
busing as a result of proven segregative intent by the 
8 
authorities involved. 
This study examined such questions involved in the 
legality of busing as a means for desegregation as: (1) rea­
sonableness of busing, (2) racial balance and ratios, (3) bus­
ing across administrative lines, (4) depletion of white stu­
dents in an administrative unit, (5) busing in cases of 
both _de facto and _de jure segregation, and (6) racial intent 
versus extent. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to determine the legal 
basis for court ordered busing for public school desegrega­
tion. It was necessary to examine pertinent United States 
Supreme Court decisions that had led to busing. Questions 
answered in this study were: 
1. What did the United States Supreme Court consider 
reasonable in cross-district busing? 
2. What was required by the United States Supreme 
Court in busing across administrative lines in 
order to correct an inequity in a segregated 
school system? 
7 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
717 (1974T 
8 
Austin Independent School District v. United States, 
429 U.S. 991 (1976). 
4 
3. What was expected from the United States Supreme 
Court when a school system's white population 
had been significantly depleted? 
4. How had the Supreme Court implemented busing 
in cases of de jure segregation? 
5. How had the Supreme Court reacted to cases of 
de facto segregation? 
6. How had the United States Supreme Court ruled in 
cases where the intent to segregate by school 
officials was proven? 
7. To what extent did the United States Supreme 
Court mandate remedial plans to desegregate 
school systems? 
This study dealt only with limited social influences 
as reflected in the Court's decisions, even though the 
study was factual in theme, as it examined the legal aspects 
of busing. 
After explanation of the judicial decisions relating 
to busing, the study summarized constitutional mandates of 
busing for desegregation. The study further provided guide­
lines that were formulated with the view of helping school 
administrators avoid litigation encapsulating questions of 
desegregative busing and in pupil assignments. 
5 
METHOD OF PROCEDURE 
The research in this paper was necessarily historical 
in nature. The primary sources that were examined were con­
tained in The National Reporter System, The Corpus Juris 
Secundum, and The Supreme Court Digest. Secondary sources 
were also used. There were selected studies relating to 
busing, as well as discussions of various court cases having 
to do with integration, in general, and busing, in particu­
lar. Utilization was also made of books, articles in publi­
cations, and journals in an attempt to answer the key ques­
tions in this study. 
Information in Chapter II was gathered from books, 
articles, and researching court decisions in order to review 
the earlier background cases prior to the court order to 
desegregate in Brown I. In Brown I the Supreme Court declared 
"we conclude that in the field of public education the doc­
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educa-
9 tional facilities are inherently unequal." The Supreme 
Court cases were complemented by comments from various author­
ities in order to better understand how and why the legal 
segregation existed in the first place and was later elimi­
nated by the courts. 
Chapter III developed research necessary to under­
stand transition of the Court's philosophy that had carried 
9 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 973 
(1954). 
6 
the case from the simple prohibition of a segregated school 
system as in Brown I, to the Court ordered busing in Swann 
that closely approached mandatory integration of minorities 
within a school system. The Court's philosophy 
had transcended to a doctrine of "intent" vs. "extent." 
Chapter III further explored the historical review of the 
selected busing cases. 
Chapter IV analyzed the most significant United 
States Supreme Court cases in order to give understanding to 
the legal aspects of busing through analysis. Each case 
produced a profound effect on the controversial topic of 
busing for desegregation in that a relatively clear pattern 
of Court decisions resulted. These decisions, although pro­
viding some guidance, were still in' a state of uncertainty as 
to a full, clear meaning. 
The summary attempted to consolidate the events of 
the entire historical study in such a way that understanding 
can be gained of the evolutionary development of the legality 
of busing for desegregation. The conclusion attempts to draw 
together the most important legal points of busing litiga­
tion. There are clear conclusions that are drawn, as one 
sorts through the numerous legal entanglements, as a result of 
this study. Among the most outstanding appear to be that the 
disallowing of "freedom of choice" in Greene is now allowed 
in Dayton as "freedom of enrollment." The recommendations 
are reduced to twelve legal principles that have grown out 
7 
of this study and have been placed in a form that can be 
used more easily by school administrators in decision-making 
processes. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was limited to questions regarding the 
legal aspects of busing for desegregation as viewed and 
decided by the United States Supreme Court. Because this 
study was factual in theme and legal in nature, the study 
did not address such areas as (1) society, (2) politics, 
(3) religion, and (4) economics. The study did not touch 
on these areas because of the nature of judicial investiga­
tion. Although the writer recognized the importance of these 
areas to a complete study of busing, such research was beyond 
the practical limitations of this one study. 
Since the ultimate decisions concerning the legality 
of busing for desegregation lay within the final power of 
the United States Supreme Court, the primary source for 
research was an analysis of United States Supreme Court 
cases. This study necessarily included all significant 
United States Supreme Court cases relating to integration 
as a prelude to busing. Litigation began with Plessy in 
1896, proceeded through Brown in 1954, and ended with the 
study of Dayton in 1977. This study was thus limited to the 
United States Supreme Court decisions as of July 1, 1977. 
This review of such literature provided a setting in which 
to place our present day questions concerning busing. 
8 
An examination of such landmark cases as Green and 
Swann, for example, gave rise to the understanding of the 
Court's guidelines on such landmark cases. The limitations 
of this study should produce a more meaningful document to 
school administrations and school board members. 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
Action: Court proceedings: "a suit," the bringing of legal 
action against another for the protection of a right. 
Amicus Curiae: "friend of the Court," one who gives expert 
testimony to assist in the deliberation of the court. 
Appellant: a court or agency that reviews power. 
Concurring Opinion: The opinion of one of several judges 
which is in agreement with the majority yet for 
reason other than those of the majority. 
Court: The term Court is capitalized when it refers to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Dafendant: The party who is defending the propriety of his 
acts and whom the relief is brought against in a 
court action. 
de jure: Legislation that is made into law. In this study 
refers to law or policy that segregates. 
de facto: Refers to "from the fact of one's own authority." 
In this study it often refers to the natural distri­
bution of the population of a community although 
segregated. 
t 
9 
Dissenting Opinion: The differing opinion from the majority 
opinion of a judge sitting on a panel. 
Due Process: The provision that governmental power must 
protect the rights of the individual. 
En banc: The federal judges of one circuit sitting as a 
complete panel or court. 
Enjoin: A court ordering a defendant to do or not to do 
something by writ of injunction. 
Injunction: Judicial order that restrains a person or agency 
from a certain course of action. 
Litigation: A court "suit"? court action. 
Plaintiff: One in court who seeks relief for some injury 
to his rights. 
Remand: The returning of a court case from a superior court 
to an inferior court. 
Writ of Certiorari: (From Latin "to be informed of some­
thing" ). A court order that a higher court issues 
to a lower court requesting that court records be 
sent to the higher court for review. 
10 
CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE PRIOR TO BUSING 
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
In a momentous decision by the United States Supreme 
Court, the social fabric of America was changed. Chief 
Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
We conclude that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of "separate-but-equal" has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.1 
At the time this decision was handed down, in Brown 
v. Board of Education of Topeka, seventeen states actually 
practiced segregation as was required by state constitutional 
or statutory law. The states were Alabama, Arkansas, Dela­
ware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Caro­
lina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The 
four additional states that permitted segregation were Ari-
2 zona, Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming. 
C. Hudgins, Jr., The Warren Court and its 
Public Schools (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers 
and Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 76. 
2Ibid., p. 78. 
11 
LEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
The period of 1880 through the early 1900's brought 
about State laws that were directed toward keeping the black 
man "in his place." The so called "Jim Crow" term referred 
to laws and practices that were aimed at segregating the black 
man. According to C. Vann Woodward, the term "Jim Crow" 
came into use in the late 1800's and possibly referred to a 
song and dance called "Jim Crow" which was written by Thomas 
C. Rice. Although the origin of the term "Jim Crow" was 
3 uncertain, the connotation was clear. In speaking of "Jim 
Crow" practices Woodward stated: 
That code lent the sanction of law to a racial ostracism 
that extended to churches and schools/ to housing and 
jobs, to eating and drinking. Whether by law or by 
custom, that ostracism eventually extended to virtually 
all forms of public transportation, to sports and rec­
reation, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons and asylums, 
and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and ceme­
teries.4 
North Carolina and Virginia passed laws that did not 
allow fraternal organizations whereby individual members of 
different races in the membership would address each other 
as "brother." Alabama laws did not permit white female 
nurses to attend black male patients. New Orleans confined 
3 Alan Barth, Prophets With Honor, First Vintage 
Books Edition (New York: Random House, Inc., 1974), p. 26. 
4 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.7. 
12 
white and black prostitutes to different districts. In 
Birmingham, Alabama, blacks and whites were not legally 
allowed to play checkers or dominoes together, or even be 
5 xn each other's company. 
The laws, during this time period, were not without 
challenge. From 1865 to 1935 the school segregation laws 
were challenged thirty-seven times. In each case, however, 
the courts upheld the separate schools. Only nine of these 
cases proved somewhat successful. In most instances the court 
g 
found that inequality had not been proven. Only two cases 
were heard by the Supreme Court during some fifty years of 
7 de jure segregation. 
In taking a historical view of segregation two early 
legislative documents were important. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, 
proved to be a paradox of the time. Although neither the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 nor the Fourteenth Amendment men­
tioned education, each was concerned with the rights of 
every man and yet seemed to have provided the opportunity 
for a dual school system of education for Negroes and whites 
throughout the South. 
5 
Barth, Prophets With Honor. 
g 
Richard Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), p. 216. 
7 Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 75. 
13 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was designed to protect 
the freedman from the Black Codes and other repressive laws. 
In addition, the act gave citizenship to the Negro. Briefly, 
the statute stated: 
There shall be no discrimination in the Civil Rights 
of immunities among the inhabitants of any State or 
Territory of the United States on account of race, 
color, or previous conditions of slavery. . . .® 
The Fourteenth Amendment also gave definition to cit­
izenship, provided citizenship for the Negro, and gave cause 
for intervention by the federal government where violations 
of individual constitutional rights were proven. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was very 
precise in restriction of states enacting laws that limited 
the rights of citizens: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni­
ties of citizens of the United States: nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law? nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.9 
The question arose as to how states enacted laws which very 
clearly discriminated against Negroes in almost every area 
of life, including separate schools. The answer to the 
0 U. S. Congress, Senate, A Question of Intent, 
David J. Moys, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 
May 14, 1959, p. 2. 
9 United States, Constitution, Amendment XIV, 
Section 1. 
14 
question became somewhat clearer as the atmosphere of the 
time of the legislative enactment was investigated. 
During the debate on the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
House of Representatives, the Senate passed "an act donating 
certain lots in the city of Washington for schools for 
colored children in the District of Columbia." The legisla­
tion also provided funds for equitable apportionment of 
school funds to Negro schools.1^ 
During the course of the debate in the Senate, 
Senator Cowan expressed a concern that the amendment would 
end segregation in the schools. However, the bill's patron, 
Senator Trumball of Illinois, assured the Senator that the 
act affected only civil rights. The chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee stated, in opening debate, "... nor do they mean 
that their children shall attend the same schools."1'1' 
Soon after the Amendment was passed, Southern states 
enacted legislation that established separate schools for 
Negroes and whites. Alabama's law illustrated this by 
stating: 
The General Assembly shall establish, organize, and 
maintain a system of public schools in the state, for 
the equal benefit of the children, thereof, between 
the ages of seven and twenty-one; but separate schools 
shall be provided for the children of African descent. 
10U. S. Congress, Senate, A Question of Intent, 
p. 3. 
11Ibid., p. 2, Note 5. 
12 John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 61. 
15 
Legislation was often reflected in the social atti­
tude of its.people. John Dollard stated that "caste replaced 
slavery as a means of maintaining the essence of the old 
13 
status order in the South." Why were the laws not success­
fully challenged in the courts? Gunnar Myrdal stated the 
reasoning as: 
It is generally held that the Supreme Court acted in 
agreement with, and actually expressed what was then 
the general sentiment even in the North. The North 
had gotten tired of the Negro problem and, anyhow, saw 
no immediate alternative other than to let the white 
Southerners have their own way with the Negroes. But 
it must not be forgotten that the decisions of the 
Court had themselves a substantial share in the respon­
sibility for the solidification of Northern apathy.14 
In the North an apparent attitude of separate schools 
for Negro children existed as early as 1849. The laws in 
some northern and western states, however, were changed 
after the 1860•s. The issue of segregated schools arose in 
an early court case that questioned whether a general school 
committee could exclude a Negro child from attending a school 
nearest home when a special school was available for Negro 
children. 
15 Sarah C. Roberts v. The City of Boston was con­
cerned with a five-year-old Negro child in Boston who applied 
13 Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, p. 62. 
14 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: 
Harper and Row, Publisher^ 1962) , pT 516. 
15 
Sarah C. Roberts v. The City of Boston, 59 Massa­
chusetts (5 cushing) 198 (1849), cited by Chester M. Nolte, 
School Law in Action, 101 Key Decisions with Guidelines for 
School Administrators (West Nyack, N. Y.; barker Publishing 
Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 30, 31. 
16 
for a change to a school near the home. Admission was denied 
because the girl was black, and because of a special provision 
16 
set up for certain schools for colored students. 
The plaintiff applied for admission to the primary 
school nearest home, but the application was rejected. Ear­
lier the girl had petitioned the general primary school 
which referred the case to the district committee. The dis­
trict committee, however, denied admission. At this point, 
Sarah Roberts went directly to the school and was rejected 
17 by the teacher. The plaintiff sought a court order t-.hat 
would compel the defendant school board to pay damages under 
a statute that stated a qualified child could not lawfully 
18 
be excluded from public school instruction. 
Both the trial court and the appellate court held 
in favor of the defendant school board. Apparently the 
child was not excluded from school, and instruction was not 
closed for the student. The father, in fact, had denied 
Sarah Roberts1 admission by not applying at the school 
provided. 
The Roberts case was cited forty years later in the 
20 landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson. From the time of the 
16 
Sarah C. Roberts v. The City of Boston, cited by 
Nolte, School Law in Action, 101 Key Decisions, p. 30. 
17Ibid. 18Ibid. 19Ibid., p. 31. 
on 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
17 
Roberts case to the Brown I decision, the doctrine of sepa­
rate facilities was considered common law, and school boards 
had a constitutional right to provide separate schools for 
the instruction of Negro children and to prevent attendance 
in any other public school in the same district. This 
concept was overturned in the 1954 Brown decision by the 
Supreme Court which held that "separate but equal" facilities 
were unequal as well as unconstitutional. 
During the period of Reconstruction, Southern states 
were permitted to maintain separate schools for the races. 
Strangely enough, the challenge to separateness came from 
states other than those in the South. However, these cases 
brought approval of the segregated school, and no case was 
21 
found otherwise in the United States Supreme Court. 
A typical case of the time was a California case, 
22 Ward v. Flood. Litigation involved Mary Frances Ward, a 
black child who attempted to enroll in a public school near 
the San Francisco home. After being rejected by the prin­
cipal, the father, Noah H. Ward, appealed to the state court 
to have Mary admitted. The court, however, determined that 
the school principal may, on certain grounds, not enroll a 
child. The court further stated that privilege of attending 
the public school was not a privilege pertaining to or derived 
^Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, pt 90. 
22Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874). 
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from national citizenship. The court also pointed out that 
California's constitution guaranteed to children the benefits 
23 of a common school system. The court denied the writ be­
cause separate facilities were not considered to inherently 
discriminate more heavily against one race than another since 
each group was excluded from the other's school and did not, 
therefore, constitute the sort of denial of equal protection 
24 of the laws the Fourteenth Amendment forbade. 
The last federal civil rights legislation, until 
1957, came in 1875. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was designed 
to protect the civil and legal rights in that the act sought 
social, as well as political, equality for Southern Negroes. 
In part, the act stated: 
it enacted, that all persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States shall be entitled to the full and 
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facil­
ities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on 
land or water, theaters and other places of public amuse­
ment: subject only to the conditions and limitations 
established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of 
every race and color regardless of any previous condi­
tions of servitude.25 
This act went beyond the rights granted by Congress 
in the amendments drafted from Reconstruction. This legisla­
tion included very exact penalties for its violations by 
^Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874). 
24Ibid. 
25 Harry A. Ploski and Ernest Kaiser, The Negro Alma­
nac (New York: Bellwether Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), p. 132. 
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ordering fines or imprisonment, and further spoke of the 
possibility of the Supreme Court's having become involved 
26 in cases of violations. 
The Supreme Court ruled the act unconstitutional in 
1883. The case was heard along with a group of civil rights 
cases that challenged the constitutionality of this Civil 
Rights Act. The Court ruled that the Civil Rights act was 
unconstitutional because the act did not spring directly from 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
The view of the Court was that the Thirteenth Amendment was 
concerned exclusively with slavery and that the Congress did 
not have the power to counteract the effect of state laws or 
policies. This Supreme Court ruling actually deprived the 
Negro of the three post-war Freedom Amendments—the Thir-
27 
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth. 
One of Louisiana's "Jim Crow" laws was destined to 
become a Supreme Court landmark case. This statute concerned 
railway trains and was enacted to "promote the comfort of 
passengers on railway trains." The main purpose was to 
provide: 
All railway companies carrying passengers in their 
coaches in this State shall provide equal but separate 
accommodations. No person or persons shall be admitted 
to occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones assigned 
to them on account of the race they belong to.28 
Ploski and Kaiser, The Negro Almanac, p. 132. 
27Ibid., p. 252. 
OQ 
Barth, prophets With Honor, pp. 30-32. 
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The New Orleans Negro aristocracy was resentful of 
the anti-Negro feeling of the 18801s felt throughout the 
country. The Louisiana statute concerning separation of 
races on railroads was particularly distasteful to Negroes. 
The New Orleans Negro leaders were destined to test the con­
stitutionality of the law. Homer Plessy was sent to buy a 
first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway. The ticket 
placed the passenger in a first-class coach from New Orleans 
to Covington, Louisiana. Plessy was, by admission, seven-
eighths white and one-eighth Negro. Homer Plessy appeared to 
29 
be white. 
On June 7, 1892, Homer Plessy presented a first-class 
* • 
ticket and boarded the train. The man was seated in an 
orderly fashion in the first-class car reserved for white 
passengers. The conductor asked Plessy to move to the car 
entitled "colored." Plessy refused and was arrested by 
Detective Christopher C. Cain. The man was charged with a 
violation of the Louisiana statute. Plessy1s friends, who 
were members of the Citizens Committee to Test the Constitu­
tionality of the Separate Car Law, had employed two attorneys. 
' 30 
They were James C. Walker and Albios Winegar Tourgee. 
Tourgee was a well known carpetbagger of the Recon­
struction decades and a noted North Carolina leader. The 
29 
Barth, Prophets With Honor, pp. 30-32. 
30 John A. Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the 
Constitution (New York: Harper and Row, Publisher, 19647, 
p. 150. 
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attorney published six novels based on personal Reconstruc­
tion experiences. Tourgee practiced law in Greensboro, 
North Carolina, in 1865. Here, as a leader in the Republican 
Party, the lawyer had a prominent role in writing the new 
constitution for North Carolina. Later Tourgee served as a 
31 superior court judge for six years. 
As the Committee searched for legal counsel, the 
/ 
group wrote Tourgee, "We know we have a friend in you and we 
32 know your ability is beyond question." The attorney was 
told that the Committee's decision was made "spontaneously, 
33 
warmly and gratefully." 
A plea was entered before Judge John H. Ferguson of 
Criminal District Court for the Parish of New Orleans. 
Argument stated that the law Plessy was charged under was 
"null and void" and conflicted with the Constitution of the 
United States. Judge Ferguson ruled against Plessy, but a 
hearing was held on a writ of prohibition and certiori in 
34 November, 1892, in the State Supreme Court. The hearing 
was the origin of Plessy v. Ferguson. At a later hearing, 
Plessy was granted a writ of error that allowed the Negro 
man to seek redress before the Supreme Court of the United 
States• 
31 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, 
p. 148. 
32Ibid. 33Ibid. 34Ibid., p. 151. 
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Tourgee's argument before the Court was more dramatic 
than factual. Tourgee said: 
The crime, for which he became liable to imprisonment 
so far as the Court can ascertain, was that a person 
of seven-eighths Caucasian blood insisted on sitting 
peacefully and quietly in a car the State of Louisiana 
had commanded the company to set aside exclusively for 
the white race. Where on earth should he have gone? 
Will the Court hold that a single drop of African blood 
is sufficient to color a whole ocean of Caucasian white­
ness?^ 
/ 
Tourgee1s most lasting statement came when the 
leader said that "justice is pictured as blind, and her 
daughter, the law, ought at least to be color-blind." 
This comment must have made a lasting impression on Justice 
John Harlan because, in dissent, the Justice said that "our 
37 
Constitution is color-blind. ..." 
Tourgee did not find sympathy in the Court's deci­
sion concerning Plessy. On May 18, 1896, Associate Justice 
Henry Brown delivered the opinion of the Court: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's 
argument (that separate but equal facilities for black 
and white passengers was psychologically damaging to 
Negroes) to consist in the assumption that enforced 
separation of the two races stamp the colored race with 
a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by 
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because 
the colored race chose to put that construction upon 
it.38 
35 
Barth, Prophets With Honor, pp. 32-33. 
36Ibid., p. 33. 
3^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 558 (1896). 
38Ibid., p. 551. 
23 
So the doctrine of "separate but equal" was upheld 
by the United States Supreme Court. There was, however, a 
cry in the wilderness in Justice John M. Harlan's dissent: 
. . .  I n  v i e w  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i n  t h e  e y e  o f  t h e  
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, 
ruling, class of citizens. There is no caste here. 
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil 
rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The 
humblest is the peer of the most powerful.39 
During the next fifty-eight years the "separate but 
equal" doctrine was cited in most civil rights cases. How­
ever, application proved increasingly difficult becauso of 
the natural inadequacies. The Plessy doctrine applied to 
almost every phase of life, including education, even though 
Plessy was concerned with transportation. 
Three years after the Plessy decision was adjudicated 
on the cornerstone of "separate but equal," a United States 
Supreme Court decision was handed down in the case of 
40 
Cumming v. Board of Education. This case involved public 
schools. The issue in Cumming was to decide whether the 
only black high school that enrolled sixty students could 
be constitutionally closed so as to convert to a three 
hundred student elementary school, while at the same time 
maintain the white high school. The black high school was 
not to be opened at that time because of a lack of school 
^Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 558 (1896). 
40 Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 
175 U.S. 528, Ga. (1899T 
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funding. The injunction filed by the Negroes stated that an 
inequality existed because of the county's failure to pro­
vide a high school for Negroes while white students were 
furnished with a high school. In argument, the attorneys 
for the Negroes debated that separate schools were unconsti-
41 tutional. 
The Court was unanimous in refusing relief and found 
no evidence of racial discrimination. The Justices also 
held that the relief requested was improper in that closing 
the white high school would not remedy the wrong suffered by 
the Negroes. The Court held that because it would be "only 
tyranny" and because of economic conditions, Negro students 
were not deprived of their constitutional rights. Justice 
John M. Harlan delivered the Court's opinion and stated that 
the board could not be compelled, under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, to withhold funds for economic support for the white 
high school until support for the Negro high school was 
42 available. 
43 In Berea College v. Kentucky, the United States 
Supreme Court faced a case that involved a state-chartered 
private college. The question was whether the institution 
could separate the races for instruction. In the charter 
41 Cumminjg v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 
175 U.S. 531 (1899). 
42Ibid., p. 533. 
4^ 
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 54 Ky. (1308). 
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granted by the state of Kentucky, the provisions instructing 
both Negroes and whites were included for the students. 
However, the state of Kentucky's law stated that there would 
be no instruction in any educational institution for Negro 
and white students simultaneously. The real question in 
this case was the validity of this state law. 
The Court did not refer to the Plessy decision, but 
proceeded to uphold the Kentucky statute by other means. 
The Court declared that the state had a right to control the 
corporation. The state chartered college was considerad a 
corporation in this case. The state, the Court insisted, 
was right, under this statute, in providing for the separa­
tion of the races for educational instruction. 
The Court noted that the state had no right to prevent 
an individual, as opposed to a corporation, from teaching 
Negroes and whites together. A statute such as this was 
indeed in conflict with the Constitution because it denied 
44 
the individuals "powers which they may rightfully exercise0" 
This case stated clearly that separate facilities 
in tax-supported public school systems would suffer no censure 
45 from the Supreme Court. The Plessy doctrine was upheld, 
but weakened, because there had been doubt raised in reference 
^4Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 55 (1908). 
45 
Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, p. 152. 
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to a double standard—one standard for a corporation and one 
46 standard for an individual. 
47 
The 1927 case of Gong Lum v. Rice reached the 
United States Supreme Court and met the first challenge to 
actual segregation. The case concerned a nine-year-old 
Chinese girl who, after attending class for one-half day, 
was notified that the student was not to be in the all-white 
Rosedale School. The school officials offered the girl the 
option of attending the Negro school or attending a private 
school. 
A litigation was instituted by the father to admit 
the girl to the all-white school. The case raised the issue 
of whether a state could, for educational purposes, classify 
a Chinese child, born in the United States, and place the 
girl in the same grouping as Negro children. 
48 
Reference was made to Wong Him v. Callahan which 
stated, in part, that "when separate schools are provided for 
children of Chinese or Mongolian descent, such children 'must 
49 
not be admitted into any other schools.'" The case also 
debated what proportion of Negro blood constituted "colored." 
Reference was also made to Wall v. Oyster to show that the 
46 Nolte, School Law m Action, p. 34. 
^Gong Lum v. Rice 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
4^Wonq Him v. Callahan, C C 11 Fed 381 (1902). 
^Gonq Lum v. Rice 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
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1910 case proved that one-sixteenth proportion of Negro blood 
50 classified the individual as colored. 
Mr. Chief Justice William H. Taft delivered the opin­
ion of the Court by stating that no school was maintained in 
the district for the education of children of Chinese descent, 
and there were none in Balvan County. The father was a tax­
payer and the child was an educable citizen. The girl was 
not of Negro blood, nor mixed blood, but was of pure Chinese 
descent. The Supreme Court opinion declared most cases that 
had been cited arose over the establishment of separate 
schools as between black and white pupils, but the Court did 
not think that the question was any different or that any 
different result could be reached. Chief Justice Taft added, 
"assuming the cases cited to be rightly decided, where the 
issue is as between white pupils and the pupils of the yellow 
51 races." The Court declared that the state had the discre­
tion of regulating its public schools; and, in turn, this 
did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme 
Court of the United States affirmed the previous holdings of 
52 
the lower court. 
There was increasing doubt escalating over the jus­
tice in the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy. The 
~^33 Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D.C. 50, 31 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 180 (19I0T. 
"*"Gonq Lum v. Rice 275 U.S. 87 (1927). 
52Ibid. 
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majority opinion reflected the doubt when Chief Justice Taft 
stated that if the mandate had not been so often approved 
in the past, the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy 
might have necessitated a "very full argument and considera-
53 tion." In a sense Justice Taft apologized to the plain­
tiffs in the ruling when stating, "assuming the case (such 
54 as Plessy ar*d others cited) to be rightly decided. ..." 
The case illustrated the change of attitude of the 
Court as early as 1927 in that there was some inadequacy of 
the "separate but equal." The courts, however, revealed the 
extent of willingness to proceed to uphold the right of the 
state to promote segregation in the public schools. 
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL CASES 
The mid 1930's saw the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People leadership planning a systematic 
legal assault on the discrimination in the schools. The plan 
was to attack the South's reluctance to admit Negroes to 
Southern graduate professional schools such as state uni­
versity law schools. The considerations in adopting this 
strategy were based on the premise that the Southern states 
did not attempt to maintain equality in the professional 
schools. Thus the "separate but equal" was inappropriate. 
^Gonq Lum v. Rice 275 U.S. 85 (1927). 
54 3 Ibid. 
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Even if Southern states had tried to circumvent this plan 
by attempting to provide equal facilities for the Negro's 
graduate education, the expense was prohibitive. 
Thurgood Marshall, who later became an Associate 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, was appointed 
by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People in 1938 as special counsel in charge of such cases. 
In speaking of the emotions involved with the graduate school 
as opposed to the lower level schools, Marshall said: 
Those racial supremacy boys somehow think that little 
kids of six or seven are going to get funny ideas about 
sex and marriage just from going to school together, but 
for some equally funny reason, youngsters in law school 
aren't supposed to feel that way. We didn't get it, 
but we decided that if that was what the South believed, 
then the best thing for the moment was to go along.55 
The plan had slow beginnings but later precipitated 
outstanding results. In the mid 1930's# all Southern states 
and nearly half the United States still either required or 
C/r 
permitted segregation in the schools. Few doubted that 
Negro children were denied educational opportunities equal 
57 to that of white children. Yet the record of federal cases 
showed no serious breach in the color line as far as federal 
court decisions were concerned# until the Gaines case of 
1938.58 
55 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, 
pp. 253, 254. 
56Ibid., p. 254. 
57 58 
Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 73. Ibid., p. 18. 
30 
In the succeeding years, a number of cases having to 
do with higher education followed. The decisions of these 
cases appeared to spell the doom of the doctrine derived 
from Plessy. In the case of Lloyd Gaines, N.S.W. v. Canada, 
59 
Register of the University of Missouri, Gaines was denied 
admittance to the all-white University of Missouri Law 
School. Gaines, a Negro, was offered tuition to be paid by 
the state if the student would attend a law school in an 
adjoining state since Missouri provided no law school for 
Negroes. 
Although a separate opinion was delivered by Mr. 
Justice James C. McReynolds and Mr. Justice Pierce Butler 
who stated that Gaines ought to be satisfied since the 
"state had offered to pay his tuition at a nearby school of 
60 good standing," the Court struck down a statute offering 
educational segregation. Mr. Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes 
opined: 
Curators acted in accordance with educational policy 
in denying admission since the Legislature had said 
... Negroes could attend law school in another state 
with tuition paid pending the full development of Lin­
coln University. . . . The fact remains that instruc­
tion in law for Negroes is not now offered by the State, 
and the State excludes Negroes from the advantages of 
law school at the University of Missouri.61 
59 Gaines v. Canada, Register of the University of 
Missouri, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
60Ibid., p. 353. 61Ibid., pp. 344, 345. 
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Justice Hughes also noted that discrimination might 
be temporary because tuition outside the state was temporary 
until the establishment of a law department for Negroes at 
Lincoln University. Mr. Hughes wrote that the equality of 
legal education offered blacks and whites was "beside the 
point." The question was not the quality of education, 
but Hughes said: 
Its duty when it provides such training is to furnish 
it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an 
equality of right. By the operation of the laws of 
Missouri, a privilege has been created for white law 
students which is denied to Negroes because of their 
race.®3 
The Court's decision actually, in effect, affirmed 
the "separate but equal" doctrine, even for law schools. 
The only obligation the school had was to furnish facilities 
within its borders, for "legal education substantially equal 
to those which the State afforded for persons of the white 
race. 
Although Lloyd Gaines disappeared soon after the legal 
triumph and was never located again, the state did erect a 
separate law school for Negroes. Even though the principle 
65 
of "separate but equal" was left unimpaired, Gaines was a 
case wherein the Court considered the "equal" part of the 
Gaines v. Canada, Register of the University of 
Missouri* 305 U.S. 349 (1938). 
63Ibid., 64Ibid., p. 351. 
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separation principle because the Justices recognized the 
advantages to studying law in the state where people lived 
66 
and expected to practice. The Court's decision was that a 
state was required to allow Negroes to be admitted at the 
state university if equal educational facilities were not 
available. This created, in effect, a separate graduate 
school for Negroes. 
A similar case during the same time period went only 
to the Maryland Court of Appeals. In University of Maryland 
67 v* Murray, a twenty-year-old Baltimore Negro graduate of 
Amherst College rejected an out-of-state tuition grant when 
the man applied for admission to the University of Maryland 
Law School. The University did not admit Negro students to 
the law school, but as did many other states, the school 
offered scholarships allowing study outside of the state of 
Maryland. After being rejected, the student entered suit. 
The trial court issued a writ of mandamus, ordering the 
University to admit the Negro. The University appealed the 
case to the state's court of appeals; however, the appeals 
court sustained the lower court's ruling. The court stated 
that "equal treatment could only be furnished by the "one 
existing law school." The court stated that "the petitioner 
68 must be admitted then." 
66 
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^University of Maryland v. Murray, 165 MD. 478 (1935). 
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69 
A companion case followed in Bluford v. Canada. 
Suit was entered by Lucille Bluford, a Negro, against the 
University of Missouri School of Journalism. The United 
States District Court of Missouri emphatically reaffirmed 
that a state's right, under the Constitution of the United 
States, to furnish "separate but equal" schools for the races 
had not been, in any way, disparaged by the Gaines decision. 
The United States Supreme Court heard, per curiam 
(by the court without an opinion by an individual justice), 
70 
the case of Ada Lois Sipuel v. Board of Regents. This 
case, once again, was intent upon chipping away at the legal 
armor of the "separate but equal" doctrine. Thurgood Mar­
shall argued against the out-of-state grant offered to Ada 
Sipuel so that the girl could attend the University of Okla­
homa Law School. The Court ruled that the substitute of 
going to an out-of-state law school was inadequate. It 
further stated that the state must provide "equal protec­
tion" for Negroes as for other citizens. The writ also 
declared that Ada Lois Sipuel was entitled to immediate 
admission to the all-white Oklahoma Law School and the school 
could not wait until protection was requested since such pro­
tection had not been provided by the state in furnishing a 
Negro law school. The Court did not actually require admission 
ft Q 
Bluford v. Canada, 32 F. Supp. 707 (1940). 
70 
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
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at this point, but mandated the ruling later in Sweatt v. 
Painter in 1950. The state of Oklahoma met the requirements 
of the Court by setting up a law school for Negroes. How­
ever, Ada Lois Sipuel refused to attend. 
Two years later, in Parker v. University of Dela-
71 ware, a lower court concerned itself with the quality of a 
separate school, while at the same time, giving approval to 
the abstract principle of separate schools. The federal 
court ordered admission of a Negro to a white state college 
when finding the Negro college inferior. However, the 
Justices refused to hold that the latter was inferior merely 
because the school was segregated. 
June 5, 1950, proved to be an important day in the 
cause of desegregation because the United States Supreme 
Court handed down two important decisions in Sweatt v. 
72 73 
Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. The 
decision of the Court strengthened the opinion expressed in 
Gaines in matters of public education where the races were 
not equal. The Court stated there was a vast constitutional 
difference that had been imposed by the state. In pointing 
out this difference, the Supreme Court refused to uphold 
laws that separated the races for educational purposes. 
71 Parker v. University of Delaware 31 Del. 381, 
75A 2d 225 (1950). 
72Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
73 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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In Sweatt v. Painter the state of Texas tried to 
circumvent the equal protection questions by hastily setting 
up a separate Negro law school in the basement of a building 
near the capitol in Austin. Meantime, Herman Sweatt was 
denied admission to the University of Texas on the grounds 
that "separate but equal" was indeed the law of Texas. The 
University was restricted to admit white students in accor-
74 
dance with Texas state law. 
Herman Sweatt, a Houston mail carrier, was invited 
to attend the newly established law school. Instead, Sweatt, 
along with Thurgood Marshall, instituted suit against the 
state court asking for admission to the University of Texas 
Law School. Marshall presented a large number of legal and 
academic experts who testified to the inadequacy of the Negro 
law school as compared with the all-white University of 
Texas State Law School. The Texas Supreme Court ruled against 
75 Sweatt. 
The United States Supreme Court ordered Sweatt1s 
admission to the University's all-white law school as the 
Court recognized the inequality between the hastily erected 
law school at Austin and the University of Texas Law School. 
Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson declared: 
7 a 
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75Ibid., p. 632. 
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. . .  W e  c a n n o t  f i n d  s u b s t a n t i a l  e q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  e d u ­
cational opportunities offered white and Negro law 
students by the state. In terms of the number of 
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for special­
ization, size of the student body, scope of the library, 
availability of law reviews and similar activities, the 
University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater 
degree those qualities which are incapable of objective 
measurement, but which make for greatness in a law 
school. Such qualities, to name a few, include reputa­
tion of the faculty, experience of the administration, 
position and influence of the alumnae, standing in the 
community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to 
believe that one who had a free choice between these law 
schools would consider the question closed.7® 
Herman Sweatt was admitted to the University of Texas 
Law School. The fact that the student promptly flunked out 
did not damage the case's legal significance in that a 
state's attempt to provide overnight "separate but equal" 
77 facilities could not stand up in court. 
78 In McLaurin v. Oklahoma Regents, a decision of 
equal significance to Sweatt was handed down from the United 
States Supreme Court. The case centered around G. W. McLau­
rin, an Oklahoma Negro who was admitted to the University of 
Oklahoma Graduate School as a candidate for the degree of 
Doctor of Education. McLaurin was accepted because the Court 
compelled the University to admit him. The University 
attempted to maintain segregation internally by requiring 
^Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 633, 634 (1950). 
77 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitu­
tion, p. 256. 
78 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Edu­
cation, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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McLaurin to sit in a special section in the classroom that 
was surrounded by a rail that contained a sign reading, 
Reserved for Colored. In the library the student was 
required to sit at a designated place on the mezzanine floor. 
McLaurin was thus prohibited from using the regular desks in 
the reading room. In addition, the man was assigned to a 
particular table in the cafeteria as well as a designated 
time to eat that was different from the time other students 
would be eating in the cafeteria. 
In the opinion given by Chief Justice Frederic'.': M. 
Vinson, under the equal protection clause, the Court held 
that the Negro student must receive the same treatment at 
the hands of the state as students of other races. The 
opinion stated that the man might stand in line and talk 
with fellow students, but McLaurin must eat alone. The 
opinion rendered further said that: 
The result is that the appellant is handicapped in 
his pursuits of effective graduate instruction. Such 
restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, 
to engage in discussion, and to exchange views with other 
students: and, in general, to learn his profession.79 
The Court ruled that "state imposed restrictions 
80 
which produce such equalities cannot be sustained." The 
Court concluded that conditions under which this appellant 
was required to receive his education deprived the man 
79 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, 339 U.S. 641 (1950). 
80-,., 
Ibid. 
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of "personal and present right to equal protection of the 
laws." 
It was obvious to Marshall and others on his staff 
that Sweatt and McLaurin were milestones in the fight for 
the rights of the Negro. There had been much progress in 
winning admission for some black graduate students to white 
schools. However, it looked as if there would be a long 
struggle before the Negro public school students would be 
82 
allowed to attend school with white children. Clearly, 
the courts had actually done little to undermine the "sepa­
rate but equal" rule. The Court's findings seemed to 
strengthen the "separate but equal" rule since, in both 
cases, facilities were found not to be adequate because 
standards concerning the required "separate but equal" rule 
were not met. Apparently, states were not able to achieve 
equality at the graduate school level, but could achieve 
equality in the Negro public schools if enough resources, 
as well as sufficient time, was found. All over the South, 
white school boards were beginning programs for improving 
Negro public schools. Governor James Byrnes confessed that 
improvements had to be made to "remedy a hundred years of 
81 
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neglect" of the Negro education lest the Supreme Court "take 
83 matters out of the states' hands." 
A look in retrospect by H. C. Hudgins gave a clearer 
view of the tremendous blow to the "separate but equal" 
principle dealt by the university school cases. Hudgins 
stated: 
The significance of the university cases is manifest 
as one sees a gradual erosion of the separation doc­
trine. Both Gaines and Sipuel opened the way for blacks 
to attend white schools. McLaurin held that, once a 
school had been desegregated, its facilities must be 
made available to all alike? its students must be 
accorded equal treatment. Sweatt expanded the holding 
in showing a segregated school to be unequal and in 
pointing out intangible factors as measurements of 
potential success. It was these cases that actually 
provided the segregation in the public and elementary 
schools in a case to be heard by the Warren Court.84 
THE BROWN DECISIONS 
Apparently, the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People was placed in a quandary as to what 
strategy to pursue at this point. The states involved with 
segregation laws were seemingly in compliance with the doc­
trine of "separate but equal," and were, in fact, hastily 
attempting to bring about a more equal education for Negroes 
by the improvement of facilities and equipment and the upgrad­
ing of staff. 
83 
Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitu­
tion, p. 256. 
84 Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 19. 
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School boards in South Carolina and in Virginia1s 
85 
Prince Edward County rejected any gradualist program. John 
Garraty, in his book, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Consti­
tution, stated that Marshall had said: 
If the school boards in key Southern states had shown a 
general disposition to accept any kind of gradualist 
program combining more adequate schools with some pri­
mary and secondary desegregation, the Association might 
well have agreed to cooperate, at least for a time.8° 
At the New York National Strategy Conference of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
in 1950, Thurgood Marshall and the legal staff selected five 
key segregation suits at selected points around the nation. 
The suits were in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Dela­
ware. The fifth case was to be heard separately by the 
United States Supreme Court because the Congress, rather 
than a state legislature, governed the District of Columbia. 
The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People filed four suits in equity in federal district 
courts in the name of the Negro school children demanding 
admission to the all-white schools. The charges in the 
suits were based on the fact that the Negro schools were 
inferior to the white schools. The National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People also charged that the 
"separate but equal" idea violated the equal protection 
OC 
Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, 
p. 257. 
86TV. , Ibxd. 
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fifth suit, Boiling 
87 v- Sharpe, involving the District of Columbia, charged 
violation of due process in the Fifth Amendment. The dif­
ference in procedure was initiated so as not to challenge 
state action, since the Fourteenth Amendment restricted states 
but not Congress. 
88 In Briqgs v. Elliott, action was brought in the 
United States District Court in order to prevent the enforce­
ment of South Carolina's state constitution and statutes that 
required segregation of Negroes in Clarendon County. The 
United States District Court found the Negro schools inferior 
and ordered the state to equalize the Negro schools. How­
ever, the court upheld the state constitution as valid if 
the facilities were equal to the white schools. The court, 
in time, denied the Negro children the right to attend the 
white school during the period of equalization. There was 
to be a further report on the progress of equalization to 
the court within six months. There was an immediate appeal 
to the United States Supreme Court. The case was returned 
to the lower court to assess the progress toward equalization. 
The finding of the lower court stated that there was substan­
tial equality between the white and Negro schools with the 
exception of buildings. The case was then returned to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
8^Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
^Briggs v. Elliott, 103f Supp. 920 (1952). 
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The Prince Edward County, Virginia, case was known 
89 
as Davis v. County School Board. The events that led up 
to this case were somewhat typical of the five cases involved 
in Brown, as well as the attitude of the South at that time. 
This case, as well as the others involved in Brown, was the 
direct result of an organized effort to equalize the chasm 
of justice between the white and Negro schools. 
Prince Edward County was located in the southern part 
of Virginia. In 1950, the population consisted of forty-five 
90 percent Negroes. Although there was concern for the infer­
iority of all Negro schools by Negro parents in Prince Edward 
County, there was special concern for overcrowded and decrepit 
conditions of the Negro high school. Early in 1950, a plea 
was made by the Parent Teachers Association before the county 
school board for a new high school. After meeting on a reg­
ular basis for more than a year, and armed with facts and 
figures, Negroes were told that there was no money for a new 
high school. One of the Parent Teachers Association committee 
members stated: 
Finally we got them to agree to secure land for a new 
high school—if we could find a suitable plot, they'd 
buy it. We found a place, up where the new high school 
is now located, of sixty acres or more. But the Board 
then said they had no money to build with, and that we 
QQ 
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 103P Supp. 337 (1952). 
90August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, The Making of 
Black America, Vol. II (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 269• 
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need not come back; they'd notify us through the press 
when they were in the position to build. 
During this time period the students walked out and 
set up picket lines. The student leaders requested a con­
ference with the superintendent of schools: however, the 
superintendent refused to see the students unless the group 
returned to class. The students refused to return. Instead 
the leaders appealed to the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People for assistance. Litigation was 
initiated on the basis of abolishing the segregated school 
92 
system. 
A new black high school, costing $900,000, was com­
pleted during the 1953-54 school year. The school was well-
equipped with laboratories, shops, and a competent staff 
93 consisting of twenty-five teachers. 
The Virginia suit, as well as the other four suits, 
involved introducing extensive testimony from experts in 
social science, including the leading Negro psychologist, 
94 Kenneth Clark, from New York University. Professor Clark 
testified to the psychologically damaging effects of inferior 
91 
Meier and Rudwick, The Making of Black America, 
Vol. II, p. 269. 
Briqgs v. Elliott, 103f Supp. 920 (1952). 
93 Meier and Rudwick, The Making of Black America, 
Vol. II, p. 270. 
94 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 494, 
Note 11. 
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95 Negro schools. Kenneth Clark submitted a statement signed 
by thirty-two social scientists as expert witnesses. Clark's 
testimony was based on an experiment conducted with black 
96 children who ranged m age from three to seven. These 
children were in segregated Northern schools. Clark pre­
sented the children with both a brown doll with black hair 
and a light-colored doll with blond hair. The children were 
asked to pick the doll that was "nice" and "looked like you." 
The findings showed that the black children in the segregated 
school picked the white doll. Clark concluded that the study 
proved a "fundamental effect of segregation is basic con-
97 fusion in individuals and their concept about themselves." 
In Clark's opinion, the black children had been "definitely 
98 
harmed in the development of their personalities." 
After extensive testimony, the three-judge district 
99 court panel refused to grant relief to the plaintiff. The 
95 Kenneth B. Clark, "The Social Scientists, the Brown 
Decision, and Contemporary Confusion," in Argument; The Com­
plete Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, 1952-55, ed. Leon Friedman (New 
York: Chelsea House, 1969), pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. 
96 Ibid? also "The Effects of Segregation and the 
Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 
Appendix to Appellants' Briefs, Brown v. Board of Education 
as quoted in Kenneth B. Clark, Prejudice and Your Child 
(Boston, 1956), p. 168. 
97 Lino A. Groglia, Disaster by Decree (Ithaca, N. Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 27-28. 
99 Meier and Rudwick, The Making of Black America, 
Vol. II, p. 271. 
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lower court did indeed concede that the Negro school was 
"substantially inferior," but since the Prince Edward County 
school board was moving toward the construction of a new 
Negro school, "an injunction could accomplish nothing 
more. The plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court, on appeal, 
to overrule the district court's decision and to require 
that children be admitted to the all-white high school. 
Partial success was achieved in the New Castle County, 
102 
Delaware, case of Gebhart v. Belton. Action by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People attorneys 
on behalf of elementary and high school Negro students was 
to enjoin enforcement of segregation laws. The court granted 
an injunction and ordered the Negro children to be admitted 
to white schools on the grounds that this difference was 
"substantially unequal." The case was appealed to the 
Delaware Supreme Court which upheld the lower court. The 
court did not overturn Plessy, but rather the court implied 
that a more equal Negro school might, in the future, make 
racial segregation lawful. This decision was different from 
the Virginia and South Carolina decisions in that the ruling 
stated the "right of the plaintiff to equal facilities to be 
"^^Meier and Rudwick, The Making of Black America, 
Vol. II, p. 272. 
101Ibid. 
10? 
Gebhart v. Belton, 91A 2d 137 (1952). 
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103 present and personal." The court held that schools could 
be separate if currently equal. The decision was appealed, 
indicating that the state had not had a reasonable time to 
equalize Negro facilities. 
104 
The last of four cases to be cited in Brown was 
the case that commonly carried the citation for all four 
cases to the United States Supreme Court. This Kansas case 
arose from a complaint issued on behalf of eleven-year-old 
Linda Brown and other elementary school Negro children 
denied admission to state public schools that white children 
attended. The petition asked the district court to enjoin 
the enforcement of a Kansas statute which permitted cities 
of more than 15,000 population to maintain segregated school 
facilities in grades one through eight. The Topeka school 
board segregated elementary schools under this statute in 
grades one through six. 
Linda Brown was assigned to a Negro school and had 
to travel over four times as far to attend the white school. 
The suit attempted to enjoin the enforcement of the Kansas 
statute and to declare the law unconstitutional because 
segregation created inferiority and was, therefore, a denial 
105 of due process and equal protection. 
103 
Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 78. 
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The brief filed by the Topeka school board offered 
historical evidence that the intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not to dispose of segregation. The defense 
also stated a dislike of "federal interference" in the state 
schools. The argument further stated that white and Negro 
schools had been equalized, or were being equalized, with 
respect to buildings, curriculum, qualifications and sal-
1 Ofi 
aries of teachers, and other tangible factors. 
The United States District Court agreed that segre­
gation in the public school was psychologically detrimental 
107 
to Negro children. However, the court chose not to over­
throw Plessy. The court found the schools in question sub­
stantially equal with respect to tangible factors. The court 
felt bound by previous decisions made by the Supreme Court 
108 and ruled that absolute equality was impossible. The Kansas 
case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The 
Topeka school board, however, abolished elementary school 
109 
segregation under the Kansas local option clause in 1953. 
The cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Delaware were re-argued in the United States Supreme Court. 
106 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 486, 
Head Note 1. 
107 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitu­
tion, p. 259. 
108 
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There was a total of seventeen other states that required 
segregation by law. The states were Alabama, Arkansas, Dela­
ware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Caro­
lina, West Virginia, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. More­
over, four states had laws permitting segregation—Arizona, 
Kansas, New Mexico, and Wyoming. 
Upon acceptance of the four cases, the Court joined 
and referred to the suit as Brown, on appeal in 1952. In 
the December, 1952, session, the United States Supreme Court 
heard arguments concerning questions previously asked by the 
Court. The lawyers for the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People contended Plessy had been 
decided in error, or in any event, was in error.Attorney 
General Edward McGranahan filed a brief as amicus curiae 
requesting the Supreme Court to declare school segregation 
invalid under the equal-protection clause. Also, some thirty 
social scientists, including Kenneth Clark, attacked school 
segregation by declaring that segregation did vast psychic 
damage to Negro and white children. A powerful argument was 
presented, in defense, for the school boards by John W. Davis, 
112 a noted constitutional lawyer. 
^""^Hudgins, The Warren Court, p. 78. 
^^Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitu­
tion, p. 265. 
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In re-argument, the Court directed: 
In their brief, and on oral argument, counsel are reques­
ted to discuss particularly the following questions in 
so far as they are relevant to the respective cases: 
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which 
submitted, and the State legislatures and con­
ventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, 
contemplated or did not understand that it would 
abolish segregation in public schools? 
2. If neither the Congress, in submitting, nor the 
States, in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, 
understood that compliance with it would require 
the iiranediate abolition of segregation in pub­
lic schools, was it nevertheless the understand­
ing of the framers of the Amendment 
(a) that future Congress might, in the exer­
cise of their power under section 5 of 
the Amendment, abolish such segregation, 
or 
(b) that it would be within the judicial 
power in the light of future conditions, 
to construe the Amendment as abolishing 
such segregation of its own force? 
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 
2(a) and (b) do not dispose of the issue, is it 
within the judicial power, in construing the 
Amendment, to abolish segregation in public 
schools? 
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in pub­
lic schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment, 
(a) would a decree necessarily follow that, 
within the limits set by normal geographic 
school districting, Negro children should 
forthwith be admitted to schools of their 
choice, or 
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its 
equity powers, permit an effective grad­
ual adjustment to be brought about from 
existing segregated systems to a system 
not based on color distinctions? 
5. On the assumption, on which questions 4(a) and (b) 
are based, and assuming further that the Court 
will exercise its equity powers to the end 
described in question 4(b), 
(a) should this Court formulate detailed 
decrees in these cases; 
(b) if so, what specific issues should decrees 
reach j 
(c) should this Court appoint a special master 
to hear evidence with a view to recommend­
ing specific terms for such decrees: 
50 
(d) should this Court remand to the courts 
of first instance with directions to 
frame decrees in these cases; and, if 
so# what general directions should the 
courts of first instance follow in arriv­
ing at the specific terms of more 
detailed decrees?1!3 
The Court apparently turned its sympathy to the cause 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People and decided to re-examine the original meaning of the 
114 Fourteenth Amendment. The Court searched for some rational 
justification for setting aside the "separate but equal" 
115 
doctrine of the long lasting Plessy decision. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall turned to the world of 
experts for answers to these questions—a decision he later 
116 
evaluated as the "smartest move I ever made in my life." 
Mr. Marshall called a total of 130 social scientists. The 
brief that was prepared argued from the viewpoint of legal 
advocacy rather than history. In the final decision the 
Court put aside the historical argument and did not attempt 
to "resolve the problem." Rather the decision was based on 
117 "sociological" grounds. 
113 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 972 
(1953). 
114 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitu­
tion, p. 260. 
115Ibid. 116Ibid. 
117 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 489 
(1954). 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, acting as amicus 
curiae, stated the position of the Eisenhower Administration 
and the Republican Party. The brief stated that the Four­
teenth Amendment's authors' intent was not conclusive. How­
ever, the broad egalitarian purpose was to "secure for 
Negroes full and complete equality before the law, and to 
118 
abolish all legal distinctions based upon race." The 
brief also suggested a one-year transition period in the 
South because of complicated racial and educational problems 
involved. 
Briefs from the defense lawyer emphasized the fact 
that the Reconstruction Congress had voted funds for segre-
119 gated schools in the District of Columbia. Defense stated 
that the Fourteenth Amendment intent was not to strike down 
segregation in schools. South Carolina argued to ensure 
states' rights by saying: 
The people of South Carolina may, on the exercise of 
their judgment, based on a first-hand knowledge of 
local conditions, decide that the state objective of 
free public education is best served by a system con­
sisting of separate schools for white and colored 
children.120 
The Court handed down a unanimous decision on May 17, 
1954. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the opinion. Justice 
Warren introduced the decision with a brief history of the 
118 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitu­
tion, p. 265. 
119Ibid. 120Ibid., p. 266. 
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case and the background. Warren addressed the issue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intent by insisting: 
It covered, exhaustively, consideration of the Amendment 
in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing 
practices in racial segregation, and the views of the 
proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This dis­
cussion and our own investigation convince us that, 
although these sources cast some light, it is not 
enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. 
At best, they are inconclusive.121 
Justice Warren further referred to the condition of 
Southern education at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
drafted as the reason that education was not mentioned in 
122 the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice Warren continued by discussing Plessy and the 
six cases that followed Plessy involving the "separate but 
equal" doctrine, as well as the graduate school cases, as 
having failed to reexamine the doctrine. Mr. Warren summarized 
the Court's position by saying: 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 
1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must 
consider public education m the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life 
throughout the nation. Only in their way can it be 
determined if segregation in public schools deprives 
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.123 
Justice Warren further spoke of the value of educa­
tion by stating: 
121 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 489 
(1954). 
122Ibid., p. 490. 123Ibid., p. 492. 
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It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it 
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cul­
tural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment.124 
Chief Justice Warren then proceeded to a fundamental 
question by asking: 
Does segregation of children in public schools solely 
on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities 
and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the 
children of the minority group of equal educational oppor­
tunities? We believe that it does.125 
At this point Justice Warren rejected Plessy by 
stating: 
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological know­
ledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding 
is amply supported by modern authority. Any language 
in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is 
rejected. We conclude that in the field of public edu­
cation the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.126 
This put to rest plans many Southern school boards were 
carrying out to build and improve the all-Negro schools. 
Finally Justice Warren insisted: 
We have now announced that such segregation is a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws.127 
Senator Hubert Humphrey's assessment of the Brown 
decision was: 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
the segregation cases of May 17, 1954, was one of the 
124 Brown v. Board of Educatxon of Topeka, 347 U.S. 493 
(1954). 
125Ibid. 126Ibid., pp. 494, 495. 127Ibid., p. 495. 
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great moments of our time and one of the profound turn­
ing points of American history.-*-28 
And so, in an effort to desegregate the American 
society, the long sought milestone was reached. The step 
was only a milestone. The greatest obstacle to a massive 
desegregation of society was overcome in the Brown decision. 
An important battle was won, but the war continued. The 
Court did not decide how desegregation was to be administered. 
All cases under Brown were sent back to district court for 
hearing, in implementing Brown. 
129 Boiling v. Sharpe, a fifth case decided the same 
day as Brown, was adjudged as a separate suit. The case was 
not encompassed under the umbrella of Brown because Brown 
dealt with a challenge to states governed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Since the District of Columbia was governed by 
the Congress, the same issue was not appropriate. The action 
taken in Boiling, however, was questioning the due process 
in the Fifth Amendment which read: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in 
actual service in time of war or public danger: nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb: nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
128 
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due process of law: nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.-30 
Litigation was initiated because Negro children were 
excluded from an all-white junior high school. The case 
questioned segregation as being unconstitutional in the Dis­
trict of Columbia. The question was raised concerning the 
legal statutes of the District of Columbia school board's 
operating a segregated school system. The defense for the 
school board moved for dismissal on the grounds that unequal 
facilities had not been questioned. The case was then heard 
by the United States Supreme Court. Chief Justice Warren 
delivered the opinion by saying in part: 
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related 
to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes 
on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden 
that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their lib­
erty in violation of the Due Process Clause.131 
This opinion caused the Boiling case to be placed for re-
argument along with the other four cases of Brown. 
John A. Garraty, author of Quarrels That Have Shaped 
the Constitution, evaluated the Brown decision correctly by 
stating: 
The Court's decision, handed down on May 17, 1954, could 
hardly have occasioned any great surprises either to pro­
ponents or enemies of segregated schools.^32 
130 United States, Constitution, Amendment V. 
"^Boiling v. Sharps, 347 U.S. 499 (1954). 
132 Garraty, Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitu­
tion, p. 267. 
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A look at the cases preceding Brown indicated the decision 
placed before the Supreme Court of 1954 was no less than the 
greatest victory for the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People. Decisions such as Gaines, Sipuel, 
McLaurin, and Sweatt predicted the direction of this Court. 
Following Brown I, Arkansas, Maryland, Missouri, West 
Virginia, Delaware, Arizona, New Mexico, and the District of 
Columbia at least partially desegregated their school systems. 
The Court's action set off litigations throughout the South 
by petitioning local school boards to desegregate the all-
133 white schools. 
A final act concerning Brown was played out in fur­
ther re-argument as ordered by the Supreme Court concerning 
what kind of decree the Court should issue. Re-argument 
came from the United States Attorney General, the states of 
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Maryland, and 
Texas, as well as the parties involved. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren reiterated the necessary 
implications of Brown by saying: 
These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions 
of that date, declaring the fundamental principle that 
racial discrimination in public education is unconstitu­
tional, are incorporated herein by reference. All pro­
visions of federal, state or local law requiring or 
permitting such discrimination must yield to this prin­
ciple.134 
133 Peter M. Bergman, The Chronological History of the 
Negro in America (New York: The New American Library, 1969), 
p. 536. 
134firown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 298 
(1955). : . ' 
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The question of who would carry out the order was 
discussed by Justice Warren by insisting: 
Full implementation of these constitutional principles 
may require solution of varied local school problems. 
School authorities have the primary responsibility for 
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; 
courts will have to consider whether the action of school 
authorities constitutes good faith in the implementation 
of the governing Constitutional principles.13^ 
The Court made the controversial stand concerning 
time. Hopes of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People were that a more specific time would be 
ordered by the Court. However, pertaining to time, the 
Court stated: 
While giving weight to the public and private consid­
erations, the Court will require that the defendants 
make a prompt and reasonable start toward full com­
pliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling.136 
The Court continued with an outline of procedure and 
time by saying: 
Once such a start has been made, the courts may find 
that additional time is necessary to carry out the 
ruling in an effective manner. 
Chief Justice Warren placed the burden of compliance 
on the defendants by insisting: 
The burden rests upon the defendants to establish such 
time as is necessary in the public interest, and is 
consistent with good faith in compliance at the ear­
liest practicable date.137 
135 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 299 
(1955). 
136Ibid., p. 300. 137Ibid. 
58 
Justice Warren suggested problem areas to be consid­
ered in the desegregation process when he reasoned: 
To that end, the Court may consider problems related to 
administration, arising from the physical conditions 
of the school plant, the school transportation system, 
personnel, revisions of school districts and attendance 
areas into compact units to achieve a system of deter­
mining admission to the public school on a nonracial 
basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which 
may be necessary in solving the foregoing problem.I38 
Finally Justice Warren remanded the case to the dis­
trict courts to implement consistent with the Court's order. 
In addition, concerning time, the opinion declared: 
The judgments below, except that in the Delaware case, 
are accordingly reversed, and the cases are remanded 
to the district courts to take such proceedings and 
enter such orders and decrees consistent with this 
opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public 
schools on a racially nondiscrimination basis with all 
deliberate speed, the parties to these cases.139 
Brown II of 1955 sought relief from Brown I of 1954. 
Brown II remanded the cases to the federal district courts 
and charged the local school boards with the burden of insti­
tuting plans to desegregate. The Court did, however, outline 
some of the problems of the desegregation process, while at 
the same time the Supreme Court required the local boards to 
proceed with "all deliberate speed." 
138 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE DESEGREGATION PROCESS 
THE EVASIVE DESEGREGATION CASES 
Two years after Brown II, a decision regarding pri­
vate schools in Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City 
Trusts of the City of Philadelphia was initiated."'" The case 
involved Girard College and its refusal to admit two Negro 
boys, aged six and ten. The "college" was operated under 
a trust fund left by Stephen Girard and managed under trus­
teeship by the city of Philadelphia mandated by the state 
statute. 
The institution was all white at the time of request 
for admission by the two Negro youths. Upon rejection of 
admittance, legal action was instituted against the board of 
directors contesting the refusal as a violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment. Relief was denied by the Pennsylvania 
2 Supreme Court. 
The case was heard by the United States Supreme Court 
in a brief per curiam opinion. The opinion first established 
^"Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts 
of the City of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). 
2Ibid., 1 L ed 2d 792. 
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that the two Negro boys were otherwise qualified for admit­
tance by stating: 
In February, 1954, the petitioners, Foust and Felder, 
qualified for admission to the "college." They met all 
qualifications except that they were Negroes. For this 
reason the Board refused to admit them.' 
Chief Justice Earl Warren insisted the Board of 
Trustees was a state agency by virtue of being created by 
the State Legislature: 
The Board which operates Girard College is an agency 
of the State of Pennsylvania; therefore, even though the 
Board was acting as a trustee, its refusal to admit 
Foust and Felder to the college because they were Negroes 
was discrimination by the State. Such discrimination is 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 
At this point Justice Warren cited Brown I and con­
tinued: 
. . .  t h e  j u d g m e n t  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  P e n n s y l v n n i a  
is reversed and the case is remanded for further pro­
ceedings not inconsistent with the opinion.5 
This case clearly illustrated the relationship of 
the state and desegregation. The Court implicitly stated 
that the state must not participate, in any manner, in dis­
criminatory practice.^ 
7 In Cooper v. Aaron the power of a state government 
to refuse to obey a federal court order was questioned when 
3 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts 
of the City of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 1 L ed 2d 792. 
4Ibid., p. 231. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 
7 Cooper, Members of the Board of Directors of the 
Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 20 (1958). 
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it applied to Brown I. The case drew national attention when 
nine Negro children sought to integrate Central High School 
in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
The Little Rock school board adopted policy to carry 
out the intent of Brown I. Meantime, state authorities 
amended the state's constitution. This legislation opposed 
the United States Supreme Court's decisions of May 17, 1954, 
8 and May 31, 1955. The plan adopted by the school board 
would: (1) initiate integration at the senior high school; 
(2) junior high integration was to occur later; and (3) the 
elementary school was to be integrated. Integration was 
scheduled to begin in 1957 and to be completed by 1963. How­
ever, Negroes wanted a more immediate schedule of integra-
9 tion. Relief was sought in the district court and the 
court of appeals where the school board's plan was upheld. 
As Little Rock Central High School opened doors in the fall 
of 1957, nine Negro students appeared for the purpose of 
enrolling. Governor Orval Faubus, however, had dispatched 
units of the Arkansas National Guard to prevent integration.^ 
After three weeks of opposition, the district court and the 
attorney general enjoined Governor Faubus and the National 
o 
Chester M. Nolte, School Law in Action, 101 Key 
Decisions with Guidelines for School Administrators (New 
York: Parker Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), p. 207. 
9Ibid. 
"^Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 21. 
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Guard. Therefore, the Guard was removed.1"*" Although on 
September 23 nine Negroes entered the high school, the 
students withdrew when a very hostile crowd appeared. Pres­
ident Dwight Eisenhower ordered federal troops to the school 
12 site, where they remained for two weeks. President Eisen­
hower then federalized tha Arkansas National Guard and placed 
13 the troops at the school for the entire school year. The 
school board asked for a postponement of the desegregation 
plan as well as removal of Negro students at Central High 
School. The district court did grant relief, but the circuit 
court reversed the decision. Argument was heard by the 
United States Supreme Court in special session. The decision 
of the circuit court was affirmed. The issue in the case 
was whether the governor and State Legislature were obligated 
to obey federal court orders, such as in Brown. 
Chief Justice Warren delivered the Court1s opinion 
by stating, in part: 
The conditions they depict are directly traceable to 
the action of legislators and executive officials of 
the State of Arkansas, taken in their official capaci­
ties, which reflect their own determination to resist 
this Court's decision in the Brown case, and which have 
brought about violent resistance to the decision in 
Arkansas.14 
^Nolte, School Law in Action, p. 207. 
12Ibid. 13Ibid. 
14 Cooper, Members of the Board of Directors of the 
Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 20 (1958). 
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Justice Warren further emphasized the position of the 
Court concerning Arkansas by insisting: 
. . .  T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s  o f  c h i l d r e n  a r e  n o t  t o  
be discriminated against in school admission on grounds 
of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown 
case can neither be nullified openly and directly by 
state legislators or state executive or judicial offi­
cers/ nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive 
schemes for segregation, whether attempted "ingeniously 
or ingenuously. 
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Felix Frank­
furter, in October, 1958, spoke of responsibility by stating: 
That the responsibility of those who exercise power in 
a democratic government is not to reflect inflamed pub­
lic feeling, but to help form its understanding, is 
especially true when they are confronted with a problem 
like a racially discriminating public school system.^ 
Little Rock high schools were closed for the 1958-1959 
school year by Governor Orval E. Faubus to prevent "violence 
and disorder." Schools were reopened after school closing 
17 laws were declared unconstitutional by a federal court. 
In Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knox-
18 ville, Tennessee, the question was raised concerning whether 
a desegregation plan was valid if the plan entitled a stu­
dent, on the basis of race and the racial composition of the 
assigned school, to transfer from a school, where the student 
"^Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 17 (1958). 
16Ibid., p. 26. 
17 Harry A. Ploski and Ernest Kaiser, The Negro Almanac 
(New York: Bellwether Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), p. 30. 7 
18 Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee, 
373 U.S. 683T1963T 
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was in a minority, back to a school where the pupil would be 
in racial majority. The case was decided, in 1963, with the 
Court's opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark. 
Shortly after reiterating the desegregation plan as well as 
the question, Justice Clark stated the findings of the Court, 
based on Brown II: 
The transfer plans, being based solely on racial fac­
tors , which under their terms, inevitably lead toward 
segregation of the students by race, we conclude that 
they run counter to the admonition of Brown v. Board of 
Education, wherein the District Court was directed to 
"consider the adequacy of any plan" proposed by school 
authorities "to effectuate a racially nondiscriminatory 
school system." Our conclusion here leads to reversal 
of the judgments of the Court of Appeals to the extent 
they approve the transfer provision of respondent boards 
in each of the cases. The only question with which we 
are here concerned relates solely to the transfer pro­
visions and we are not called upon either to discuss or 
to pass on the other provisions of the desegregation 
plan. 
Again Justice Clark expressed concern about the plan 
operating with transfer procedures based on race: 
It is readily apparent that the transfer system proposal 
lends itself to perpetuation of segregation. ... While 
transfers are available to those who choose to attend 
school where their race is in the majority, there is no 
provision whereby a student might transfer upon request 
to a school in which his race is in a minority, unless 
he qualifies for "a good course" transfer. ... This 
Court has decided that state-imposed separation in public 
schools is inherently unequal, and results in discrimina­
tion in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 
19 Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee, 
373 U.S. 684, 685 (1963) 
20Ibid., p. 683. 
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Justice Clark then looked at the major issue of the 
case and gave some indication of guidelines that would be 
acceptable to the Court: 
Our task then is to decide whether these transfer pro­
visions are likewise unconstitutional. In doing so, 
we note that if the transfer provisions were made 
available to all students regardless of the racial com­
position of the school to which they requested transfer, 
we would have an entirely different case. Pupils could 
then, at their option, (or that of their parents) choose, 
entirely free of any imposed racial consideration, to 
remain in the school of their zone or to transfer to 
another. 
In Goss, guidelines were given by the Court which 
stated that transfer provisions must be made available to all 
students regardless of race and social composition of the 
intended school. The Court was actually saying that a trans­
fer plan which used social factors in the operation was 
depriving Negro students of constitutional rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The same day decision in Goss was handed down, another 
segregation case was decided in McNeese v. Board of Education 
22 for School District 187, Cahokia, Illinois. This Illinois 
case arose over the questions of the transfer of students 
from Centreville School to Chenot School and internally seg­
regated assignments of students. Allegedly, the Chenot School 
21 Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, Tennessee, 
373 U.S. 687ll963T^ 
22 McNeese v. Board of Education School District 187 
Cahokia, Illinois, 373 U.S. 668 (1963). 
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was a segregated school and in conflict with the rights as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 
The attendance boundaries were redrawn for the Chenot 
School in 1957 because of overcrowded conditions in the 
nearby Centreville School. The fifth and sixth grade classes 
of Centreville were transferred to Chenot. There classes 
consisted of 97 percent white students4 The enrollment-
ment at Chenot changed to 251 Negro and 254 white. The white 
23 students came from Centreville. At Chenot School all but 
eight Negro students transferred from Centreville School. 
Separate exits and entrances were assigned to Negro students. 
Relief was asked by plaintiffs. This included regis­
tration of the Negro students in an integrated school that 
was in compliance with a plan approved by the district 
24 
court. 
In the district court the board moved for dismissal 
on the grounds that plaintiffs had not esdiausted prescribed 
Illinois laws which were administrative remedies for such 
situations. The district court granted the motion. On a 
petition of writ of certiorari the case was heard, in the 
Supreme Court. The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice 
25 William 0. Douglas. Justice John M. Harlan dissented. 
23 
McNeese v. Board of Education School District 187 
Cahokia, Illinois, 373 U.S. 669 (1963). 
24Ibid. 25Ibid., p. 678. 
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Justice Douglas cited a precedent in dealing with the 
state actions as a prerequisite to federal proceedings when 
he stated: 
We have previously indicated that relief under the Civil 
Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not 
first sought under state law which provided a remedy.26 
He then cited Monroe v. Dape 365 U.S. 167, as a prec­
edent to this case. Justice Douglas continued by summarizing 
the Court's opinion: 
It is no answer that the State has a law which would give 
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state 
remedy and the latter need not be first sought and 
reused before the federal one is involved.2' 
Justice Harlan's dissent began with a question from 
Burford v. Sun Oil Company, "... assuming that the federal 
district court had jurisdiction, should it, as a matter of 
sound equitable discretion, have declined to exercise that 
28 jurisdiction here?" Mr. Harlan further stated that this 
approval had been used by lower federal courts. 
The dissent determined that this should be left to 
local authorities: 
The alleged discrimination practices relate rather to 
the manner in which this particular school district 
was formed and the way in which the internal affairs of 
the school are administered. These are matters in 
McNeese v. Board of Education School District 187 
Cahokia, Illinois, 373 U.S. 671 (1963). 
27 
Ibid. 
^Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317, 318, 
87L ed 1424, 63 SG 1098. 
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which the federal courts should not initially become 
embroiled. Their exploration and correction, if need 
be, are much better left to local authority in the 
final instance.29 
Justice Harlan stated that the state of Illinois, 
prior to Brown, had provided for dealing with discrimination: 
Finally, we shall be slow to hold, unavailing, an admin­
istrative remedy afforded by a state which long before 
Brown v. Board of Education ... had outlawed, both by 
its constitution and statutes, racial discrimination in 
the public schools, and which since Brown has passed 
the further implementing legislation drawn in question 
in the litigation.30 
Therefore a ruling resulted because of the federal 
Civil Rights Act. To exhaust the state's system of recourse 
before relief was sought in federal court was not necessary. 
Another guideline was set down in procedures for handling 
segregation suits. 
In 1964 Prince Edward County, Virginia, was once 
again brought back to the attention of the Supreme Court in 
Griffin.31 Prince Edward County was one of the original 
cases consolidated in Brown I. The case evolved from an 
attempted plan for closing the county's public schools and 
operating segregated private schools by using public funds 
contributed for support. This suit was filed in district 
court in an attempt to enjoin the school board from failing 
to provide public schools for the county and to enjoin the 
29 
McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 677 (1963). 
30Ibid., p. 679. 
31 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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use of public funds in support of the private segregated 
32 schools. The district court found the county1s public 
schools could not be closed in order to circumvent desegre­
gation while other public schools in the state were being 
operatedo Upon appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, with one dissent, by insisting that the district 
court should have abstained in order to await the state 
court's determination concerning the validity of tuition 
33 grants as well as the closing of the public schools. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
by stating: 
In view of the long delay in the case since our decision 
in the Brown case and the importance of the question 
presented, we grant certiorari, and put the case dov/n 
for argument March 30, 1964, on the merits as we have 
done in other comparable situations without waiting 
for final action by the Court of Appeals.34 
Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion. 
First a summary of the events was given, and then Justice 
Black dealt with the position of the Court by stating: 
For reasons to be stated, we agree with the District 
Court that, under the circumstances here, closing the 
Price Edward County Schools, while public schools in 
all the other counties of Virginia were being maintained, 
32 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 377 U.S. 224 (1964). 
33 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward 
322 F 2d 332 (1963). 
34 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
375 U.S. 391, 392 (1964). 
County, 
County, 
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denied the petitioners and the class of Negro students 
they represent the equal protection of the law guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.35 
Justice Black addressed the question of local or 
state responsibility in actual closing of the Prince Edward 
County Schools by stating: 
While a holding as to the constitutional duty of the 
Supervisor and other officials of Prince Edward County 
may have repercussions over the State and may require 
the District Court's orders to run to parties outside 
the county; it is, nevertheless, true that what is 
attacked in the suit is not something which the State 
has commanded Prince Edward to do—close its public 
schools and give grants to children in private schools— 
but rather something which the county with state 
acquiescence and cooperation has undertaken to do on 
its own volition, decision not binding on any other 
county in Virginia. ... We hold that the single Dis­
trict Judge did not err in adjudicating the present 
controversy.3® 
Justice Black then looked at the reason for closing 
the county schools as: 
. . .  t o  e n s u r e ,  t h r o u g h  m e a s u r e s  t a k e n  b y  t h e  c o u n t y  
and the State, that white and colored children in 
Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, 
go to the same school.37 
Mr. Black adjudged the reasons for closing as a denial 
of equal protection by saying: 
Whatever non-racial grounds might support a State1s 
allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object 
must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and 
opposition to desegregate do not qualify as constitu­
tional. 38 
35 
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 375 U.S. 225 (1964). 
36Ibid., p. 228. 37Ibid., p. 231. 38Ibid. 
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Justice Black turned then to the question of the 
decree for implementing the Court's judgment: 
That relief needs to be quick and effective. ... The 
Board of Supervisors has the special responsibility to 
levy local taxes to operate public schools or to aid 
children attending the private schools now functioning 
there for white children. The District Court enjoined 
the county officials from paying county tuition grants 
or giving tax exemptions and from processing applica­
tions for state tuition grants so long as the county's 
public schools remained closed.39 
Justice Black directed the district court to require 
financial support if necessary by saying: 
. . .  t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  m a y ,  i f  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r e v e n t  
further racial discrimination, require the Supervisors 
to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to 
raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain, 
without racial discrimination, a public school system 
in Prince Edward County like that operated in other 
counties in Virginia.40 
Mr. Justice Black closed the opinion in summary: 
The time for mere "deliberate speed" has run out, and 
that phrase can no longer justify denying these Prince 
Edward County school children their constitutional 
rights to an education equal to that afforded by the 
public schools in the other parts of Virginia.41 
Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark and Mr. Justice John M. 
Harlan filed a concurring and dissenting opinion and insisted 
that federal courts did indeed have the power to reopen the 
42 public schools of Prince Edward County. They otherwise 
43 joined the Court's majority opinion. 
39 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 375 U.S. 232 (1964). 
40Ibid., p. 233. 41Ibid., p. 234. 
42 43 
Ibid., p. 235. Ibid., p. 234. 
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In Price Edward County the school board closed the 
44 school system rather than integrate. The action was declared 
unconstitutional by the district court. Moreover, the United 
States Supreme Court declared such action as a denial of 
"equal protection." 
THE DISMANTLING OF THE DUAL SCHOOL SYSTEM 
Ten years had lapsed since the Court had stated "with 
45 46 
all deliberate speed" in Brown II. Then Rogers v. Paul 
was placed before the United States Supreme Court. This case 
illustrated the impatience of the Supreme Court in dealing 
47 
with a desegregation plan that incorporated one-grade-a-year. 
The case came to the United States Supreme Court 
per curiam, in 1965, as a challenge to the desegregation plan 
of Fort Smith, Arkansas' public high school. The 1957 
Arkansas plan integrated one grade each year: however, in 
1964, grades ten, eleven, and twelve were still not inte­
grated. Class action litigation was initiated by two Negro 
students. The plaintiffs challenged two factors: (1) the 
plan had not been followed; and (2) after seven years, 
grades ten, eleven, and twelve in high school were still 
not desegregated. To this Chief Justice Earl Warren opined: 
44 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 375 U.S. 223 (1964). 
45 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
47 
Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965). Ibid., p. 199. 
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. . . Petitioners and those similarly situated shall be 
allowed immediate transfer to the high school that has 
the more extensive curriculum and from which they are 
excluded because of race.48 
The petitioners also questioned the desegregation 
of faculties. The allegation was one of assignment on a 
racial basis. The Court remanded a hearing on the issue 
and further stated: 
Two theories would give students not yet in desegre­
gated grades sufficient interest to challenge racial 
allocation of faculty: (1) that racial allocation 
of faculty denies them equality of educational oppor­
tunity without regard to segregation of pupils and 
(2) that it renders inadequate an otherwise consti­
tutional pupil desegregation plan to be applied to 
their grades.49 
Rogers illustrated the growing impatience of the 
Court concerning the implementation of Brown I. However, 
the Court left some question unanswered concerning compli­
ance with "all deliberate speed" in Brown I. 
In 1968, three separate, but similar, cases were 
heard in the United States Supreme Court. Although the 
cases were not joined by the Court, the facts of each were 
much the same. The cases came from Arkansas, Virginia, and 
Tennessee. Two of the cases concerned "freedom-of-choice" 
assignments and the third had a free choice plan. The cases 
were important to the South because some thirteen hundred 
4.8 
Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 199 (1965). 
49Ibid., p. 200. 
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Southern school systems were using some form of "freedom-of-
choice" to retard the integration process as much as the 
county would allow.^ 
51 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County 
came on appeal from the Fourth Circuit in Virginia. New Kent 
County's population consisted of about one-half Negro with 
no residential segregation. Two schools were maintained, 
one in the eastern part of the county and one in the west. 
In 1965, the school board adopted a "freedom-of-
choice" plan for desegregating the schools. This was done 
in order to establish eligibility and receive federal aid. 
The plan called for students to choose, each year, between 
the schools. The plan excluded pupils entering the 
first and eighth grades to choose schools annually. The 
students who did not choose a school were assigned schools 
in the attendance zones. The district court approved the 
plan, and the court of appeals sustained; however, the court 
of appeals remanded for a more specific and comprehensive 
52 
plan concerning teachers. 
The plan operated for three years with no white stu­
dent choosing the all-Negro school. However, there were 
50 
Richard Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), p. 456. 
51 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
52Ibid., p. 434. 
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115 Negro students admitted to the formerly all-white 
school. Therefore, eighty-five percent of the Negro students 
in the system attended the all-Negro school. 
Mr. Justice William J. Brennan delivered the Court's 
majority opinion. Mr. Brennan first discussed the question 
before the Court: 
The question for decision is whether, under all circum­
stances here, respondent School Board's adoption of 
"freedom-of-choice" plan which allows a pupil to choose 
his own public school constitutes adequate compliance 
with the Board's responsibility "to achieve a system of 
determining admission to the public schools on a non-
racial basis."53 
Justice Brennan spoke of the delays of the school 
board in carrying out Brown I's mandate. 
In determining whether respondent School Board met that 
command by adopting the "freedom-of-choice" plan, it is 
relevant that this first step did not come until some 
eleven years after Brown I was decided, and ten years 
after Brown II directed the making of a"prompt and 
reasonable start." This deliberate perpetuation of the 
unconstitutional dual system can only have compounded 
the harm of such a system. Such delays are no longer 
tolerable, for"the governing constitutional principles 
no longer bear the imprint of the newly enunciated 
doctrine."54 
Continuing, Justice Brennan established guidelines: 
The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances 
present and the option available in each instance. It 
is incumbent upon the school board to establish that 
its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate pro­
gress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. 
... Where the Court finds the board to be acting in 
53 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent Countv, 
391 U.S. 431 (196871 
54Ibid.t p. 438. 
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good faith and the proposed plan to have real prospects 
for dismantling the state-imposed dual system "at the 
earliest practicable date/' then the plan may be said 
to provide effective relief.55 
While Justice Brennan did not find the "freedom of 
choice" plans completely unconstitutional, he suggested: 
We do not hold that "freedom-of-choice" can have no place 
in such a plan. We do not hold that a "freedom of 
choice" plan might of itself be unconstitutional, although 
that argument has been urged upon us. Rather, all we 
decide today is that in desegregating a dual system, 
a plan utilizing 'freedom of choice"is not an end in 
itself.56 
Finally Justice Brennan spoke to the New Kent County 
questions: 
The New Kent County School Board's "freedom of choice" 
plan cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to 'teffec-
tuate a transition"to a unitary system. ... In other 
words the school system remains a dual system. Rather 
than the further dismantling of the dual system, the 
plan has operated simply to burden children and their 
parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed 
squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required 
to formulate a new plan. . . . The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is vacated in so far as it affirmed 
the District Court, and the case is remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.5' 
Another "freedom-of-choice" case decided the same 
day was Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School 
58 
District. This Arkansas school district contained a Negro 
population of about sixty percent. The school district 
55 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 439 (1968). 
56Ibid., pp. 439, 440. 57Ibid., p. 441. 
CO 
Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School 
District, 391 U.S. 443 (1968). 
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provided two combination elementary and high schools some 
ten blocks apart in the district's only major town. Up to 
1965 the system had been totally segregated. However, in 
1965, a "freedom-of-choice" plan was adopted in order to 
assure eligibility for federal financial aid. The plan 
required all pupils to choose a school annually. Those not 
desiring to choose were assigned to the school previously 
59 attended. By 1967 no white student had chosen the all-
Negro Fields School. However, eighty-five Negroes had 
enrolled in the previously all-white Gould Schools. The 
plan was initiated in 1965. However, the number of students 
who requested the Gould Schools exceeded the number of 
places available. Therefore, twenty-eight Negro students 
60 
were refused admittance. 
Injunctive relief was sought by the Negroes required 
to attend the Fields Schools. Meanwhile, the school board 
announced plans to construct a new high school at Fields. 
Petitioners sought to enjoin construction and stated the 
school should be built at the Gould site instead of the 
Fields site.6"'" 
District court denied relief and insisted that: 
(1) the "freedom-of-choice" plan had been adopted without 
59 Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School 
District, 391 U.S. 44 (1968). 
60Ibid., p. 446. 61Ibid. 
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court action; (2) the plan had received approval by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: and (3) some 
Negroes had enrolled in the Gould schools. Therefore, the 
6 2 plan was not a pretense or a sham. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court 
decision and stated that adequacy of the plan was not ques-
6 3 tioned and neither was the implementation. Certiorari 
was granted by the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Justice 
William J. Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Concerning the adequacy of the "freedom-of-choice" plan, 
Justice Brennan said: 
. . .  T h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  " f r e e d o m - o f -
choice" is properly before us. On the merits, our 
decision in Green v. County School Board, supra, estab­
lishes that the plan is inadequate to convert to a 
unitary, nonracial school system. As in Green, the 
"school system remains a dual system."64 
Justice Brennan closed the opinion by relying on 
Green: 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed 
and the case is remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent-with our opinion in 
Green v. County School Board.6 
The third and final case relating to "freedom-of-
choice" was Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City 
66 
of Jackson. This Tennessee case involved the city of 
Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School 
District, 391 U.S. 446 (1968). 
63Ibid., p. 447. 64Ibid. 65Ibid., p. 449. 
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City of 
Jackson, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). 
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Jackson's school system. The system contained eight elemen­
tary schools, three junior high schools, and two senior high 
schools. Some forty percent of the student population was 
Negro. The system was operated as a segregated system, 
according to Tennessee statute, with five elementary schools, 
two junior high schools, and one senior high school operating 
as all-white. Three elementary schools, one junior high school, 
and one senior high school were operated as "Negro" schools. 
The pupil placement law enacted by Tennessee was not upheld 
6 7 in district court. The local school board enacted a "free 
transfer" plan in 1963. The plan provided for assignment of 
pupils within geographic or natural boundaries according to 
capacity and facilities. The "free transfer" portion of the 
plan provided the student an opportunity to transfer to the 
68 
school of choice if space was available. 
After one year of operation, 118 Negro students 
transferred among four formerly all-white schools. All 
former Negro elementary schools remained all-Negro. The dis­
trict court was petitioned for relief by the Negro students. 
The school board proposed new zones for the three junior high 
schools, but petitioners objected because of alleged racially 
gerrymandered zones that failed to provide a nonracial system. 
fi7 
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City of 
Jackson, 391 U.S. 453 (1968). 
68Ibid., pp. 453, 454. 
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The district court insisted that petitioners had not 
proven allegations that proposed junior high attendance zones 
69 were indeed gerrymandered. The court of appeals affirmed, 
except the serious issue of faculty desegregation. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Justice William J. Brennan delivered the opinion. In part, 
Mr. Brennan said: 
The principles governing determination of the adequacy 
of the plan as in compliance with the Board's respon­
sibility to effectuate a transition to a racially non­
discriminatory system are those announced today in 
Green v. County School Board, supra, tested by those 
principles, the plan is clearly inadequate.^ 
Justice Brennan then spoke directly concerning the 
71 "free transfer" plan by relying on Green. 
We do not hold that "free transfer" can have no place 
in a desegregation plan. But like "freedom of choice," 
if it cannot be shown that such a plan will further, 
rather than delay, conversion to a unitary, nonracial, 
nondiscriminatory school system, it must be held 
unacceptable. ... 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated 
insofar as it affirmed the District Court's approval 
of the plan in its application to the junior high schools, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consis­
tent with this opinion in Green v. County School Board, 
supra.72 
69 Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City of 
Jackson, 391 U.S. 453, 454 (1968). 
70 
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71 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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81 
The last Warren Court decision concerning education 
was the United States v. Montgomery County Board of Educa-
73 tion. This case concerned a plan to desegregate the Mont­
gomery County, Alabama, school faculties. In 1964, the dis­
trict judge issued an order that required integration of cer­
tain grades followed each year by an annual report. This 
suit was initiated by Negro children and Negro parents. 
A 1968 order involved the desegregation of faculties. 
The court-mandated goal required the school board to attain a 
uniform ratio of five to one (white to Negro) faculty members 
in each school throughout the system. 
The court of appeals modified the district court's 
order of a systemwide five to one (white to Negro) faculty 
ratio. The new order read only "substantially or approxi-
74 
mately." Thus the ratio was eliminated. 
In delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Hugo L. 
Black held: 
We believe it best to leave Judge Johnson's order as 
written rather than modified by the 2-1 panel, par­
ticularly in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals, 
as a whole, was evenly divided on this subject. We 
also believe that under all the circumstances of this 
case we follow the original plan outlined in Brown II, 
or brought up to date by this Court's opinion in Green 
v. County School Board, supra, and Griffin v. School 
Board 337 U.S. 218.75 
73 United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 
395 U.S. 225 (1969). 
74Ibid., p. 234. 75Ibid., p. 235. 
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The district court's original order for faculty 
desegregation was: 
. . .  e a c h  s c h o o l  w i t h  f e w e r  t h a n  t w e l v e  t e a c h e r s  w a s  
required to have at least two full time teachers whose 
race was different from the race of the majority of 
the faculty of that school/ and in schools with twelve 
or more teachers, the race of at least one out of every 
six faculty and staff members was required to be dif­
ferent from the race of the majority of the faculty and 
staff members at that school.7® 
After the decision was rendered by the Warren Court 
77 in United States v. Montgomery, Justice Burger replaced 
the retired Chief Justice Earl Warren. During the next two 
years three additional changes were made in the United States 
Supreme Court. Henry A. Blackmun replaced Associate Justice 
Abe Fortas. William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell replaced 
retired Associate Justices Hugo Black and John M. Harlan. 
Each Justice was appointed by President Richard M. Nixon. 
The Supreme Court's impatience with "all deliberate 
78 
speed" was demonstrated in Alexander v. Holmes. This con­
troversial litigation grew out of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals' order that required a new plan to desegregate thirty-
three Mississippi school districts. 
In a per curiam opinion, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, 
as Circuit Justice, was asked to vacate the Fifth Circuit's 
76 
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 
395 U.S. 232, 233 (1969). 
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78 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 
396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
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79 order. Justice Black stated the decision in Brown had not 
been completely enforced and there were still states with 
many all-white and all-Negro schools. Thus the application 
to vacate the suspension of the order was denied. Then Jus­
tice Black stated the reason: 
This has resulted in larger part from the fact that in 
Brown II the Court declared that this unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection should be remedied, not 
immediately but only "with all deliberate speed."... 
Unfortunately, this struggle has not eliminated dual 
school system, and I am of the opinion that so long as 
that phrase is a relevant factor that will never be 
eliminated. "All deliberate speed" has turned out to 
be only a soft euphemism for delay. 
While Justice Black recognized a single Justice was 
speaking,, the reasoning was clear: 
I recognize that in certain respects, my views as stated 
above, go beyond anything this Court has expressed held 
to date. Although Green reiterated that the time for 
"all deliberate speed" has passed, there is language in 
that opinion which might be interpreted as approving 
a "transition period" during which federal courts would 
continue to supervise the passage of the Southern schools 
from dual to unitary systems. 
Justice Black, in conclusion, invited the applicants 
to "present the issue to the full Court at the earliest 
82 
possible opportunity." The case was argued in October 
with the unanimous, but brief, decision rendered shortly 
thereafter. Justice Black said, in part: 
79 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 
1218 (1969). 
80Ibid., p. 1219. 81Ibid., p. 1222. 
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The Court of Appeals' order of August 28, 1967, is 
vacated, and the case is remanded to that Court to 
issue its decree and order, effective immediately, 
declaring that each of the school districts here in­
volved may no longer operate a dual school system based 
on race or color, and directing that they begin immed­
iately to operate, as unitary, school systems within 
which no person is to be effectively excluded from any 
school because of race or color.83 
The Court further ordered the court of appeals to 
"retain jurisdiction in order to issue prompt and faithful 
84 compliance with its order." 
The Court1s further impatience was illustrated in 
85 
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board. The United 
States District Court had rejected a proposed desegregation 
plan for the 1969-1970 school year. The United States Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision in December, 
1969. The court of appeals further ordered school boards to 
desegregate faculties and formulate a plan for converting 
the school systems to a unitary one by February 1, 1970. The 
court did, however, authorize a delay in desegregating the 
pupils until September, 1970. 
The United States Supreme Court considered the case 
on certiorari and rendered a per curiam opinion. Chief Jus­
tice Warren Burger's opinion read: 
83 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 
396 U.S. 20 (1969). 
84Ibid., p. 21. 
Q C  
Robert Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School 
Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970). 
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Insofar as the Court of Appeals authorized deferral of 
student desegregation beyond February 1, 1970, that 
Court misconstrued our holdings in Alexander v. Holmes 
County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 240 Ed. 2d 19, 
905 ct 29. Accordingly, the petitions for writs of 
certiorari are granted, the judgments of the Court of 
Appeals are reversed, and the cases remanded to that 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. The judgments in these cases are to issue 
forthwith.86 
In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice John M. Harlan 
and Mr. Justice Byron R. White were not content just to tender 
the decision, but the Justices felt that further guidelines 
were needed: 
The intent of Alexander, as I see it, was that the burden 
in actions of this type should be shifted from plain­
tiffs, seeking redress for a denial of constitutional 
rights, to defendant school boards. What this means 
is that upon a prima facia showing of non-compliance 
with this court's holding in Green, ... sufficient 
to demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial, plain­
tiffs may apply for immediate relief that will, at 
once, extirpate any lingering vestiges of a constitu­
tionally prohibited dual school system. ... 
Such relief, I believe it was intended, should 
consist of an order providing measures for achieving 
disestablishment of segregated school systems, and 
should if appropriate, include provisions for pupil 
and teacher reassignments, rezoning or any other steps 
necessary to accomplish the desegregation of public 
school systems as required by Green.8? 
Justice Harlan then turned to an exact timetable of 
events needed in such cases as was declared: 
. . .  T h i s  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  i n  n o  
event should the time from the finding of noncompliance 
with the requirements of the Green Case to the time of 
86 
Robert Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School 
Board, 396 U.S. 291 (19707 
87Ibid., pp. 291, 292. 
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the actual operative effects of the relief, including 
the time for judicial approval and review, exceed a per­
iod of approximately eight weeks. This I think, is 
indeed the "maximum" timetable established by the 
Court today for cases of this kind.® 
Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall 
expressed disagreement because they considered procedures 
too lenient. They said: 
. . .  t o  d i r e c t  s u m m a r y  r e v e r s a l  w i t h o u t  a r g u m e n t  a n d  
without opportunity for exploration of the varying 
problems of individual school districts seems unsound 
to us.®^ 
Although the decision was a six to two vote, it reinforced 
further the determination of the Court in viewing full com-
90 pliance of Alexander. 
Two months later, Northcross v. Board of Education of 
91 the Memphis, Tennessee, City Schools came to the United 
States Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari. The 
case involved a May, 1969, district court order that required 
the Memphis School Board to submit a plan based on geographic 
92 assignment by January, 1970. After Alexander, plaintiffs 
concluded that there was to be greater emphasis on speed of 
desegregation since there was a constitutional requirement. 
88 
Robert Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School 
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However, the district court denied the motion for further 
relief and required only the geographic plan by the January 
date. Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals while, at the same time, moved for an injunction 
to direct the district court to order a plan for operating 
the Memphis schools as a unitary system during the current 
1969-70 school year.^ 
The Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the denial that asked 
for further relief. The court also, at the same time, denied 
the injunction. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Court held that the court of appeals erred. Justice 
Hugo White wrote the opinion and enumerated: 
. . . The Court of Appeals erred in its own findings 
that respondent Board is "not now operating a dual 
school system."... It was premature for the Court of 
Appeals to rule that the Board has, subject to comply­
ing with the present commands of the District Judge, 
converted its pre-Brown dual system into a unitary 
system "within which no person is to be effectively 
excluded because of race or color." In holding that 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board is applicable to this 
case the Court of Appeals order of remand of December 19, 
1969 affirmed, but with the direction that the district 
court proceed promptly to consider the issues before it 
and to decide the case consistently with Alexander v. 
Holmes County Board. The order of the Court of Appeals 
of January 12, 1970, denying the injunctive relief is 
affirmed. The motion for injunctive pending certiorari 
filed in this Court is denied.94 
93 
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Mr. Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred separately, 
and at the same time urged the Court to resolve some "basic 
95 
practical problems" concerning the requirement of a "uni­
tary system" by having said: 
. . .  A s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  h o w e v e r ,  w e  o u g h t  t o  r e s o l v e  
some of the basic practical problems when they are appro­
priately presented, including whether, as a constitu­
tional matter, any particular racial balances must be 
achieved in the schools: to what extent school districts 
and zones may or must be altered as a constitutional 
matter; and to what extent transportation may or must 
be provided by prior holdings of the Court. Other 
related issues may emerge.96 
Justice Burger stated that the reason he was not in 
favor of setting the case down for an expedited hearing was 
the fact that Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate. 
Thus the Court was limited to seven Justices. 
BUSING AS A MEANS OF DESEGREGATION 
The questions that Chief Justice Burger raised in 
97 
Northcross opinion were answered, in part, in Swann v. 
98 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Speaking for 
the Court, Justice Burger discussed compulsory integration 
in order to"dismantle the dual system." The case centered 
around a desegregation plan that was based on geographic 
95 
Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, 
Tennessee, City Schools, 397 U.S. 237 (1970). 
96Ibid. 97Ibid. 
98 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburq Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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zoning with a free-transfer provision. The plan was ini­
tially approved by the district court in 1965. In September, 
99 
1968, a petition seeking further relief based on Green was 
filed. Both parties agreed the present plan did not achieve 
the required unitary school system. The school board was 
ordered to formulate a plan that would include student and 
faculty desegregation. Even though the school board sub­
mitted a plan in June, and again in August of 1969, a third 
plan was required. The Court, however, after having reviewed 
the partial plan, declared the ideas unacceptable. Dr. John 
Finger was appointed by the court to design a desegregation 
plan."^^ In February, 1970, the district court was presented 
a "board plan" and the "Finger Plan." 
The district court adopted the board plan with modi­
fications. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court affirmed the 
district court's order, in part, and vacated, in part. The 
case was then remanded to the district court for reconsidera­
tion. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and ordered reinstatement of the district court. 
The district court, on remand, was presented two new 
plans. After lengthy hearings, the district court concluded 
99 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
^"^Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 9 (1971). 
101Ibid., p. 8. 
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the "Finger Plan" was acceptable. The court ordered the 
school board to accept one of three plans or provide a new 
one. The "Finger Plan" remained in effect until the school 
board did provide a new plan. In August, 1970, the school 
102 
board gave the court notice that it would "acquiesce" in 
the "Finger Plan," but stated that the plan was not reason­
able. The district court then ordered the "Finger Plan" to 
remain in effect. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the Court1s 
majority opinion: 
We granted certiorari in this case to review important 
issues as to the duties of school authorities and the 
scope of powers of federal courts under the Court's man­
dates to eliminate racially separate public schools estab­
lished and maintained by state action.^03 
Chief Justice Burger turned to the problem of defin­
ing "responsibility of school authorities in desegregating 
a state-enforced dual school system in light of the Equal 
104 Protection Clause." He acknowledged the problem was of 
student assignment. In referring to systems that had 
operated on dual decrees, the first obligation of school 
authorities was to eliminate racial distinctions in trans­
portation, supporting personnel, and extra curricular activi­
ties, maintenance of buildings, and distribution of equipment. 
102 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 11 (1971). 
103Ibid., p. 5. 104Ibid., p. 18. 
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Justice Burger then centered his attention on four 
problems in Swann: 
(1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas 
might be used as an implement in a remedial order to 
correct a previously segregated system; 
(2) whether every all-Negro and all-white school must 
be eliminated as an indispensable part of a remedial 
process of desegregation; 
(3) what the limits are, if any, on the rearrangement 
of school districts and attendance zones, as a remedial 
measure; and 
(4) what the limits are, if any, on the use of trans­
portation facilities to correct state-enforced racial 
school segregation. 
In addressing the problem of "racial balance" or 
"racial quotas," Justice Burger drew heavily on the district 
court's order concerning a 71-29 percent ratio in the 
Charlotte school system. However, Justice Burger cau­
tioned: 
. . .  I f  w e  w e r e  t o  r e a d  t h e  h o l d i n g s  o f  t h e  D i s t r i c t  
Court to require, as a matter of substantive constitu­
tional right, any particular degree of racial balance 
or mixing, that approach would be disproved and we 
would be obliged to reverse. 
Justice Burger further stated that the order to desegregate 
schools did not mean that there must be a reflection of the 
racial composition of the community in the school system. 
Justice Burger insisted the district court used the mathemat­
ical ratio only as a starting point in formulating a plan, 
, . 107 and not as a requirement. 
105 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 22 (1971). 
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108 
Concerning the "one-race school," Justice Burger 
suggested there were circumstances that caused certain 
schools to be composed of all one race. Justice Burger 
pointed out, however, that this would prevail until new 
schools were provided or until neighborhood patterns changed. 
According to Justice Burger, "remedial altering of 
109 attendance zones" was to be utilized in order to break up 
a dual school system. The practice of gerrymandering school 
districts and attendance zones, as well as pairing, "clus­
tering" or "grouping" of schools occurred in order to elimi­
nate the all-white and the all-Negro schools.110 Continuing, 
Justice Burger pointed out that a school system with no his­
tory of discrimination might assign its pupils to the schools 
nearest their homes.111 
112 Regarding "transportation of students" Justice 
Burger said that no rigid guidelines should be given because 
113 of the many problems xn thousands of situations. Mr. 
Burger then cited the extensive use of bus transportation 
used in the nation for educational purposes and maintained 
that busing was an acceptable tool. Justice Burger then 
justified the district court's order by stating: 
108 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 25 (1971). 
109Ibid., p. 27. 110Ibid. 111Ibid., p. 28. 
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. . .  t h u s  t h e  r e m e d i a l  t e c h n i q u e s  u s e d  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  
court1s order were within that Court1s power to provide 
equitable relief? implementation of the decree is well 
within the capacity of the school authority.H4 
The Court did point out that there was an objection to the 
transportation of students when time or distnce traveled 
would risk health or would infringe upon the education of 
the child. 
In closing, Justice Burger turned attention to a 
shift in population: 
It does not follow that the communities served by 
such systems will remain demographically stable, for in 
a growing mobile society, few will do so. Neither school 
authorities nor district courts are constitutionally 
required to make year by year adjustments of racial com­
position of student bodies once the affirmative duty to 
desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimina­
tion through official action's eliminated from the 
system. 
The full impact of Swann was not realized until years 
later. It was, however, immediately apparent that: (1) rac­
ial balance was indeed a consideration; (2) cross-district 
busing was a requirement when necessary to achieve a deseg­
regated school system; and (3) schools were to have student 
bodies and faculties with the same racial proportion as the 
school systems on a whole. Also, it became clear in this 
case that the Court had introduced the philosophy of "intent" 
v. "extent," and the degree of "intent" to segregate dic­
tated the "extent" of the remedy of a court. 
114 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 30 (1971). 
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The companion case to Swann, Davis v. Board of School 
1.16 
Commissioners of Mobile County, concerned a challenge to a 
school desegregation plan for Mobile County, as well as the 
city of Mobile and its suburbs. An area of 1,248 square 
miles coverage was included. At the beginning of 1969 the 
school system contained some 73,500 students enrolled in 
ninety-one schools. Approximately 58 percent of the 
students were white and forty-two percent Negro. Most of 
the Negro students were residents concentrated in an area of 
117 the city east of a north-south highway. 
The district court ordered a plan that required school 
1X8 pairing as well as rezoning. The plan mandated nineteen 
schools to have sixty percent of the Negro student population, 
while others were either totally black or nearly all-black. 
On appeal by plaintiffs the plan was rejected. The western 
zone was treated in isolation from the eastern zone and the 
plan provided no transportation for students for the purpose 
of desegregating schools. Therefore, the court of appeals 
directed the district court to reach the same ratio for staff 
and faculty as existed in the district as a whole. In deliv­
ering the court's opinion, Chief Justice Warren Burger affirmed 
the court of appeals' decision concerning faculty and staff 
ratio as was stated: 
116 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971). 
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The Court of Appeals concluded that with respect to 
faculty and staff desegregation, the board had almost 
totally failed to comply with earlier orders, and 
directed the District Court to require the board to 
establish a faculty and staff ratio in each school 
substantially the same as that for the entire dis­
trict. 
Justice Burger continued by insisting the court of 
appeals had erred in isolating the eastern section and had 
not considered all available techniques to produce optimum 
desegregation: 
On the record before us, it is clear that the court 
of appeals felt constrained to treat the eastern part 
of metropolitan Mobile in isolation from the rest of 
the school system, and that inadequate consideration 
was given to the possible use of bus transportation and 
split zoning.120 
Davis, even more than Swann, appeared to demonstrate 
clearly that busing could be required to achieve racial 
balance. 
Swann and its satellites were followed by another 
North Carolina case—-Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of 
121 Education v. Catherine Scott. The case centered around 
appeals from an order of the United States district court 
approving a modified plan for desegregation of certain North 
Carolina schools. The suit was pending in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit when the United States 
Supreme Court decided Swann. Therefore, the appeals court 
119 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 402 U.S. 35 (1971). 
120Ibid., p. 38. 
121 Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education v. 
Catherine Scott, 404 U.S. 1221 (1971). 
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recommended the "instant proceedings with instructions to the 
district court to receive new school board plans to meet the 
122 requirements of the Swann decision." The district court, 
however, interpreted the remand order as requiring a plan to 
"achieve the greatest possible degree of desegregation." 
The school board submitted a revised plan to achieve a "fixed 
racial balance in the schools through a substantial increase 
123 in pupil busing." After approval of the new plan by the 
district court, the school board applied to Circuit Justice 
Burger for a stay of the lower court's mandate pending 
"disposition of the Board's petition for certiorari to renew 
124 the Court of Appeals1 decision." 
Justice Burger's reasoning for the denial was: 
The stay application was not presented until seven and 
three days respectively, before the school term.12^ 
Thus, there was not enough time for the Court to deal 
adequately with the stay. Justice Burger further indicated 
that the application did not include "specific allegations as 
to the time of travel or other alleged hardships involved in 
226 
the added bus transportation program." Finally Justice 
Burger insisted the record was inadequate to evaluate the 
issue. 
122 
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127 
In Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, the 
issue concerned the credibility of a new school district 
created where boundaries were in a system that had a history 
of state enforced racial segregation. 
Schools in Emporia, Virginia, operated as a part of 
the county public school system under a "freedom-of-choice" 
plan approved by the district court. After the Green decision 
there was a motion by petitioners to change the plan in order 
to comply with the Court's decision. Thus a "pairing" plan 
was initiated by the district court June 25, 1969, effective 
128 
at the beginning of the 1969-1970 school year. Two weeks 
later the City of Emporia announced the city would operate 
the school system. On August 1, 1969, petitioners filed a 
request to enjoin the city from withdrawing Emporia children 
from county public schools. 
The district court insisted that such action would 
create a "substantial increase in the proportion of whites 
in the schools attended by city residents, and a concomitant 
129 decrease in the county schools." The increase would cause 
the county system to be twenty-eight percent white and 
seventy-two percent Negro, while the city schools would be 
127 
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451 (1972). 
128Ibid. 
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130 forty-eight percent white and fifty-two percent Negro. 
The district court also found that if Emporia did withdraw, 
this would frustrate the June 25th decree, and the court 
enjoined respondents from pursuing the plan. The district 
court held for the plaintiffs, while the court of appeals 
insisted that the purpose was a "cover-up" for racial dis­
crimination; therefore, the court reversed. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
considering whether a federal court might enjoin state or 
local officials from dividing and creating a new school dis­
trict from a segregated school district. The United States 
Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals had erred 
and the district court order was proper. 
i 
The Court opinion was delivered by Justice Potter 
Stewart. Justice Stewart insisted the Court would be guided 
by the effect of school officials' actions in meeting Four­
teenth Amendment constitutionality. In reference to racial 
ratios Justice Stewart said: 
We need not and do not hold that this disparity in racial 
composition of the two systems would be a sufficient 
reason, standing alone, to enjoin the creation of the 
separate school district. The fact that a school board's 
desegregation plan leaves some disparity in racial bal­
ance among various schools in the system does not alone 
make that plan unacceptable.131 
130 
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Justice Stewart referred to Swann in speaking of the 
disparity of buildings and equipment: 
The record reflects that the school buildings in Emporia 
are better equipped and are located on better sites than 
are those in the county. We noted in Swann that factors 
such as these may, in themselves, indicate that enforced 
racial segregation has been perpetuated.132 
Justice Stewart then turned to a third factor, a ques­
tion of timing. Justice Stewart felt that the district court 
was correct in the conclusion that Emporia's withdrawal from 
the Greenville County System would have an adverse psycho­
logical effect on its children. 
Noting another factor concerning timing Justice Stew­
art proclaimed: 
In August, 1969, one month before classes were scheduled 
to open, the city officials were intent upon operating 
a separate system despite the fact that the city had no 
buildings under lease, no teachers under contract, and 
no specific plans for the operation of the schools. 
Thus, the persuasiveness of the "quality education" 
rationale was open to question.133 
t 
Justice Stewart spoke to the question concerning the 
future: 
Once the unitary system has been established and accepted, 
it may be that Emporia, if it still desires to do so, 
may establish an independent system without such an 
adverse effect upon the students remaining in the county, 
or it may be able to work out a more satisfactory 
arrangement with the county for joint operation of the 
existing system.I34 
132 
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Another case, United States v. Scotland Neck City 
135 Board of Education, presented a similar question to 
136 
Wright and both cases were decided June 22, 1972. In 
March, 1969, the North Carolina State Legislature created a 
new school district for Scotland Neck, North Carolina. The 
Halifax County school system was in the process of dis­
mantling its dual school system at that time. The United 
States Department of Justice instituted litigation enjoining 
the implementation of the statute on grounds that it "created 
a refuge for white students and promoted school segregation 
137 in the county." The district court permanently enjoined 
the implementation of State Statute, Chapter 31. The court 
138 of appeals reversed the decision. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The question before the Court was to decide whether the dis­
mantling of a dual school system was furthered or hindered 
by creating a new school district from the larger school 
district. 
135 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). 
136 
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
451 (1972)": 
137 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Edu­
cation, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). 
138T, Ibid. 
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Justice Potter Stewart again delivered the majority 
opinion by citing Wright. 
If the proposal would impede the dismantling of a 
dual system, then a district court, in the exercise of 
its remedial discretion, may enjoin it from being 
carried out, Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 
supra at 460. The District Court in this case concluded 
that chapter 31 "was enacted with the effect of creating 
a refuge for white students of the Halifax County School 
System, and interferes with the desegregation of the 
Halifax County System," 314 P Supp. at 78.139 
The court of appeals was reversed. 
The issue of consolidation of school districts came 
to the Court in School Board of Richmond, Virginia, v. State 
Board of Education of Virginia in 1973. Through a series of 
segregation cases and litigation in courts the Richmond sys­
tem moved from 56.5 percent white and 43.5 black to a high 
of 70.5 percent black in 1969."^^ 
In 1971, the district court ordered a racial-balance 
plan intended to eradicate "racial identifiability of each 
facility to the extent feasible within the city of Rich-
141 mond." Richmond moved to have the city's school system 
consolidated with two nearby county school systems that 
were ninety-one percent white. The district court then 
142 ordered the consolidation. 
139 United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Edu­
cation, 407 U.S. 489 (1971). 
140 Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 
Virginia, 412 F, 2d 1058, 1074 (1972). 
141 
•'•Ibid., 325 F Supp, 835 (1971). 
142Ibid., 338 F Supp 67 (1972). 
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The order was appealed to the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit by the two county school boards. The 
143 district court's judgment was reversed. The issue cen­
tered around whether a school system might be consolidated 
144 
to create a system with a lower ratio of Negro students. 
Having relied on Swann, the court found there was no consti­
tutional requirement for racial balance other than in the 
145 process of dismantling the dual system. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
However, a decision was never reached because of an equally 
divided court. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's decision was 
affirmed. 
"INTENT" V. "EXTENT" 
In June, 1973, the United States Supreme Court 
divided on Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, 
147 Colorado. This case differed from de jure cases from the 
South because there never was required integration. Keyes 
was a de facto case. In addition, the Court focused attention 
143 Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 
Virginia, 462 F 2d 1058 (1972). 
144 145 
Ibid., p. 1060. Ibid. 
146 Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 
Virginia, 412 U.S. 92 (1972). 
147 Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, 
Colorado, 413 U.S. ll39 (1973). 
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on the issue of "intent" of the school board. Thus the Court 
ordered an extensive remedy. The Court was also a divided 
Court. Justice Lewis Powell concurred in part and dissented 
in part, whereas Justice William Rehnquist dissented. How­
ever, Justice Byron White took no part. 
Litigation originated from petitioners seeking to deseg­
regate the Park Hill Schools of Denver. The district court 
ordered relief, and the suit was extended in an attempt to 
secure desegregation in the remaining schools of Denver. 
Emphasis was placed on desegregating the core city schools. 
The district court found that the core city schools were edu­
cationally inferior to the white schools outside the core 
148 city area. By relying on Plessy v. Ferguson, the school 
board was ordered to provide equal facilities for the core 
city schools. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied 
core city relief but affirmed the Park Hill decision. Park 
Hill segregation had been deliberate and actually proved 
nothing in reference to the school board's overall policy of 
segregation. 
Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., delivered the 
majority opinion and was joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart, 
Marshall, and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger concurred; 
Justice Powell agreed in part and dissented in part. Justice 
Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice White took 
no part in the decision. 
1 4-ft 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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Justice Brennan insisted the district court had erred 
in defining a segregated core city school because it had not 
included Hispanos in the same category as having experienced 
educational inequalities for Negroes as compared with treat­
ment of white students* when the opinion stated: 
The District Court, in assessing the question of de jure 
segregation in the core city schools, preliminarily 
resolved that Negroes and Hispanos should not be placed 
in the same category to establish the segregated char­
acter of a school. ... The Court concluded that a 
school would be considered inferior only if it has 
"a concentration of either Negro or Hispano students 
in the general area of 70 to 75 percent. ..." We 
intimate no opinion whether the District Court's 70 per­
cent to 75 percent requirement was correct. ... In 
addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a 
school's student body, other factors such as the racial 
and ethnic composition of faculty and staff, and the 
staff, community and administrator's attitudes toward 
the school, must be taken into consideration. 
We conclude, however, that the district court erred 
in separating Negroes and Hispanos for purposes of 
defining a "segregated school."149 
Justice Brennan insisted the district court did not 
apply proper legal standards in dealing with arguments con­
cerning school board's policy of deliberately segregating 
the core city schools. Justice Brennan suggested at the 
trial court level proof could be established indicating 
school board did have a segregation policy in a large portion 
of the school district. 
Justice Brennan directed the district court to decide 
whether the school board's segregation policy concerning Park 
149 Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, Col­
orado, 413 U.S. 196, 197 (1973). 
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Hill included the entire Denver school district as a dual 
150 school system. Justice Brennan further pointed out m 
cases of intentional proven segregation that included signif­
icant portions of a district, the school board must prove 
segregated schools were not segregated by intent. Finally 
Justice Brennan suggested: 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified to 
vacate instead of reverse the parts of the Pinal Decree 
that concern the core city schools, and the case is 
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.151 
Justice William H. Rehnquist's dissenting opinion 
rejected the hypothesis that compulsory integration followed 
from Brown. The opinion was simply to the point of prohib­
iting racial discrimination: 
To require that a genuinely "dual" system is disestab­
lished, in the sense that the assignment of a child to 
a particular school is not made' to depend on his race, 
is one thing. To require that school boards affirma­
tively undertake to achieve racial mixing in schools 
where such mixing is not achieved in sufficient degree 
by naturally drawn boundary lines is quite obviously 
something else.2 
Justice William 0. Douglas concurred in a separate 
opinion but added that there was no constitutional difference 
153 
between de jure and de facto school segregation. Mr. 
Justice Powell concurred in part and dissented in part 
by insisting "grounds that the distinction between de jure 
150 Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, 
Colorado, 413 U.S. 213 (1973). 
151Ibid., p. 214. 152Ibid., p. 258. 153Ibid., p. 
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and de facto segregation should be abolished in favor of a 
constitutional rule requiring genuinely a integrated school 
154 
system." 
155 Milliken v. Bradley introduced a proposed remedy 
for extending Detroit's district lines into the suburbs. 
The action alleged that the Detroit public school system was 
a racially segregated school system and was segregated 
because of the policies and actions of both state and city 
officials. The action sought to implement a plan that would 
156 
provide a unitary school system. 
The district court concluded that certain acts of the 
school board, as well as the state, had created segregation. 
The court ordered the school board to prepare a desegregation 
plan that involved only Detroit. In addition, the state was 
ordered to submit a plan that included a three-county metro­
politan area. There was no valid claim that the eighty-five 
school districts within the three counties were guilty of 
157 any constitutional infractions. 
The district court ruled the board of education's 
plan inadequate to accomplish desegregation. The court, 
therefore, sought to find a solution beyond the limits of 
154 Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, 
Colorado, 413 U.S. 214 (1973). 
155 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
717 (1974). 
156Ibid., p. 717. 157Ibid. 
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the Detroit school district by cross busing across adminis­
trative district jurisdiction. The district court appointed 
a panel to formulate a plan for the Detroit schools that 
would include fifty-three of the eighty-five suburban school 
districts as well as Detroit. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis­
trict court's finding concerning constitutional violations 
and required the school board to implement the plan involving 
fifty-three suburban districts. However, the court of appeals 
vacated the order to obtain 295 school buses subject to a 
158 more appropriate time. 
The state officials and the school district inter­
veners, (but not the Detroit Board of Education), obtained a 
writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. 
The issue before the Court was: 
. . .  w h e t h e r  a  f e d e r a l  C o u r t  m a y  i m p o s e  a  m u l t i - d i s t r i c t ,  
area wide remedy to a single-district de jure segrega­
tion problem absent any finding that the other included 
school districts have failed to operate unitary school 
systems within their districts, absent any claim or find­
ing that the boundary lines of any affected school dis­
trict were established with the purpose of fostering 
racial segregation in public schopls, absent any findings 
that the included districts committed acts which affected 
segregation within the other districts.159 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the Court's 
majority opinion and was joined by Justices Stewart, Blaclariun, 
1 Rfi 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
718 (1974TI 
159Ibid., p. 721. 
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Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Stewart filed a concurring 
opinion. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion. Jus­
tice White also dissented and was joined by Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, and Marshall. Justice Marshall dissented and was 
joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White. 
Justice Burger insisted the district court erred in the 
use of standard development of a metropolitan area plan. 
Reasoning was that such a plan would prevent the school 
system from having a pupil racial composition not in pro-
160 
portion to the metropolitan area. 
Justice Burger further stated that the school district 
lines would not be ignored and local control of public educa-
tion was a deeply rooted tradition. Continuing, Justice 
Burger suggested the interdistrict could extensively disrupt 
public education in Michigan and that the district court 
would become a de facto "legislative authority, as well as a 
•school superintendent* for the entire area, a task that few 
162 judges are qualified to perform." 
Justice Burger then outlined conditions the Court 
might approve in such cases by stating that racial discrim­
ination acts by the state or local school districts must be 
I £ O 
proven having not proved violations by the fifty-three 
1 60 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
739-741 (1974^ 
161Ibid., pp. 741, 742. 162Ibid., pp. 743-744. 
163Ibid., pp. 744-745. 
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school districts and having found no interdistrict viola­
tion constituted a violation. 
The opinion of the Court closed by saying: 
We conclude that the relief ordered by the district 
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was based 
upon an erroneous standard and was unsupported by record 
evidence that acts on the outlying.districts effected 
the discrimination found to exist in the school of 
Detroit. Accordingly the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further 
proceeding consistent with this opinion leading to 
prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating 
the segregation found to exist in Detroit city school, 
a remedy which has been delayed since 1970.164 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, 
and White, asserted: 
After 20 years of small, often difficult steps toward 
that great end, the court today takes a giant step back­
ward. ... I cannot subscribe to this emasculation 
of our constitutional guarantee of equal protection of 
the laws and must respectfully dissent.165 
After the case was remanded for further proceedings, 
the city of Detroit was not spared the remedy of busing when 
a plan was denied by the district court to bus students 
166 
within the city limits. 
The Supreme Court, on June 27, 1977, handed down a 
16 7 second decision concerning Milliken. ' Chief Justice Warren 
164 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 752 (1974). 
165 
Ibid., p. 782. 
1 cc 
Merrill Sheils, "Smooth Ride in Detroit," Newsweek, 
February 9, 1976, p. 45. 
167ibid. 
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Burger delivered the opinion. The case centered around 
plans devised by the district court, on remand, to include 
decreed components of reading, in-service teacher training, 
testing, and counseling as a necessary part of the plan to 
168 carry out desegregation in the Detroit City Schools. 
The Court further directed that the cost be borne by both 
the Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan. The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the decision. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in order to consider the question of whether a district 
court could, as a component of a desegregation plan, order 
remedial educational programs and whether a federal court 
could require state officials, found responsible for consti­
tutional violations, to bear part of the cost of such pro-
169 
grams. As the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the 
court of appeals, Chief Justice Burger stated that 
. . . in light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, 
federal courts have, over the years, often required 
the inclusion of remedial progress in desegregation 
plans to overcome the inequalities inherent in dual 
school systems.170 
Concerning question of responsibility for costs of 
the remedial program, Justice Burger stated, "The decree to 
share the future costs of educational components in this case 
168 
William G. Milliken, Governor of the State of 
Michigan v. Ronald Bradley (Milliken II), 97 S. Ct. 2749  
(1977). 
169Ibid. 170Ibid. 
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fits squarely within the prospective compliance exception 
1 71 reaffirmed by Edelman. This case questioned the right of 
Illinois officials to withhold disability benefit payments. 
This decision answered the question of the financial 
responsibility in cases of violations of de jure segregation. 
The Court had said unanimously that (at least in Michigan) 
the responsibility of those who had been in constitutional 
violation was to pay one-half the cost to implement the remed-
172 ial program. 
173 
On November 4, 1975, Tasby v. Estes came to the 
United States Supreme Court, on certiorari denied, let 
stand an order by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which 
mandated Dallas, Texas, to begin busing. The Fifth Ciicuit 
declared a 1971 desegregation plan inadequate and that a new 
174 
plan must be implemented by January, 19760 
The rejected plan relied on: (1) some school clos­
ings; (2) student assignments, school site selections; 
(3) new school construction; and (4) a proposal to utilize 
television hookups. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declared the stated plan did not alter the racial character 
175 
of the schools. Continuing, the court of appeals further 
"*"^Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
172Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct.27749 (1977) 
(Milliken II). 
173Eddie Mitchel Tasby v. Nolan Estes, 423 U.S. 939 
(1975). 
174Ibid., 517 2nd 92. 175Ibid., p. 93. 
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stated that the district's plan was constitutionally inade­
quate because proper weight to racial composition of the 
student bodies was never considered when the plan was under 
construction. Moreover, the court insisted the dual structure 
must be dismantled by beginning of the second semester 
176 1975-1976 academic year. However, the case was remanded 
to the district court. On October 16, 1975, United States 
District Court Judge William M. Taylor authorized a delay 
until August, 1976, with the explanation that a busing plan 
177 
implemented in the middle of the year would be disruptive. 
The actual busing began in the fall of 1976 when 
approximately seventeen thousand students, in grades four 
178 through eight, were bused. Some ten thousand studerts 
were bused voluntarily so as to take advantage of special 
educational programs that were offered in schools outside 
the neighborhood. The plan incorporated seven Dallas sub­
urbs because of a charge that the district operated a rac-
179 lally segregated system of Negroes and Mexican-Americans. 
This case differed from Detroit in that there was: (1) no 
"^^Eddie Mitchel Tasby v. Nolan Estes, 423 U.S. 93 
(1975). ' 
177 The World Book Encyclopedia, Field Enterprises 
Educational Corporation, Yearbook 1976, p. 269. 
178 
"Another Year of Turmoil in Schools?" U. S. 
News and World Report, Sept. 31, 1976, p. 31. 
179 Newsweek, "Testing Time for Busing," Sept. 8, 
1975, p. 79. 
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unitary school system established in Dallas; and (2) that 
there was prima facie evidence of a segregated system. 
In November, 1975, the Supreme Court upheld the three 
judge United States District Court of Delaware in Buchanan 
180 v. Evans. The district court had enjoined the enforcement 
of the Delaware state statute known as the Educational Advance­
ment Act, enacted by the State Legislature in June, 1968. 
The statute was designed 
. . .  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  f o r  a n  e f f e c t i v e  a n d  
orderly reorganization of the existing school dis­
tricts of this state through the retention of cer­
tain existing school districts. 
The statute stated that the "city of Wilmington shall be the 
182 
City of Wilmington with the territory within its limits." 
The case centered around three contentions: (1) an 
unconstitutional dual system in New Castle County, which 
included Wilmington, was maintained; (2) the state, by virtue 
of practices which included low-cost housing policies, was 
the cause of the discrimination that had resulted in segre­
gated schools; and (3) the Educational Advancement Act, in 
substance, directed Wilmington to continue as a school dis­
trict, thus preventing the state board from dismantling the 
, . . 183 
dual system. 
1 80 
Madeline Buchanan v. Brenda Evans 423 U.S. 963 (1975). 
181Ibid., p. 964. 
^•®^14 Del. C. Section 1001-05 (Educational Advance­
ment Act). 
183Ibid. 
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The Educational Advancement Act was declared uncon­
stitutional and remedial action was deemed necessary by the 
184 district court. The Supreme Court's memorandum decision 
affirmed the lower court ruling and allowed interdistrict 
185 busing in Wilmington because the city schools were approx­
imately eighty-five percent black, and the suburban districts 
186 
were practically all white. District court ruled the 
state or local school district, by racially discriminatory 
acts, had caused an interdistrict segregation under Milli-
. 187 ken. 
The difference between the Detroit case and the 
Delaware case seemed to be that in Detroit there was never 
prima facie evidence that the state had enacted unconstitu­
tional legislation with segregative "intent" nor was there 
evidence of de jure segregation in the fifty-three suburbs 
of Detroit. In Wilmington, Delaware, however, the state had 
unconstitutional statutes that promoted segregation by 
"intent." Thus there was an extensive remedy that involved 
the Wilmington suburbs. 
18428A 393 F Supp. 438-439. 
1 
Madeline Buchanan v. Brenda Evans, 423 U.S. 963 
(1975). 
1 "Busing in Schools," Greensboro Daily News, 
Sept. 4, 1977, p. 81. 
"^^Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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On January 28, 1976, the United States Supreme Court 
handed down a landmark decision in Pasadend City Board of 
188 
Education v. Spanqler. The primary question concerned 
whether a school system was 
. . .  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  m a k e  y e a r - b y - y e a r  
adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies 
once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accom­
plished and racial discrimination through official 
action is eliminated from the system. 
The 1968 class action case was brought against school 
190 
officials by high school students and their parents. Injunc­
tive relief came from allegedly unconstitutional segregation 
of the Pasadena public schools. 
In historical retrospect, in 1970 a district court 
decision found that Pasadena school system's educational 
policies and procedures violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Defendants were enjoined from failing to adopt a plan to 
desegregate. The school system was ordered to submit a plan 
that would desegregate the school system, beginning with the 
191 1970-1971 school year. This plan included the provision 
that no school would be "with a majority of any minority 
192 students." The defendants than submitted the "Pasadena 
Plan" which was approved by district court. 
188 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spanqler, 
427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
1 ftQ 
Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 32 (1971). 
190 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spanqler. 
427 U.S. 427 (1976). 
191Ibid., p. 424. 192Ibid., p. 428. 
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In 1974 a motion was filed with the district court 
to modify the 1970 "Pasadena Plan." The motion was denied 
and appeal was made to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
where, although one judge dissented, the district court's 
decision was affirmed. 
On appeal the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and the judgment of the district court was vacated 
and remanded for further proceedings. Justice William H. 
Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Rehnquist 
insisted that the Pasadena school system did not have to 
make 
. . . year by year adjustments of the racial composi­
tion of student bodies once the affirmative duty to 
desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimi­
nation through official action is eliminated from the 
system [established in Swann"] ... .193 
The decision was six to two, with Justices Marshall 
and Brennan dissenting. The dissent was largely attributed 
to the argument that the racial discrimination had not been 
eliminated from the school system in Pasadena. Justices 
Marshall and Brennan interpreted Swann as saying that "until 
such a unitary system is established,a district court may 
act with board discretion—discretion which includes the 
194 adjustment of attendance zones." 
193 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa­
tion, 402 U.S. 1 (197Xn 
194 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 442 (1976). 
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In Austin, Texas, the Supreme Court rendered a dif­
ferent decision. Here the Court struck down a Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals1 decision busing twenty-five thousand stu-
195 dents to desegregate Austin's city schools. 
In Austin Independent School District v. United 
196 
States, the issue concerning the assignment of students 
was questioned. Most of Austin was residentially segregated. 
The school board's policy was to assign students to schools 
nearest their homes. Thus forty-five percent Mexican-American 
students attended schools in which sixty percent were black 
197 or Mexican-American. The complaint was that this policy 
constituted prima facie de jure segregation which violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. The Fifth Circuit Court cf 
Appeals1 judgment was vacated. 
In writing the majority decision, Judge Powell stated: 
The principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in 
urban public schools across the county—north and 
south—is the imbalance in residential patterns. Irish 
residential patterns are typically beyond the control 
of school authorities. For example, discrimination in 
housing, whether public or private, cannot be attributed 
to school authorities. . . .198 
Justice Powell did not, however, discount the use of 
busing to desegregate. He did outline the use of busing under 
certain circumstances: 
195 "Court Nixes Busing Plan," Burlington Time News, 
Dec. 7, 1976, p. 4A. 
196 Austin Independent School District v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 991 (1976). 
197Ibid. 198Ibid., p. 996. 
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Large scale busing is permissible only where the evi­
dence supports a finding that the extent of integration 
sought to be achieved by busing would have existed had 
the school authorities fulfilled their constitutional 
obligations in the past.199 
Once again the Court proclaimed that the order for 
busing would be predicated on a history of de jure segrega­
tion as in Swann and Keyes, Without that burden of proof, 
the Court said there would be no widespread busing as a 
remedy. 
In June, 1977, an Ohio case developed along the same 
issues and the United States Supreme Court rendered its 
decision in the Dayton case.2C)0 The decision vacated judg­
ment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. The district court insisted 
that the Dayton School Board had practiced racial discrimina­
tion in school operation. Discrimination was established on 
the basis of "cumulative violation" of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal to the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, a plan that included requirements 
for district wide racial distribution was approved. The 
ruling required the Dayton school system to attain a racial 
distribution for each school within the system that would be 
within 15 percent of the 48 to 52 percent black-white 
199 Austin Independent School District v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 998 (1976). 
20^Payton Board of Education v. Mark Brinkman, 97 
S. Ct. 2766 (1977). 
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201 population of Dayton. This plan employed the tech-
ques of "pairing/1 redefining attendance zones, centraliz­
ing special programs, and the institution of "magnet 
schools. "2®2 
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court sought to deter­
mine whether the appeals court remedy was.consistent with con­
stitutional violations as determined by the lower courts. In 
vacating the court of appeals1 decision the Supreme Court 
directed the lower courts to determine whether the school 
board's action intended to "discriminate against minority 
pupils, teachers, or staff" as the Court saw racial "in-
203 
tent." Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the court's 
opinion by directing that if discrimination was found, the 
district court must determine "how much incremental segrega­
tive effect those violations had on the racial distribution 
204 of the Dayton school population as presently constituted." 
The Court ordered the solution to be "designed to redress 
that difference, and only if there had been a systemwide 
205 impact may there be a systemwide remedy." 
The Dayton case once again: (1) outlined procedures 
for a lower court to follow: and (2) set precedence in 
201 Dayton Board of Education v. Mark Bnnkman, 
97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). 
202Ibid., p. 2766. 203Ibid., p. 2775. 
204Ibid., p. 2768. 205Ibid. 
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examining the racial "intent" of the school system. Such 
examination would determine the extent of the remedy to erase 
discrimination as directed by the courts. 
121 
CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED BUSING CASES 
BACKGROUND 
After the Brown"'" decision mandated desegregation 
in the South and other Southern border states1 schools, 
there was a period of some ten years of resistance before 
implementation in those states. The decade of delay was an 
agonizingly slow period of desegregation. This was illustrated 
by the Civil Rights Report, Federal Enforcement of School 
2 Desegregation, September 11# 1969. 
Table 1 represented the percentage of students 
attending desegregated schools in seven Southern states 
during a period of time in 1963 as compared to a time in 
3 1969. Many Southern states had accomplished only token 
desegregation by 1963-1964. Yet, while the federal courts 
focused attention only on the South, there were difficult 
problems that faced the desegregation process in the Northern 
and mid-Western states. Moreover, in many Southern states, 
^"Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
2 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Federal Enforcement 
of School Desegregation (September, 1969), p. 31. 
3Ibid. 
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TABLE 1 
Percentage of Students Attending Desegregated Schools 
in Seven Southern States 
1963-1964 1968-1969 
Percentage of All Percentage of All 
State Negro Students Negro Students 
Alabama .007 7.4 
Georgia .052 14.2 
Louisiana .602 8.8 
Mississippi .000 7.1 
North Carolina .537 27.8 
South Carolina .003 14.9 
Virginia 1.63 25.7 
123 
the problem of desegregation faced by school boards was 
solved because of the rural nature of the South. This was 
accomplished by closing the all-black school and transferring 
these students to the all-white schools, or by simply exchang^ 
4 xng black students for white students. Schools located in 
large metropolitan areas, however, faced a far more complex 
problem because of large pockets of minorities located in 
5 the inner city area. This problem was illustrated by Rep­
resentative Richardson Preyer when stating that "it was hard 
to see how the twenty square mile block area of Chicago can 
6 be integrated in any practicable way." 
Researchers from the University of Michigan conducted 
7 a study using an "array of indicators" to determine a deseg­
regation scorecard revealing how school integration had pro­
gressed in United States cities. The findings were based on 
data obtained from the United States Office for Civil Rights 
and the United States National Center for Educational Statis-
8 tics. 
4 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1868T; 
^Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
Richardson Preyer, "Beyond Desegregation—What 
Ought to be Done?" North Carolina Law Review, Volume 51, 
Number 4 (March 1973), p. 660. 
7 "Testing Time for Busing," Newsweek, September 8, 
1975, p. 79. 
8Ibid. 
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Table 2, based on University of Michigan research 
and published in Newsweek magazine, indicated a rating of 
cities on a scale of 0 for total segregation and 100 for com-
9 plete racial balance in 1967. The problem of desegregation 
during the 1960's extended outside the South. Not only did 
the University of Michigan's study show that Southern cities 
such as Atlanta scored a five, but also that the Northern city 
of Chicago scored eight. 
The Supreme Court, growing impatient with the speed 
of desegregation, forced school boards to look for a means 
of implementing the desegregation process.10 One solution, 
busing, was apparent to many people. Busing meant students 
from a majority race were joined by bus with students from a 
minority race.11 After all, the solution was not new because 
rural sections of the United States had used buses to trans-
12 port students to consolidated schools for many years. 
Congressman Morris Udall voiced the feelings of some 
decision makers in the West and North when he said: 
In many respects the Civil Rights revolution of the 
1960's was a striking success. But in the area of 
education we have largely had a psychological victory 
and practical failure. Many of our Southern friends 
told us that things were not all so simple and that 
g 
"Testing Time for Busing," Newsweek, September 8, 
1975, p. 79. 
10United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
372 P. 2d 836 
11Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1970). 
12Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
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Table 2 
Rating of Cities on a Scale of 0 for Total Segregation 
and 100 for Complete Racial Balance in 1967 
City Rating 
Atlanta 5 
Boston 26 
Charlotte 23 
Chicago 8 
Dallas 8 
Denver 8 
Detroit 21 
Indianapolis 15 
Jacksonville 8 
Los Angeles 11 
New York 48 
Oklahoma City 3 
Philadelphia 24 
San Francisco 33 
Tampa 12 
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there would be different reactions when the tough 
school integration problems came North. We know that 
much of what they said was right. 
The present day busing practice illustrated below 
showed only about 3 percent students bused for the purpose 
of desegregation, according to a 1972 Department of Health, 
14 Education, and Welfare memorandum. 
Number of children bused to school.. 19.6 million 
Cost of busing (including replacement) 1.5 billion 
Busing cost in states as percentages of 
total educational outlays 0.7% to 6.9% 
Number of buses 256,000 
Number of drivers 275,000 
Miles traveled per year 2.2 billion 
Concerning pupil transportation and the responsibil­
ity of transportation as applied to education, the North 
Carolina State Board of Education said: 
As long as we have accepted a narrow and limited edu­
cation as satisfactory, the State discharged this 
responsibility primarily through the establishment of 
a small school within walking distance of most pupils. 
But demands on the school for a broadened program 
increased. Those and other factors have resulted in 
transportation of pupils to and from school becoming 
one of the most important of the auxiliary activities 
of the schools. 
The post World War II era brought about an influx 
of large numbers of students. Student enrollment surpassed 
the rate of school construction. Therefore busing was utilized 
13 Congressional Record, 11. 11883 (daily ed. March 8, 
1972). 
14 Nicolaus Mills, The Great School Bus Controversy 
(New York: Teachers College Press, 1973), pp. 6-8. 
15 Nicolaus Mills, "Busing: Who's Being Taken for a 
Ride?", Commonweal, March 24, 1972, p. 4. 
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as an implement for transporting students into less crowded 
schools. In St. Louis, Missouri, buses were used to shift 
16 students to schools with fewer pupils. This plan was an 
effective alternative to the establishment of double shifts 
that otherwise would have had students divided into morning 
and afternoon groups. 
Administrators had tried for decades to sell busing 
17 as a means to achieve quality education. This plea focused 
on providing a school that could compete with schools in 
the cities. Objections concerning the school bus were: 
(1) length of time students spent on the bus; (2) distance 
traveled; and (3) safety and cost of busing. 
Prior to 1954, students were bused in the Southern 
18 states literally as a means of segregating the races. Most 
Southern states operated a dual bus system, one for white 
19 children and one for black children. Often both buses 
20 operated on the same streets and highways. Buses transport­
ing black students often passed near white schools en route 
21 to the all-black school. 
16 Nicolaus Mills, "Busing: Who's Being Taken for a 
Ride?", Commonweal, March 24, 1972, p. 4. 
17Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
18 Richard Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970), p. 322. 
19Ibid. 20Ibid. 
21Ibid. 
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Thus the formerly accepted means of improving educa­
tion became a paradoxical solution when applied to desegre­
gating schools. Violent opposition to busing for desegrega­
tion in such places as Detroit, Louisville, and Boston had a 
familiar ring. Such concerns as (1) safety, (2) distance 
children had to travel, and (3) associated costs were exhib-
22 xted by the opponents of busing. 
James Bolner concluded: 
. . .  w e  a r e  c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  t h e  b u s i n g  i s s u e  i s  i n  l a r g e  
part a symbol of opposition to school desegregation 
and residential integration. That is, busing has become 
one of the battlegrounds on the central question: Does 
the United States want a socially integrated society.2^ 
The busing issue that had arisen over the Supreme Court's 
ordered busing for desegregation was found to be a symbol of 
resistance for people opposed to the entire integration doc-
24 trine by two Duke University researchers. These researchers 
had only recently established through research what was 
25 thought true by others. That is, that attitudes opposed 
to school busing were based more on racial feelings than on 
yc 
a real concern for the quality of the educational process. 
In summary the findings were: * 
22 Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, p. 321. 
23 James Bolner, Busing: The Political and Judicial 
Process (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 234. 
24 "Antibusing Called Symbolic Racism," Greensboro 
Daily News, August 29, 1977. 
25Ibid. 26Ibid. 
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Symbolic racism is a much greater factor in busing oppo­
sition than conventional racism based on negative stereo­
types of blacks. Racial attitudes are "closely related 
to antibusing attitudes ... the more racist, the more 
opposed to busing." ... The inconvenience of busing 
and concern for quality of education were only weakly 
associated with opposition to the belief of some research­
ers.27 
The Berkeley, California, school system became the 
28 first city to achieve full desegregation by busing in 1968. 
Other cities such as Galveston, Texas, Oklahoma City, and 
Pontiac, Michigan, started to utilize busing after the suc-
29 cess in Berkeley. 
This desegregation method was mentioned in Hobsan v. 
Hansen as a means of desegregating school systems located in 
larger cities.^ 
There was much speculation about the limits of court 
ordered busing until this question was answered by the United 
31 States Supreme Court in the decision of Swann. In this 
famous landmark case the Supreme Court insisted that cross 
district busing could indeed be instituted in order to deseg-
32 regate the school systems. 
27 
"Antibusing Called Symbolic Racism," Greensboro 
Daily News, August 29, 1977. 
28 Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, p. 321. 
29_,. , Ibid. 
Of) 
Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967). 
31 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
32Ibid. 
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It seemed appropriate, however, before looking at 
Swann, to examine three cases that set the stage for Swann. 
The Court moved from a prohibition of segregation to a 
requirement of racial balance. Obviously this led to the 
busing in Swann. 
33 Griffin v., County Board of Prince Edward County came 
to the Supreme Court just ten years after the Court had 
insisted, in Brown II, that a "prompt and reasonable" start 
must be made in order to comply with the 1955 decision of 
34 
Brown II. The Court remanded the cases in Brown II to the 
district court and directed to "admit to public schools on a 
racial non-discriminatory basis with 'all deliberate speed' 
35 the parties to these cases." However, the ten-year period 
that passed brought about few results and impatience of the 
Court. The planned delays, reflected in Griffin, concerning 
the closing of public schools and the state's paying the 
tuition for students to attend private schools, denied Negro 
children equal protection, the Court said. Justice Hugo 
Black referred to Brown II when he said, "The time for mere 
'deliberate speed' has run out." It was clear that the 
33 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
34 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954). 
35 
Ibid. 
Q/r 
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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Court had moved from a position of tolerance and delay, 
because of unexpected problems, to one of intolerance and 
indignation. The time for compliance with Brown I had come. 
In a 1967 case, United States v. Jefferson County 
37 Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court failed 
to grant certiorari and thus established a Fifth Circuit1s 
decision as the one to be followed. Because of this decision, 
many provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were reversed 
38 
and rendered worthless. The district court was explicit 
in the language when stating "the only school desegregation 
39 
plan that meets constitutional standards is one that works." 
Thus again, more emphatically, the Court of the land had 
stated that the decade of "tokenism" was over. 
The intent of the district court was clear. However, 
the court's decision entered into semantics when using "inte-
40 
gration" and "desegregation" as being interchangeable. The 
district court referred to the doctrine in Brown, (specif-
41 ically Briggs v. Elliott), in that Brown did not require 
42 
integration but only forbade enforced segregation. 
37 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
340 U.S. 480 (1967). 
38 
Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree (Ithaca, N. Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 66. 
39 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
372 F. 2d 836 (1967). 
40 
Ibid., p. 59. 
^Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (1952). 
42 Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record, p. 452. 
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Specifically, the district court referred to the 
"mystique" developing over the differences between the terms 
in stating just how incorrect the dictum was: 
The dictum is a product of the narrow view that 
Fourteenth Amendment rights are only individual rights; 
that, therefore, Negro school children individually 
must exhaust their administrative remedies and will not 
be allowed to bring class suits to desegrate a school 
system. However, we use the term "integration" and 
"desegregation" of a formerly segregated dual system to 
a unitary, non racial system—lock, stock, and barrel: 
students, faculty, staff, facilities, programs and 
activities. . . .43 
The district court then stressed necessity to inte­
grate the system by saying: 
As we see it, the law imposes an absolute duty 
to . . . disestablish segregation. And an absolute 
duty to integrate. . . . Racial mixing of students 
is a high priority educational goal. . . ,44 
Interestingly enough the Court also referred to the 
Civil Rights Act as the fact that the Court had "... taken 
a close look at the background and objectives of the Civil 
45 
Rights Act of 1964. ..." However, section 401 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 stated quite clearly: 
Desegregation means that assignment of students 
to public schools and within such schools without 
regard to their race, color, religion or national 
origin, but desegregation shall not mean the assignment 
of students to public schools in order to overcome 
racial imbalance.46 
43 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educa­
tion, 372 F. 2d 836 (1967). 
44 
Ibid. 
45 
Civil Rights Act, Section 401,11964, as cited in 
Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 61. 
4^Ibid. 
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The Court spoke to this with a different interpre­
tation. 
The affirmative position of this definition down to 
its "but" clause, describes the assignment provision 
meaning in a plan for conversion of a de jure dual 
system to a unitary, integrated system. The negative 
portion, starting with "but" includes assignment to 
overcome racial imbalance, that is, it acts to overcome 
de facto segregation. As used in the Act, therefore, 
"desegregation" refers only to the disestablishment of 
segregation in de jure segregated schools.47 
The district court's reasoning was somewhat inconsis-
48 tent with logical reasoning. The civil rights language 
stated that desegregation did mean the assignment of stu­
dents. This fact was clear. However, clear or not, litiga­
tion had now entered the dictum of the Court, and thus 
ratios and racial balance became legal tools for desegrega­
tion. Legal direction had shifted the meaning of the Civil 
49 
Rights Act of 1964. 
Four years after Griffin, and only one year after 
the Jefferson County case, many school systems in the South 
were under a "freedom of choice" plan. This plan allowed 
students to choose schools; otherwise, students were assigned 
to the school nearest home. Although there were variations 
in each school system, the plans basically were similar. 
47 United States v. Jefferson County Board of Educa­
tion, 372 F. 2d 878 (1967). 
48 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 61. 
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The New Kent County School Board had generally such 
a plan. However, the plan actually desegregated the schools 
very little. 
The case that dealt the death blow to the effective 
use of "freedom of choice" was Green v. County School Board 
50 
of New Kent County. The Court stated New Kent School 
Board's "freedom of choice plan cannot be accepted as a suf­
ficient step to effectuate a transition to a unitary sys-
51 tem." Although the Supreme Court did not rule the plan 
unconstitutional, the Court termed the plan was ineffective 
and, in turn, directed the school board to "provide a plan 
52 that promises realistically to work now." Justice William 
Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Lino Graglia described the 1968 Green decision as work­
ing a "revolution in the law of school segregation comparable 
53 to, indeed more drastic than, that effected by Brown. 
Graglia further insisted "the Court changed the constitu­
tional mandate from a prohibition to a requirement of racial 
. . . 54 discrimination in school assignment." Graglia charged 
that the Court had not only required desegregation but had 
gone even further to integrate the schools; therefore, 
50 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
51Ibid., p. 441. 52Ibid., p. 439. 
53 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 67. 
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discrimination resulted. The situation was referred to as 
reverse discrimination. This hypothesis was difficult to 
accept until there was a decision on reverse discrimination. 
Currently there are reverse discriminatory cases pending 
before the Court and only after a decision could the require­
ment be declared actual discrimination. Although full accep­
tance of the hypothesis was questionable, there were a number 
of questions that arose from inconsistencies in Court reason­
ing . 
The Court insisted that the dual school systems of 
Brown I era were unconstitutional and dual systems that were 
"part white and part Negro" be abolished. If this were the 
only mandate of the Court's opinion, then the New Kent County 
School Board had complied by abolishing the attendance 
requirements in 1965 when the "freedom of choice" plan was 
55 adopted. However, the Court continued by insisting that 
the school system was "required by Brown II to effectuate a 
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. 
The Court acknowledged that school board position 
contended the board had "fully discharged its obligation" by 
virtue of having the "freedom of choice" plan in which each 
57 
student might choose a school, regardless of race. The 
55 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 433 (1968). 
56Ibid., p. 430. 
"*^Ibid., p. 437. 
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Court responded by stating that the plan "ignores the thrust 
58 
of Brown II." Thus, the thrust of Brown II appeared to be 
the basic disagreement between the school board and the 
Court. The Court then insisted what must be done after the 
"Board opened the doors" to the Negro children: 
School boards were nevertheless clearly charged with 
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch.59 
This was construed to mean no more than Brown I require­
ment. 
Green did not speak of requiring integration as the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had but rather spoke of 
60 requiring desegregation. However, as in Jefferson County, 
the Supreme Court1s interpretation of Brown I as applied to 
Green was radically changed and went beyond simply ending a dual 
61 
system. The Court insisted the school board must go fur­
ther in the desegregation process. 
fi 0 
In Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 
the United States Supreme Court, one year later, spoke more 
58 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 437 (1968). 
59Ibid., pp. 437, 438. 
60 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 73. 
61Ibid. 
Alexander v„ Holmes County Board of Education, 
396 U.S. 19 (1969). 
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6 3 
strongly to thirty-three Mississippi school districts. In 
only a one-paragraph opinion, the Court stated that "con­
tinued operation of segregated schools under a standard of 
allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no 
64 longer constitutionally permissible." However, the thxrty-
three school districts were ordered by the Green imperative 
to offer new plans. An extension of the time was requested 
and granted by the Fifth Circuit. Upon a motion to vacate 
the order Justice Hugo Black acknowledged that 
. . . Federal Courts have ever since Brown II struggled 
with the phrase, "all deliberate speed." Unfortunately, 
this struggle has not eliminated dual school systems, 
and I am of the opinion that so long as that phrase is 
a relevant factor, they will never be eliminated.65 
Justice Black insisted that there was no "reason why such a 
wholesale deprivation of Constitutional rights should be 
66 
tolerated another minute." 
The issue before the Court was, however, not one of 
whether "all deliberate speed" was constitutionally permiss­
ible. The basic issue concerning application was to vacate 
the postponement of the date for submission of a new plan 
6 7 for desegregation. The Court made use of the opportunity 
to elaborate on the new position and insisted that the "dual 
c O 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 
396 U.S. 1219 (1970). 
64Ibid., p. 20. 6^Ibid. 66Ibid., p. 1219. 
67Ibid., p. 1218. 
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68 system must be eliminated 'at once.1" The Court did not 
question whether the Fifth Circuit had erred or whether the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Health, Educa­
tion, and Welfare were inappropriate in requesting an exten-
69 sion. The Court delivered a per curiam opinion. 
The position of the United States Supreme Court, 
between 1954 and 1969, changed from one of prohibiting de jure 
segregation to one of integration. This position proved to 
be one of banning segregation that turned to one of requiring 
integration. 
Although the full significance of these early cases 
may not have been so apparent at the time, these background 
cases illustrated the Court's redefined stand in Brown I and 
II. The observer might look back and well visualize the 
realities of racial balance as those that would indeed void 
the scarcity of the neighborhood schools. 
LEGALIZED BUSING 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
In March, 1970, chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
reflected on many of the questions that had confused many 
70 school boards and much of the nation. In Northcross, 
68 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 
Tennessee, City Schools, 397 U.S.234(1970). 
Memphi 
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Justice Burger stated that "as soon as possible, we ought to 
71 
resolve some of the basic practical problems." Justice 
Burger referred to questions concerning: (1) constitutional 
matters of racial balance; (2) alteration of school dis­
tricts; and (3) the extent of transportation. The answers 
to the questions were not long in coming. The April, 1971, 
Swann case partially provided answers. The Swann decision — ~_
approved busing as one of several means of eliminating a dual 
school system that had a past history of de jure discrimina­
tion. 
The United States District Court had ordered exten­
sive busing in order to achieve the same ratio of blacks and 
whites throughout the district. Some years earlier the school 
system had complied with a federal court order that required 
72 much less drastic desegregation. 
The school district was a combined system which 
73 included the entire county as well as the city of charlotte. 
The system in the 1968-1969 school year contained over 84,000 
students in 107 schools. Twenty-nine percent of the students 
were black and concentrated in the city. Fourteen thousand 
Negro students were enrolled in twenty-one schools that were 
74 99 percent black. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
71 
Northeross v. Board of Education of the Memphis, 
Tennessee, City Schools, 397 U.S. 237 (1970). 
72 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 7 (1971). 
73Ibid., p. 6. 74Ibid., p. 5. 
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. . .  t o  r e v i e w  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  a s  t o  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  
school authorities and the scope of power of federal 
courts under the court's mandate to eliminate racially 
separate public schools established and maintained by 
state action.75 
The actual opinion established a requirement of racially 
76 balanced schools. It included cross-district busing for 
racial balance in a city with patterns that developed out­
side the direct control of the school board. Like most of 
the nation, neighborhood school assignments were utilized. 
The Court made use of the Green mandate by insist­
ing that racial balance was necessary in order to "dismantle 
the dual system." The district court had stated that the 
racial balance was required in order to improve academic per 
77 formance of black students. 
The Supreme Court stated that the objective was "to 
eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
78 imposed segregation." Because of the past history of dis­
crimination, the Court seemed to be intent on some form of 
79 punishment for the public school system. The Court appar­
ently was not satisfied with simply abolishing the de jure 
dual system. This issue reappeared in later de facto cases 
80 outside the South. 
75 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 6 (1971). 
76Ibid., p. 6. 77Ibid., p. 7. 
78 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 117. 
79 , 80 , . _ , , 0 Ibid. Ibid., p. 118. 
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The Court's impatience with progress of the deseg-
regative process during the decade and a half surfaced as 
the Court reasoned, "If school authorities fail in their 
affirmative obligations under these holdings/ judicial author-
81 
ity may be involved." The Court continued by stating that 
"judicial authority" was within the much broadened scope of 
Q 9 
the district court's power at this point. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger was concerned with 
Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act when stating that the 
language and history of Title IV showed that "it was not 
enacted to limit, but to define, the rule of the Federal Gov-
83 ernment in the implementation of the Brown I decision." 
Mr. Burger then defined segregation by quoting Section 2000c (b) 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Desegregation means the assignment of students to pub­
lic schools and within such schools without regard to 
their race, color, religion, or national origin, but 
desegregation shall not mean the assignment of students 
to public schools in order to overcome racial imbal­
ance. 84 
The proviso of Section 2000C-6 was also quoted by 
the Court: 
Nothing herein shall empower any official or court of 
the United States to issue any order seeking to achieve 
a racial balance in any school by requiring the transpor­
tation of pupils or students from one school to another 
81 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 15 (1971). 
82Ibid. 83Ibid., p. 16. 84Ibid., p. 170 
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or one school district to another in order to achieve 
such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing 
power of the Court to ensure compliance with constitu­
tional standards.85 
Justice Burger stated that the proviso of Section 
2000 C-6 was not intended to restrict those remedial powers 
86 
of courts. Mr. Burger further elaborated that Congress 
was concerned with a "right of action under the Fourteenth ' 
Amendment" in reference to racial imbalance created by de facto 
segregation when there was no history of discrimination by 
87 
state authorities. According to Lino Graglia, the objec­
tive of provisions in Section 2000c (b) and Section 2000C-6 
was inserted at the insistence of the representatives from 
Q Q  
the South. 
Mr. Burger then turned to the "central issue" in the 
case and proceeded to outline four problem areas: 
(1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas may 
be used as an implement in a remedial order to correct 
a previously segregated system: 
(2) whether every all-Negro and all-white school must be 
eliminated as an indispensable part of a remedial 
process of desegregation; 
(3) what the limits are, if any, on the rearrangement 
of school districts and attendance zones, as a 
remedial measure; and 
(4) what the limits are, if any, on the use of transpor­
tation facilities to correct state-enforced racial 
school segregation.89 
85 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 17 (1971). 
86Ibid. 87Ibid. 
88 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 123. 
89 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 22 (1971). 
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(1) Racial Balances or Quotas 
Mr. Burger elaborated on the first problem area of 
racial balance by stating that the 
. . .  c o n s t a n t  t h e m e  a n d  t h r u s t  o f  e v e r y  h o l d i n g  f r o m  
Brown I to date is that state-enforced separation of 
races in public schools is discrimination that vio­
lates the Equal Protection Clause. ® 
Mr. Burger pointed out that the Court's concern was with 
the "elimination of the discrimination inherent in the dual 
91 
school systems." Chief Justice Burger stated that the 
Court was not concerned in this case with all the problems 
of racial prejudice even when these problems contribute to 
92 disproportionate racial concentrations in some schools. 
Chief Justice Burger referred to the district court's 
use of the percentages, 71 percent of the pupils being white 
and 29 percent Negroes, as based on the fact that there had 
93 been a de jure dual school system until 1969. However, in 
1965, the Fourth Circuit had accepted a plan that placed over 
two thousand Negro students in schools that had a majority 
94 
of whites. This plan later found favor with the district 
court with a suggestion that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg sys­
tem had "achieved a degree and volume of desegregation of 
90 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 22 (1971). 
91Ibid. 92Ibid., p. 23. 93Ibid., p. 7. 
94 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 122. 
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95 
school apparently unsurpassed in these parts." This indi­
cated that, at least in 1965, the school board was indeed 
progressing with the obligation to eliminate the dual system. 
(2) One Race Schools 
Concerning the second area, one-race schools, Mr. 
Burger discussed whether "every all-Negro and all-white 
school must be eliminated as an indispensable part of a remed-
96 ial process of desegregation." The Court clearly stated 
that under some circumstances certain schools might remain 
as "all or largely one-race schools until new schools could 
97 
be provided or neighborhood patterns change." The Court 
hastened to point out that where a school system was in the 
process of conversion to a unitary system the school board had 
the burden of showing that these schools were nondiscrimina-
98 tory. Here the Supreme Court had partially answered a 
question concerning desegregation of the large pockets of 
99 
minority groups in the metropolitan areas. 
(3) Remedial Alterations of Zones 
The third question the Court pondered concerned "the 
limits, if any, on the arrangement of school districts and 
95 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
243-Supp. 662 (W.D.N.C. 1965) affirmed 269 F 2d 29 (4th 
Circuit, 1966). 
96 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 22 (1971). 
Q7 Qfi 
Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 26. 
99 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 123. 
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attendance zones as a remedial measure.""1"00 In speaking of 
the tools employed, Mr. Burger stated that the Court approved 
gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones as 
possible steps, and included pairing and "clustering" or 
grouping as a means of breaking up attendance patterns of 
a de_ jure dual school system."1'0"'' 
Once again, the Court seemed to be speaking to the 
large metropolitan areas that traditionally used the neigh­
borhood concept by insisting that a school system with no 
history of discrimination employ a plan that assigned stu-
102 dents to schools nearest their home. 
(4) Transportation of Students 
Fourth, Mr. Burger discussed what "limits were, if 
any, on the use of transportation facilities to correct 
103 state-enforced racial school segregation." Actually, the 
busing issue in the opinion was somewhat brief, even though 
Swann was important because of the busing issue. After a 
brief historical discussion and analysis that school buses 
had been a part of public education for years, the Court 
developed the thesis that because bus transportation was an 
accepted tool in education the district court could indeed 
use buses to effectively dismantle the dual system."1"04 
00Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 22 (1971). 
101Ibid., p. 27. 102Ibid. 103Ibid., p. 22. 
104Ibid., p. 30. 
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Therefore, busing was an acceptable remedy because "desegre-
105 
gation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school." 
The final point the Court made in Swann had to do 
with an answer to what was later to prove to be a problem 
with the so called "white flight." Mr. Burger spoke to future 
adjustments of busing thusly: 
It does not follow that the communities served by such 
systems will remain demographically stable. . . . 
Neither school authorities nor district courts are 
constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjust­
ments of the racial composition of student bodies once 
the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accom­
plished and racial discrimination through official 
action is eliminated from the system.10® 
This line of reasoning later became more fully developed in 
107 Pasadena and other important cases of the mid seventies. 
As a final footnote to Swann, Judge James McMillan, 
after overseeing the busing in Charlotte, decided the Federal 
Court no longer needed to be involved in the day to day imple­
mentation. Thus Justice McMillan removed Swann from the 
108 
"active" docket in an order that he subtitled "Swann Song." 
105 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 30 (1971). 
106Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
107 
Pasadena v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
108 
"Judge's Swann Song Orders Integration Case," 
Greensboro Daily News, July 21, 1975. 
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ALTERATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
School Board of Richmond, Virginia v. State Board 
of Education of Virginia, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
The central issue in this case concerned three sepa­
rate school districts being required to consolidate and form 
a new district that contained a smaller ratio of black stu­
dents. The Richmond City School District became 69 percent 
109 
black and 31 percent white in 1971. The city school 
board tried to prevent the school district from becoming 
all-black by attempting to have the city system consolidate 
with two surrounding county systems. This was followed by 
an order by district court. The consolidation would have 
changed the black-white percent to 60 percent white anc1 
34 percent black.110 However, the system would have expanded 
to over 750 square miles and 100,000 students.1"1"1 The Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth District en banc reversed the 
district court.11^ 
Fourth Circuit Judge Craven stated the question 
before the court was "whether a federal district judge may 
require a state to change its internal governmental stmacture 
113 in order to achieve racial balance in its schools." The 
109 
Bradley v. School Board City of Richmond, 462 F 2d 
1058 (4th Circuit 1972TI 
110Ibid., pp. 1058, 1074. 11;LIbid., p. 1074. 
112 113 
Ibid. Ibid., p. 1060. 
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was no 
requirement for internal consolidation except for the pur­
pose of dismantling a dual system. The Court insisted that 
Richmond had "done all it can do to disestablish to the max­
imum extent possible, the formerly state imposed dual school 
114 system within its municipal boundary." The Supreme 
Court continued by saying that such a consolidation of school 
systems would be such size that it would produce 
. . .  p r a c t i c a l i t i e s  o f  b u d g e t i n g  a n d  f i n a n c e  t h a t  
boggle the mind and the only reason for the consolida­
tion was the concept that it was good for children of 
different economic and social backgrounds to associate 
together.115 
Certiorari was granted in the Richmond case. Justice 
Lewis Powell did not participate and the remaining Justices 
divided equally. The Fourth Circuit's decision was thus 
affirmed. 
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 
407 U.S. 451 (1972T 
The General Assemblies in North Carolina and Virginia 
sought to frustrate the Brown I and II mandate by carving 
presumably majority white administrative units out of heavily 
black county school units. The Supreme Court spoke forcefully 
114 Bradley v. School Board City of Richmond, 462 F 2d 
1061 (4th Circuit 1972TI 
115Ibid., p. 1065. 
116 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 158. 
149 
117 
to this issue in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia and 
118 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education. 
In Emporia, the attempt was made to split the combined school 
district into a county school system and a city of Emporia 
school district. This attempt came after the Court ordered 
the schools to be "paired." The proposed split would cause 
the county system to be 72 percent black and 28 percent 
white. The result in the city would have been 48 percent 
white and 52 percent black, wheieas the combined system has 
66 percent black and 34 percent white. Although the district 
court had enjoined the split because of reduced white stu­
dents in the county schools, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the decision on the grounds that the city 
119 of Emporia had sound educational reasons. The Supreme 
Court also noted that there was only a small impact on the 
racial composition. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to con­
sider the circumstances under which a federal court might 
enjoin state or local officials from "carving out a new school 
district from an existing district that had not yet completed 
the process of dismantling a system of enforced racial 
117 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
451 (1972). 
118 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Edu­
cation, 407 U.S. 484 (1971). 
119 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
464 (1972). 
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120 
segregation." The Court stated that the "problem has 
151 
confronted other courts." 
Justice Potter Stewart, relying heavily on the Green 
mandate, insisted that the method of desegregation must not 
fail to "provide meaningful assurances of prompt and effec-
T O O  
tive disestablishment of a dual system." Moreover, the 
Court was evidently concerned with racial balance as a pri­
mary issue, although the issue was not reflected in the 
opinion. The Court did demonstrate concern by insisting 
that 
. . .  w e  n e e d  a n d  d o  n o t  h o l d  t h a t  t h i s  d i s p a r i t y  . . .  
[the split would make the city 48 percent white and 
52 percent Negroj in the racial composition of the two 
systems would be a sufficient reason . . .to enjoin 
the creation of a separate school district.-^3 
The Supreme Court then, relying on Swann, insisted 
the 
. . .  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o m m a n d  t o  d e s e g r e g a t e  s c h o o l s  
does not mean that every school in every community 
must always reflect the racial composition of the 
school system as whole.^^4 
120 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
452-453 (1972). 
121Ibid., p. 453. 
122 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 438 (1968). 
123 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
464 (1972). 
124 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 24 (1971). 
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The Court pointed out that there were three factors 
in addition to racial percentages: (1) the county white 
school children would go to academies; (2) school buildings 
in Emporia were better equipped; and (3) timing of the split 
would cause an adverse psychological effect upon the remain-
125 ing children in the county schools. The Court, m summary, 
acknowledged that 
. . . the city's creation of a separate school system 
was enjoined because of the effect it would have had, 
at the time, upon the effectiveness of the remedy ordered 
to dismantle the dual system that had long existed in 
the area.-*-26 
The dissent of Chief Justice Warren Burger, joined 
by three other Justices, indicated the discord within the 
127 Court at this time. The most convincing argument lr the 
dissent centered around an analysis of the resulting circum­
stances of the two districts if they were split. Justice 
Burger stated that "if the severance of the two systems were 
permitted to proceed . . . assignments to schools would in no 
128 sense depend on race." Justice Burger said that he believed 
a system could be produced without a "white school and a Negro 
school, but just schools if Emporia had been permitted to 
129 operate its own school system." Justice Burger insisted 
125 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
464, 465, 466 (1972). 
126Ibid., p. 470. 127Ibid. 
128Ibid., pp. 470-471. 129Ibid., p. 471. 
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that separation would "completely eliminate all traces of 
130 state-imposed segregation." Justice Burger pointed out 
that although there would be different racial ratios in the 
two school systems these disparities were not the mission 
of desegregation. The Justices who dissented recognized 
this fact concerning racial ratios. The dissenting Justices, 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, continued with an elabora­
tion on racial balance when pointing out that the great, con­
cern of the district court on the 6 percent increase in the 
Negro students in the county schools of Emporia was with-
131 
drawn. Footnote number one pointed out that the pupil-
teacher ratio of twenty-five to one would give the 6 percent 
racial shift a change of 1.5 students per class and thrt 
Justice Burger said that a difference of one or two children 
132 would not render the school as a dual system. 
Justice Burger then condemned racial proportions 
in a given geographical area by saying: 
Since the goal is to dismantle the dual school systems 
rather than to reproduce in each classroom microcosmic 
reflections of the racial proportions of a given geo­
graphical area, there is no basis for saying that a 
plan that provides a uniform racial balance is more 
effective or constitutionally preferred.133 
Next Justice Burger turned attention to an issue that 
was not part of the majority opinion, "racial balance." 
130 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
473 (1972). 
1 ̂ 1 132 1 3^ 
Ibid., p. 475. Ibid., p. 473. XJ-:>Ibid., p. 474. 
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Justice Warren Burger said: 
Just as racial balance is not required in remedying 
a dual system, neither are racial ratios the sole 
consideration to be taken into account in devising 
a workable remedy.134 
United States v. Scotland Neck City 
Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1971) 
Scotland Neck had many similar characteristics of 
Emporia. As in Emporia, the General Assembly had proposed 
to separate Scotland Neck from the Halifax County school 
system. The system, in 1968-1969, had 10,655 students of 
whom 77 percent were Negro, 22 percent white, and 1 percent 
American Indian. The proposed New Scotland Neck system would 
have had 695 students, of whom 399 or 57 percent were white 
135 and 296 or 43 percent were Negro. 
The Legislature enacted a bill that created the new 
116 
system in March of 1969. The district court enjoined 
the implementation of the state's action by saying that "the 
act in its application creates a refuge for white students, 
137 and promotes segregated schools in Halifax County." The 
district court also stated that the act defeated plans to 
desegregate the schools. However, the Fourth Circuit Court 
134 Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
465 (1972). 
135 United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, 407 U.S. 485 (1971). 
136Ibid., p. 484. 137Ibid., p. 488. 
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of Appeals reversed the ruling because "severance was not 
part of a desegregation plan proposed by the school board/" 
but stated that it was the "legislature redefining the boun­
daries."138 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, thus 
affirming the district court's ruling that the legislation 
"was enacted with the effect of creating refuge for white 
139 
students in the Halifax County School System." Justice 
Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices William J. Brennan, Byron R. White, and Thurgood 
Marshall joined. Chief Justice Warren Burger filed an opin­
ion concurring in the result, in which Justices Harry Black-
140 
mun, Lewis F. Powel}., and William F. Rehnquist joined. 
The Court acknowledged concern for the result of separation 
.  .  . i n  t h i s  l i t i g a t i o n ,  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  i n  t h e  r a c i a l  
composition of the Scotland Neck School and the schools 
remaining in District I of the Halifax County System 
would be "substantiated" by any standard of measure­
ment. 141 
The Court spoke of the Scotland Neck's proposed transfer 
plan as being one that would cause the Scotland Neck school 
system to be the "white school" and the other schools would 
stay "Negro schools." 
138 
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, 442 F. 2d 583. 
139 United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, 314 F. Supp. 78. 
140Ibid., p. 484. 
l^United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, 4U/ U.S. 4yu (19/^). 
155 
The Court quickly disposed of the state's action 
issue and relied on Swann quoting, "State policy must give 
way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal consti-
142 tutional guarantees." The court held as no "constitutional 
significance" that the act was State General Assembly action 
143 
rather than action by school boards or city authorities. 
Although the cases were not termed landmark cases 
they were significant because of the following points: 
(1) although Richmond"^"^ decision came from a divided Court 
there was support within the Supreme Court that restricted 
busing within a city: (2) the practicalities of racial bal-
145 
ance m the proposed consolidation of Richmond were out­
weighed by such factors as numbers of pupils, costs, size of 
146 area and expected gain: (3) in Emporia the Court did not 
see racial balance as a requirement in splitting a school 
147 district: and (4) in Scotland Neck state policy had to 
142 North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 
402 U.S. 45 (1972). 
143 United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, 407 U.S. 492 (19727^ 
144 School Board of Richmond, Virginia v. State Board 
of Education~~of Virginia, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
145 
Ibid. 
1 
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
464 (1972). 
147 United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of 
Education, 407 U.S. 485 (1971). 
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give way to federal authority when such policy inhibited or 
obstructed desegregation. The fact that there was a major 
division in the Court in Richmond indicated some Justices 
were unwilling to involve school districts outside the city 
in solving problems of racial balance within a city. 
INTENT TO SEGREGATE 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) 
In Keyes, the Supreme Court found proven segregative 
148 intent policy by the school board. This case furth.r 
explored what Justice Douglas called "no constitutional dif-
149 ference between de jure and de facto segregation." 
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court 
and was joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, and 
Blackmun. Justice Douglas filed a separate opinion, chief 
Justice Burger concurred in the result. Justice Powell con­
curred in part and dissented in part. Justice Rehnquist dis-
150 
sented. Justice White took no part. 
The significant point made in Keyes was the fact that 
the cases in Swann showed that there was a history of a dual 
system that produced segregation. The circumstances in Denver 
were somewhat different in that integration was imposed even 
148 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
149 150 
Ibid., p. 214. Ibid., p. 190. 
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though the school system had provisions that permitted the 
separation of races in the public schools. In fact, Justice 
Brennan pointed out that the Colorado Constitution prohibited 
"classification of pupils ... on account of race or 
151 
color." This was pointed out by Justice William Brennan 
in delivering the Court's opinion. However, Justice Brennan 
saw fit to direct compulsory integration on grounds other 
than as an appropriate remedy as it had been in the cases 
from the South. 
The case originated in 1967 when suit was brought as 
a result in a shift in the desegregation plans for the Park 
Hill area schools that had become increasingly black. The 
plan was simply an adopted resolution that the school tx.ard 
had developed. The resolution included the following: 
(1) that racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic factors be con­
sidered in establishing boundaries and new schools; (2) a 
later resolution adopted by the school board stated that the 
superintendent of schools was to submit a plan that would 
152 integrate the Denver schools. That portion of the plan 
included busing students in the Park Hill schools in order 
to implement integration. The resolution was never to be 
carried out because of the replacement of two board members 
151 Colorado Constitution, Article IX, Section 8, 
p. 191. 
152 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 195, 196 (1973). 
158 
by election. The supporters of the resolution brought suit 
because of the alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
153 to the Constitution. The petitioners also charged that 
the entire Denver school system was operating as a segregated 
system because not only were black and white separated but 
also "Hispanos" and "Anglos." 
The district court issued an order for the desegre­
gation of the Park Hill area schools after expanded legal 
action to obtain desegregation of the rest of the Denver 
154 schools. However, the district court denied this addi­
tional relief by stating that this was unlike the racial seg­
regation of the Park Hill Schools. The court, however, asked 
petitioners to prove de jure segregation. Relying on Plessy 
155 v. Ferguson m its "separate but equal" doctrine, the dis­
trict court found the core city schools segregated and the 
schools were educationally inferior to other schools irt the 
district. 
Then the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case. 
The district court ruling concerning Park Hill schools was 
156 
affirmed. However, the Circuit Court reversed the decision 
153 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 195 (1973). 
154 , Ibid. 
1 55 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
156 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 176. 
159 
157 concerning Denver and other racially imbalanced schools. 
The court of appeals remanded the case for consideration of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and pointed out, "the limitation of 
the power of the federal courts to achieve racial balance by 
158 
transportation of children from one school to another." 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but restricted 
review to court of appeals' ruling that reversed district 
court's core city decree. The school board requested that 
Park Hill school be delineated from certiorari. The request 
was granted. 
Justice William Brennan, writing the majority opin­
ion, began by examining the "District Court's method of 
159 defining a 'segregated school.'" He pointed out that 
Denver had a racial corfiposition of 66 percent Anglo, 14 per-
i fin 
cent Negro, and 20 percent Hispano in the public schools. 
He further acknowledged the Supreme Court had no opinion 
concerning the district court's definition of an inferior 
school as being 70-75 percent white.However, a "segregated" 
school in the de jure sense depended on the "facts of each 
particular case," as well as the faculty, staff, community, 
162 and administrative attitude. The district court erred by 
157 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, p. 176. 
158 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 206(1973). 
159Ibid., p. 196. 160Ibid., p. 195. 161Ibid. 
162Ibid., p. 209. 
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separating Negroes and Hispanos when defining a segregated 
school. Justice Brennan referred directly to the district 
court as recognizing Negroes and Hispanos as having common 
economic and cultural deprivation. The primary purpose was 
to insist that "Hispanos" were an identifiable group. 
Justice Brennan then spoke to the question of whether 
the "lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard" in not 
ruling that there was no "de jure segregation" in the core 
164 city schools. 
The segregated character of the core city schools could 
not be, and is not denied. Petitioner's proof showed 
that at the time of trial, twenty-two of the schools in 
the core city area were less than 30% in Anglo enroll­
ment and eleven of the schools were less than 10% 
Anglo.165 
Justice William J. Brennan further acknowledged that 
only "common sense" led to a conclusion that if de jure seg­
regation existed the remainder of the school system was a 
166 
dual system. Justice Brennan distinguished the difference 
between de facto and de jure segregation to be one of intent 
rather than extended result. 
Justice Brennan stated that a "meaningful" part of 
the school system was intentionally segregated or there was 
other segregation in the same system. The rule that the 
163 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 197 (1973). 
164Ibid., p. 206. 165Ibid. 
166Ibid., p. 212. 
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school authorities must bring forward proof to support the 
fact that the segregation was not of intent prevailed. 
Although the school board had explained the racial 
concentrations in the "core city" mandated by the neighbor­
hood school policy, Justice Brennan would not dismiss the 
argument. He further elaborated that 
. . .  i t  i s  e n o u g h  t h a t  w e  h o l d  t h a t  t h e  m e r e  a s s e r t i o n  
of such a policy is not dispositive where, as in this 
case, the school authorities have been found to have 
produced de jure segregation in a meaningful portion 
of the school system by techniques that indicate that 
the "neighborhood school" concept has not been main­
tained free of manipulation.-'-®' 
Thus Justice Brennan would not consider the neighborhood 
2.68 school issue "simply because it appears to be neutral." 
Many school systems around the nation were disappointed that 
Justice Brennan refused to deal with the neighborhood school 
169 questions. 
The Supreme Court directed the district court on 
remand that the school board be given opportunity to prove 
that the Park Hill area was "a separate, identifiable and 
unrelated section of the school district that should be treated 
170 as isolated from the rest of the district." If the school 
167 Keves v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
168Ibid., p0 213. 
169 Bolner, Busing, p. 36. 
170 Keves v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 213 (1973). 
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board failed, the district court would determine if the 
school board policy over the past ten years mandated delib­
erate segregation in the Park Hill schools. If the entire 
Denver school system was determined to be dual, then the 
school board had an "affirmative duty to desegregate the 
171 entire school system." If, on the other hand, the entire 
system was not a dual system, then the Court would "afford 
the school board opportunity to rebut petitioners prima 
172 facie case of intentional segregation." The school board 
then must establish that policies concerning school sites, 
school size, school renovations and additions, student atten­
dance zones, student assignments and transfers, mobile class­
rooms, transportation, and faculty assignments were not used 
173 to effectuate segregation in the core city. If the school 
board failed to rebut, then the "District Court would decree 
174 all-out desegregation of the core city schools." 
The constitutional violation was found by the district 
court. Moreover, the school board did not provide an accep­
table plan to the court. District court then employed Dr. 
John Finger, prominent consultant in the Swann case. Dr. 
Finger developed a plan that involved extensive busing. On 
171 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 213 (1973). 
117 173 
Ibid. Ibid., p. 214. 
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appeal Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision 
175 
except for a portion of the plan. 
Some insight was gained from Justice Powell's con­
curring and dissenting opinion. James Bolner assessed Mr. 
Powell as "sounding much like a Southern congressman support­
ing a variant of a Stennis-Ribicoff 'nationalizing' amend-
176 
ment." in dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell used the 
occasion to challenge the Swann decision as wrong constitu­
tional direction because the decision mandated desegregation 
177 
of Southern schools. Justice Powell referred to his dis­
satisfaction of busing when he stated, "To the extent that 
Swann may be thought to require large-scale or long-distance 
transportation of students in our metropolitan school dis-
178 tricts, I record my profound misgivings." 
Justice Powell listed four reasons why "remedial 
requirement of extensive student transportation solely to 
further integration" could not be justified. Justice Powell 
stated that districts that had "little or no biracial popula-
179 tion" would have little problem in "educational disruption." 
175 Graglia, Disaster by Decree, pp. 198-201. 
176 Bolner, Busing, p. 37. 
"^^Ibid., p. 185. 
178 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 248 (1973). 
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However, large metropolitan districts that had extensive 
biracial areas must undertake elaborate transportation plans 
to achieve the scale of integration mandated by the courts. 
This would occur at a time that "the economic burdens of such 
1 80 
transportation can be severe." 
Second, Justice Powell observed that the "remedy 
exceeds that which may be necessary to redress the constitu-
181 
tional evil." His assessment was one of busing, exclud­
ing the constitutional requirement, and he doubted that this 
was truly necessary. 
Third, Justice Powell was concerned that the "full bur­
den of the affirmative remedial action (compulsory transporta­
tion) was borne by children and parents who did not participate 
I oy 
in any constitutional violation." 
Finally, Justice Powell questioned the reality that 
busing was a "risk" that was setting in motion unpredictable 
and unmanageable social white flight. Justice Powell stated 
that busing would expedite the "exodus to private schools" 
and might cause the "movement from inner city to suburbs and 
T O O  
the further geographical separation of the races." 
Justice Powell stated that requests for racial mixing 
might have been maintained; however, Mr. Powell would have 
had the mixing more reasonable. Moreover, Justice Powell 
180 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 248 (1973). 
181Ibid., p. 249. 182Ibid., p. 250. 183Ibid. 
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would have approved further integration without risking the 
184 
neighborhood school and the undermining of public support. 
Justice Rehnquist also filed a dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Rehnquist rejected the doctrine of compulsory integra­
tion as the doctrine deviated from Brown I and II and would 
return to the prohibition of racial discrimination: 
To require that a genuinely "dual" system be disestab­
lished, in the sense that the assignment of a child to a 
particular school is not made to depend on his race, is 
one thing. To require that school boards affirmatively 
undertake to achieve racial mixing in schools where such 
mixing is not achieved in sufficient degree by neutrally ( 
drawn boundary lines is quite obviously something else. 
The unanimous decision of the Warren Court in Brown 
was a far cry from the wandering path of decisions that were 
prior to Keyes. Keyes left no doubt that there was a divided 
United States Supreme Court. 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. 
Ronald Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (I) 
The Detroit case was significant in two areas of 
busing for desegregation. First, the Detroit school system 
was found to practice de^ jure segregation by the district 
court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the Sixth 
Circuit. Second, the United States Supreme Court struck down 
a plan that involved the desegregation of Detroit's school 
system by merging it with those surrounding counties. 
184 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 250 (1973). 
"^^Ibid. , p. 258. 
166 
In order to explore the questions of de jure segre­
gation in this case, it was necessary to look at the lower 
courts' findings. The district court found that constitu­
tional violations existed because the board and the State of 
Michigan, during the 1950s, had utilized a policy that tol­
erated optional attendance zones in neighborhoods that were 
undergoing racial transitions which, in the district court's 
186 
eyes, allowed white students to escape "black schools," 
Also, district court found that the board, while busing pupils 
to relieve overcrowded schools, had bused black pupils past 
187 closer white schools. The school board had changed atten­
dance zones and grades to such a degree that it maintained 
racially segregated schools. The district court also insis­
ted that the school board's policies were unconstitutional. 
Upon establishing school board's de jure segregation 
practices the district court's second consideration was the 
188 
appropriate remedy. The district court's remedy required 
busing of 310,000 pupils across fifty-three school dis­
tricts.189 
While the Circuit Court of Appeals approved practically 
all of the district court's ruling on the de jure segregation 
1 Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Ronald Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
187Ibid. 188Ibid., p. 719. 
189Ibid., p. 718. 
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issue, the case was remanded to district court because school 
190 
districts outside Detroit had no opportunity to be heard. 
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals established the positions 
that the metropolitan plan, that included fifty-three dis­
tricts, was the only feasible solution and was indeed within 
191 the district court's equity power. 
State officials and the Detroit school district 
obtained a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court based on: 
. . . whether a federal court may impose a multi dis­
trict, area-wide remedy to a single-district de jure seg­
regation problem absent any finding that the other 
included school districts have failed to operate uni­
tary school systems within this district, absent any 
claim for finding that the boundary lines of any affec­
ted school district were established with the purpose of 
fostering racial segregation in public schools, absent 
any finding that the included districts committed acts 
which affected segregation within the other districts, 
and absent of meaningful opportunity for the included 
neighboring school districts to present evidence or be 
heard on the propriety of a multi district remedy or on 
the question of constitutional violations by those 
neighboring districts. . . .192 
Thus the Supreme Court did not deal directly with the 
question of whether de jure segregation as required in Swann 
was properly ruled on in the lower courts as applied to a 
193 school system that had never had assignments based on races. 
In Milliken the finding was one of racial imbalance. However, 
this issue received only passing comment in the form of a 
194 footnote. In view of the district court's de jure 
19QMilliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
191Ibid. 192Ibid., p. 721. 
193Ibid., p. 746. 194Ibid., p. 747. 
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segregation finding the Court's attention was focused on the 
195 
lower court's mandate of the metropolitan plan. 
In rendering the Court's opinion, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger insisted that the Detroit plan could not "accom-
196 
plish desegregation." This would "clearly make the entire 
197 Detroit public school system racially identifiable." Jus­
tice Burger further stated: 
. . .  b o t h  c o u r t s  p r o c e e d e d  o n  a n  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
Detroit schools could not be truly desegregated ... 
unless the racial composition of the student body of 
each school substantially reflected the racial composi­
tion of the population of the metropolitan area as a 
whole.198 
Justice Burger acknowledged that the district court 
erred by requiring implementation of a plan that would have 
"no school, grade, or classroom ... substantially dispro-
199 portionate the overall pupil racial composition." In rely­
ing on Swann Justice Burger insisted that there was no require­
m e n t  o f  " a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  d e g r e e  o f  r a c i a l  b a l a n c e . J u s t i c e  
Burger did point out there was a difference in "equating 
racial imbalance with a constitutional violation calling for 
a remedy" as opposed to the continued existence of some schools 
that are all or predominantly one race "in a dual system that 
necessitates authorities showing school assignments are 
^9^Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 748 (1974). 
196Ibid., p. 747. 197Ibid., p. 739. 
198Ibid., p. 740. 199Ibid. 200Ibid., p. 741. 
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201 genuinely nondiscriminatory." Justice Thurgood Marshall 
noted, in a dissenting opinion, that "the use of racial ratios 
202 in this case in no way differed from that in Swann." 
The Court rejected the district court's statement that 
"school district lines are no more than arbitrary lines on a 
map drawn for political convenience." Justice Burger described 
the issue of administrative lines as being "more deeply rooted 
203 than local control over the operation of schools." Justice 
Burger then asked serious questions concerning the status 
of authority, education of the school board, taxes and general 
financing, curriculum, and the general operations of the new 
school district that would involve as much as three quarters 
of a million people. The nature of these questions by the 
Court demonstrated the unmanageability of such a mammoth 
204 school system in order to provide a "remedy." 
Justice Burger stated the underlying principle 
rejecting the Metropolitan Plan was the "scope of the remedy 
is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional 
205 violation." Thus the metropolitan remedy would not be 
required unless: 
. . .  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  v i o l a t i o n  w i t h i n  
one district that produces a significant segregative 
effect in another district. ... it must be shown that 
racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school 
201Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 741 (1974). 
202Ibid., p. 788. 203Ibid., pp. 741-744. 
204Ibid., p. 744. 205Ibid. 
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districts, or of a single school district, have been a 
substantial cause of interdis trict violation and inter-
district effect. There is no constitutional wrong 
calling for an interdistrict remedy."206 
Thus Justice Burger insisted that the constitutional 
207 violation was limited to the Detroit district. Therefore, 
there was no requirement involving outer school districts 
with no constitutional violations. 
Justice Burger did not find that even if the lower 
courts were correct, in the analysis that the state was 
"derivatively responsible for the Detroit Board's violation," 
it did not follow that an "interdistrict remedy is constitu-
208 tionally justified or required." The United States Supreme 
Court's reversal of the lower court's decision was based 
largely on two major points: (1) there would be an unmanage­
able school system due to size and numerous entities; and 
(2) there were no violations indicated in the sub outer school 
districts. 
Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, 
argued that "metropolitan treatment of metropolitan problems 
is commonplace" and that "if this were a sewage problem or 
210 
water problem ... it sought a metropolitan remedy." 
Justice Douglas differentiated the Richmond case from Milliken 
2 ̂Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 741 (1974). 
207_, . , 208_, . , 209_, . , Ibid. Ibid., p. 744. Ibid. 
210Ibid., pp. 757-758. 
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by insisting that in Virginia the local school boards had ex­
clusive authority, whereas in Michigan the state operated the 
211 schools. 
Justice Douglas pictured the Court's decision as a 
"dramatic retreat" from Brown and Plessy when the segregated 
schools were described as "black schools that are not only 
212 separate but inferior." He said that the issue was one 
concerning the use of various devices by the states that 
"end up with black schools and white schools that brought 
213 
the Equal Protection Clause into effect." 
Justice Douglas1s dissent seemed to condemn the 
concept of racial imbalance or "de facto segregation." How­
ever, he appeared to require a showing of racial discrimina-
214 tion. Thus racial imbalance existed. 
Both Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall 
applied the desegregation doctrine of Green, Swann, and Keyes 
in the dissenting opinions by saying racially balanced schools 
were not required to do more than remedy "de jure segrega-
215 
tion." Such remedy did, however, require metropolitan 
"desegregation. 
Justice Marshall referred to precedents established 
in earlier cases by saying that "state-imposed segregation," 
211 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 757 (1974). 
212T, . , 213 , . , 214_, . _ Ibid., p. 761. Ibid., p. 762. Ibid. 
215Ibid., p. 812. 216Ibid., p. 813. 
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when demonstrated, would require the state to eliminate "root 
and branch, all vestiges of racial discrimination, in order 
217 to arrive at the greatest degree of actual desegregation." 
Further, Justice Marshall elaborated on what was considered 
to be the seriousness of the violation when stating that the 
"constitutional violation found here was not some de facto 
racial imbalance." However, Justice Marshall described the 
Detroit schools as "intentional, massive, de jure segrega­
tion." He then proposed "relief short of outright consoli-
218 
dation of the school district." This point was somewhat 
argumentative because the extensive system that was proposed 
if the metropolitan plan had been required would have lit-
219 erally amounted to a consolidation of fifty-three systems. 
Justice Marshall closed his dissent by attributing 
the Court's decision to the fact that the decision was "a re­
flection of a perceived public mood" that had gone far enough 
220 m the enforcement of the Constitution. Justice Marshall 
concluded that the decision would allow the metropolitan areas 
221 to become "one white" and "the other black." 
In Milliken the Court did not reverse its previous 
landmark cases. The Court did, however, limit busing as a 
^"^Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 782 (1974). 
218Ibid., pp. 782-783. 219Ibid., p. 718. 
220Ibid., p. 814. 221Ibid., pp. 814-815. 
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remedy when racially discriminatory acts of one or more school 
districts had resulted in racial segregation in a nearby 
district. 
Time magazine described the Milliken decision as a 
222 "Historic Reversal." The publication described Milliken 
223 as much more dramatic than the impact indicated. The 
true significance of the case simply lay in the limitations 
of the United States Supreme Court's doctrine as requiring 
224 xntegration plans to extend across administrative lines. 
As a postscript to this landmark case, the United 
States Supreme Court handed down a decision November 9, 1975, 
refusing to listen to arguments of the Detroit School Dis­
trict concerning payment for buses to transport pupils to 
225 desegregate the schools. After five years of judicial 
battles which did indeed limit busing, Milliken ended with 
a decision by United States District Judge Robert De Moscio , 
which included a busing plan inside the city limits. Judge 
De Moscio's plan resulted in 21,883 students being bused 
into new schools. Over half of the city's 280 schools were 
more than 90 percent black before the busing plan. However, 
J 96 
the plan desegregated only fifteen of these schools. 
222 "Desegregation: A Historic Reversal," Time, 
August 5, 1974, p. 55. 
223_, . , 224 , . , Ibid. Ibid. 
225 
Board of Education of Detroit v. Mi11iken, Gov­
ernor of Michigan, 427 U.S. 913 (1975). 
"Smooth Ride in Detroit," Newsweek, Feb. 9, 
1976, p. 26. 
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Newsweek stated that there was little opposition to busing 
because "no matter which side of the busing issue they are 
on, a good many citizens may simply think that Detroit is no 
227 longer worth fighting for." 
Milliken v. Bradley was once again before the United 
228 
States Supreme Court in June, 1977. This time the question 
before the nation's highest Court was whether state officials 
could be legally held financially responsible. This would 
mean that they would be liable for paying one-half the cost 
of implementing remedial educational programs as a part of a 
federal court requirement to effectuate a means of remedy 
for de jure segregation in the city of Detroit. 
The Supreme Court/ by affirming the judgment of 
the court of appeals, announced that it was indeed within the 
power of the lower federal courts to mandate some form of 
remedial program designed to correct the discrimination acts 
by those responsible within the local and state governments. 
This decision put to rest any question that a system had in 
reference to the financial obligation a school system had in 
the court-required compensatory programs. The Court had said 
that the federal courts had the power to require agencies 
responsible for the constitutional infraction to bear the 
227 "Smooth Ride m Detroit," Newsweek, Feb. 9, 
1976, p. 26. 
228 
Milliken, Governor of Michigan v. Ronald Bradley, 
97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977). 
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financial obligation of such remedial programs as were nec­
essary to compensate minority groups for racial isolation. 
Eddie Mitchell Tasby v. Nolan Estes 
517 2d 92 
On November 3, 1975, the United States Supreme Court 
let stand a federal court order that would begin busing for 
the purpose of desegregation of the Dallas, Texas, school 
system. Although this case had no written opinion by the 
Supreme Court, there was significance in looking at this case 
because of the plans that were ruled as inadequate by the 
lower courts. 
This case came on appeal from the Dallas Independent 
District. The Dallas Independent School District is the 
eighth largest school system with 180,000 students and 180 
schools. The case came on appeal from the Dallas school 
system. The system contained 180 separate campuses. The 
school boundaries of this vast system did not coincide with 
the city limits of Dallas. The boundaries extended into Dallas 
County along with several other independent school districts 
including Highland Park, which was locked in the city of 
Dallas.229 
The Dallas independent school system had been involved 
in a desegregation litigation since 1955. The history included 
Eddie Mitchell Tasby v. Nolan Estes, 517 2d 95, 
Certiorari denied November 3, 1975, 423 U.S. 939. 
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seven separate decisions that produced no significant change 
in the desegregation patterns of Dallas. In 1970, a class 
action suit was brought by black students and parents and 
230 
Mexican-American students and their parents. 
The complaint included: 
(a) 71% of the DISD's 180 schools were 90% or greater 
white 
(b) 40 of the DISD's schools were 90% or greater black 
(c) 49 of the DISD's school student populations were 
90% or greater of minority race (black and Mexican-
American) 
(d) 91.7% of all black students in the DISD attended 
schools in which the student body was composed of 
90% or greater minority racial makeup 
(e) Less than 3% of all black students in the DISD 
attended elementary or secondary schools in which 
the majority of the student body was white 
(f) Only 2% of black elementary students in the DISD 
attended schools in which the majority of the stu­
dent body was white 
(g) Of the 37 new schools constructed, or those to which 
additions had been made, between 1965 and 1970, 34 
had student enrollments 90% or greater black, 90% 
or greater minority (black and Mexican American) or 
90% or greater white.231 
Relief was asked of the district court as: 
(a) Meaningful desegregation of the DISD 
(b) Assignment of faculty members to each DISD school 
in proportion to the racial composition of the 
entire student body of the DISD 
(c) The Adoption of policies designed to lower the high 
drop out rate among Mexican-American students in 
the DISD.232 
United States District Court Judge William Taylor 
insisted that: 
? *30 
Tasby v. Estes, 517 2d 96. 
231t, . , 232x, . , Ibid. Ibid. 
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I am opposed to and do not believe in massive cross-town 
busing of students for the sole purpose of mixing bodies. 
I doubt that there is a Federal Judge anywhere that 
would advocate that type of integration as distinguished 
from desegregation.233 
Judge Taylor then asked the school board to look at 
one of the plans suggested by the Texas Educational Desegre-
234 gatxon Technical Assistance Center. The plan employed 
use of television in the elementary grades along with an 
235 occasional bus visit between paired ethnic groups. 
Judge Taylor, after receiving a plan from plaintiff 
and defendant, approved the television plan that was to: 
(a) Establish clustering so as to bring together as a 
2:1 ratio the minority and Anglo Classroom 
(b) To use a "neighborhood" approach with the elemen­
tary schools 
(c) To provide elementary classes with a daily minimum 
of oral hour contacts with students of other races. 
This is to be done by television. Also there is to 
be a once each week visit between the two paired 
schools 
(d) The desegregation of the faculty with no more than a 
10% variance 
(e) At the secondary level there is to be a majority-
to-minority transfer program with the students par­
ticipating having only a four-day school week 
(f) An advisory committee is to be appointed for advising 
DISD as to desegregation matters 
(g) The adoption of a school construction policy that 
would prevent a dual school system.^36 
The Supreme Court's rationale was apparent because of 
the segregative history of Dallas. For as late as 1975 Dallas 
233Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 995. 
234Ibid., p. 98. 235Ibid., p. 100. 
23^Tasby v. Estes, 517 2d 99, 100. 
178 
legally maintained a 90 percent ratio of white students in 
237 
over half of the schools. 
On appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals on 
July 23, 1975, Judge Simpson wrote the opinion for the court. 
Judge Simpson stated that the court of appeals would evaluate 
the progress of the Dallas school system "eliminating the 
vestiges of the dual educational system formerly mandated by 
..238 
Texas law." 
In speaking of the "television plan" the court 
stated: 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that nothing less 
than the elimination of predominantly one-race-schools 
is constitutionally required in the disestablishment of 
a dual school system based upon segregation of the 
races. For this reason, the district court's elemen­
tary school "television plan" must be rejected as a legit­
imate technique for the conversion of the D I S D from a 
dual to a unitary educational system.239 
The court relied on Green and its inadequate "freedom 
240 
of choice" doctrine as well as Swann. In Swann the Court 
noted the unconstitutionality of the one-race school. Fin­
ally the court termed the "television plan" as incompatible 
with all the jurisprudence of the past twenty years as to 
public school desegregation, and hence failed to pass mus-
241 ter. It would appear that the "television plan" did not 
?"37 
Tasby v. Estes, 517 2d 93. 
238Ibid., p. 94. 239Ibid., p. 103 
240 241 
Ibid., p. 104. Ibid. 
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desegregate the elementary school as was ordered in similar 
cases by the United States Supreme Court. 
In dealing with the secondary plan, the Court saw 
the 90 percent as an insufficient effort to meet the require­
ments to desegregate the dual school systems because of the 
district's 60 percent white, 32 percent black, and 8 percent 
Mexican-American. Thus, the Court rejected this part of the 
242 plan as constitutionally inadequate. 
Concerning questions of school construction, the 
Court declared the district court needed to approve only the 
projects which would assist the process of desegregation. 
This was due to the finding that previous construction had 
been based on neighborhood attendance zones and had thus fur-
243 ther segregated the school system. 
The question of the status of the Mexican-American 
wa^ declared correctly treated. The Mexican-Americans were 
declared as a "separate ethnic minority group for desegrega-
244 tion purposes." 
The question concerning the involvement of the outer 
school districts within Dallas County was answered as the 
court of appeals found no violation by the outer school 
245 districts. Thus a multi-district plan was rejected. 
24? 
Tasby v. Estes, 517 2d 104. 
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The court of appeals found much of the ruling of the 
district court in error. The appellate court, in addition, 
gave direction to the further proceedings by directing the 
Dallas School System to "be completely dismantled by the 
246 start of the second semester of the 1975-76 academic year." 
The court further directed the steps to be those as mandated 
in Swann. 
The court of appeals elected an elementary and secon­
dary student assignment plan which complied with the direc-
247 tion of the United States Supreme Court m Swann. The 
plan was to be formulated by the Fifth Circuit in time for the 
start of the second semester of the 1975-76 school year. On 
appeal in November, 1975, the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari, thus sustaining action of the Fifth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals. 
This case encapsulated several important principles: 
(1) both the state circuit court of appeals, as well as the 
United States Supreme Court, were impatient with the long 
legal proceedings of the Dallas Independent School District; 
(2) the so called "television plan" was considered as only 
"token integration"; and (3) Mexican-Americans were to be con­
sidered as a separate ethnic minority group for desegregation. 
246Tasby v. Estes, 517 2d 110. 
247 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1970). 
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Madeline Buchanan v. Brenda Evans, 
423 U.S. 963 (19757 
On November 17, 1975, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled on the case from Wilmington, Delaware. By 
affirming the district court's decision, the Supreme Court 
provided the legal means of interdistrict busing. This deci­
sion followed Milliken v. Bradley, which, in effect, had 
restricted busing to the city of Detroit. There were many 
similarities in the Detroit and the Delaware cases: they were 
both concerned with some form of consolidation of predominantly 
white suburbs with black inner-city schools which would in 
effect create busing between the two areas. However, the dif­
ference found by the Court was that the suburban district in 
the Detroit area was not to have been involved in any segre­
gative policies or practices which was de facto. Wilmington, 
however, as well as the entire governing system of Delaware, 
was involved because Wilmington was excluded in a statewide 
school district consolidation measure which was de jure seg­
regation. 
Buchanan v. Evans was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court directly from the three-judge United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware which enjoined 
248 the enforcement of a state statute. The state legislature 
enacted the Educational Advancement Act in June, 1968. The 
248 
Madeline Buchanan v. Brenda Evans, 423 U.S. 963 
(1975). 
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stated purpose of the legislation was "to provide the frame­
work for an effective and orderly reorganization of the 
existing school districts and the combination of other exist-
249 ing school districts." Implementation of the reorganiza­
tion consisted of a development plan by October 4 ,  1968. 
By July 1, 1969, the plans as adopted would be established 
250 
and reorganization of the school districts complete. 
An exception within the statute, which came under 
judicial attack, mandated that the city of Wilmington shall 
be the "city of Wilmington with the territory within its 
251 limits." The district court insisted the "exception" 
252 provision discriminated against blacks. The statute 
effects would 
. . .  l o c k  i n  N e g r o  c h i l d r e n  w i t h i n  t h e  s c h o o l  d i s ­
trict in such a manner that might not otherwise have 
resulted if the school district had been subject to 
the state school board's discretionary power to consol­
idate as were all the remaining districts in the State 
under the 1968 legislation.253 
Litigation began in 1971. However, appellees had 
contended in,the 1960's that the Wilmington black students 
254 
were required to attend segregated schools. The objection 
249 Delaware Code Annotated, Title 14, Section 1001 
(1975). 
9 K A 
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was in three parts: (1) the state still maintained a dual 
school system that was unconstitutional (New Castle County 
and Wilmington); (2) the state, by mandated policies and 
procedures, did in effect discriminate in resulting segre­
gation through its low-cost housing policies; and (3) the 
Educational Advancement Act had provided Wilmington a means 
to continue as a separate school district, thus preventing 
255 the dismantling of the dual system. 
The district court found, after oral arguments, 
that a percentage of suburban students of both races were 
traveling into Wilmington in order to attend segregated 
256 schools prior to 1954. The district court also found 
that there was a demographic shift of white students migrat­
ing to the suburbs, which was encouraged by government pol-
257 icies. This segregative action produced interdistrict 
effects. 
Finally, the district court found that the reorganiza-
tional power of the Educational Advancement Act, by its 
exclusion of Wilmington, created a racial classification 
258 
under the Equal Protection Clause. The statute also 
259 created an interdistrict violation under Milliken. Fur­
ther, the district court insisted that when the Educational 
255 Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 297 (1975). 
256T, . , 257_, . , 258_, . , Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 296. 
184 
Advancement Act "redrew" the district lines for Wilmington, 
it removed established boundaries from the authority of the 
State Board at a time when other districts in the state were 
260 
considered for some form of a consolidation program. 
The district court declared unconstitutional that 
portion of the Educational Advancement Act which removed 
261 
Wilmington from consideration for consolidation. The 
court further ruled that a plan that would remedy the segre­
gation within the present district of Wilmington and include 
262 
other areas of New Castle County would be presented. The 
court's order enjoined the State Board from relying on the 
Educational Advancement Act for the formulation of a plan. 
The United States Supreme Court, after reviewing 
the Delaware case and .without written opinion, affirmed the 
district court judgment. The Supreme Court was not without 
dissent. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion. 
263 
Justices Powell and Burger joined in part. Justices 
Burger, Rehnquist, and Powell maintained that the enjoining 
of the enforcement of the state statute was never a question 
in Milliken (on which the Court relied). Moreover, the 
Justices insisted the date of the statute had expired effec­
tive July 1, 1969. Afterward, by statutory mandate, voters 
of Wilmington approved all consolidation plans by referendum. 
2^Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 296 (1975). 
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Justice Rehnquist maintained that the district court could 
not enjoin the implementation of a statute which had already 
expired. Therefore# the only course for the Court was to 
reverse the injunctive degree that was issued by the district 
264 court and remanded the case for consideration. 
The case was then returned to the district court; and 
after the State of Delaware failed to submit a plan that was 
acceptable, the district court itself ruled that an inter-
district remedy was necessary in order to desegregate the 
Wilmington schools on May 19, 1976. The court's opinion 
described Northern New Castle County as having a school 
population of 80,678 with 78.5 percent white. Seventy-four 
and six-tenths percent of the black students in this area 
attend school in Wilmington. The Wilmington public schools 
265 are 84.7 percent black. In examining the many plans pre-
0£\£i 
sented the court pointed out that Milliken clearly stated 
that the remedy must be commensurate with the scope of the 
violation found. 
The district court rejected arguments that suburban 
districts operated a unitary system and, in turn, were not 
267 committing any constitutional violation. The court 
responded that because the local school boards were creatures 
264 
Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 293 (1975). 
265 
Ibid., p. 965. 
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of the state and the state through de jure segregation caused 
the racial disparity: therefore, the remedy must include the 
268 northern New Castle district. 
The court saw its duty as one of ordering a remedy 
that would "place the victims of the violation in substan­
tially the position which they would have occupied had the 
269 violation not occurred." The court considered limiting 
the desegregation plan to the boundaries of Wilmington and 
just what level of desegregation would be attained. On the 
other hand how wide should the district court geographical 
area be in order to bring about the "greatest possible actual 
degree of desegregation by a plan that was reasonably certain 
270 to achieve desegregation now" as m Davis. 
The district court found none of the proposed plans 
acceptable. Therefore, the district court required a reor­
ganization plan. Acknowledging the district court was not 
the proper agency to reorganize the districts of northern 
New Castle County and the District of Wilmington, a repre­
sentative board, from existing boards, was charged with the 
reorganization by judicial decree. An interim board was to 
be appointed by the system outlined in the Educational 
268Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
269t, . , Ibid. 
270 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 402 U.S. 33 (1951). 
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Advancement Act. The board assumed such responsibilities as 
initial assignment of students for desegregation, tax levy­
ing, employing faculty, and the choosing of curriculum. The 
271 new students' assignments were made by the fall of 1977. 
The court insisted that it was not bound by such state 
laws in formulating a federal remedy for the violation of 
constitutional rights. The district court also chose to ignore 
a state law that limited school district enrollments to 
272 twelve thousand students. Abiding by the state statute 
would, in the court's reasoning, cause the districts to be 
divided into patterns that would make such a reorganization 
273 impossible. The district court decided to reorganize only 
into and consolidate whole districts in order to avoid prob­
lems of the redistribution of population and tax rates. 
Thus a mammoth school district of eighty thousand 
students was formed because of past discriminatory practices. 
Those practices were brought about by the fact that Wilming­
ton schools were supported by state action. In turn, the 
state had enforced discriminatory housing and zoning provi­
sions as well as the reorganization of school districts under 
the Educational Advancement Act. This state statute unconstitu­
tionally isolated Wilmington from joining other school dis-
. . . 274 tricts. 
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ANNUAL READJUSTMENT OF ATTENDANCE ZONES 
In the Delaware, Detroit, and Richmond cases the 
Court dealt with the problem of inclusion of the city's 
suburbs in ordering a remedy. However, in Detroit and 
Richmond the Court found no constitutional violation that 
would cause the suburb to be included in the remedy. Dela­
ware was different in that constitutional violation was found 
in a state statute that caused segregative practices to con­
tinue in Delaware. 
Pasadena City Board of Education 
v. Spanqler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) 
The decision that was handed down from the United 
States Supreme Court in Pasadena v. Spanqler answered sev­
eral questions about growing problems of shifting populations 
within the cities of the United States. This shift was one 
of white middle class families moving from the suburbs. 
Such population movement raised concerns from many school 
systems which had attained unitary status as well as those 
in the process of desegregation. This raised the question of 
the necessity of adjustments each school year. 
The case originated in 1968, with a class action by 
high school students and parents against the school officials 
of Pasadena for relief from alleged unconstitutional segre­
gative practices. The United States became a party to the 
plaintiff under section 902 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The district court found the Pasadena school officials and 
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procedures in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
district court ordered the Pasadena school officials 'tenjoined 
from failing to prepare and adopt a plan to correct racial 
275 imbalance" in the Pasadena schools. The defendants were 
then ordered to submit a plan to the district court that 
would desegregate the Pasadena schools. Also the plan was 
to include attention to assignment of staff as well as school 
construction and location. Specifically the court ordered: 
The plan shall provide for student assignment in such 
a manner that, by or before the beginning of the school 
year that commences in September of 1970, there shall 
be no school in the District, elementary or junior high 
or senior high school with a majority of any minority 
students.276 
School officials then developed the "Pasadena Plan" 
whxch was found acceptable by the district court. The Pasa-
277 dena Plan was initiated in 1970. The plan included, in 
addition to having no school with a majority of students of 
any minority race, a provision to divide the district into 
four zones and to bus students to each zone so as to eliminate 
the all-black majority schools. This plan eliminated the 
original condition of 85 percent of the black grade school 
students within the district being located in eight schools 
with a black majority. Nearly one-half of the black junior 
278 high school students attended one school. 
275 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
276_, 277_,., ,oc Ibid. Ibid., p. 425. 
278nintegration Order Update Ruled Out," Greensboro 
Daily News, June 29, 1976, p. 1A. 
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This plan continued in operation until 1974 when the 
successors to the board of education filed a motion seeking 
relief from the 1970 court order. The petition included four 
parts: (1) elimination of the stipulation of "no school in 
the District, elementary or junior high, or senior high 
school, with a majority of any minority students;" (2) ending 
of the district court's jurisdiction over the board; (3) the 
dissolving of the district court's injunction; and (4) having 
the district court in approval before the school board could 
279 
modify the "Pasadena Plan.11 On March 1, 1974, the district 
280 court, after a hearing, denied all the motions. 
The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals where a divided court affirmed the district court's 
281 judgment and remanded the case. Certiorari was granted 
by the United States Supreme Court because it was considered 
important to the extension of the district court's authority 
in ordering a plan that was designed to attain unitary status 
282 in a school system. 
The Court's first concern was that original student 
petitioners had graduated from the Pasadena School System. 
Therefore, the case should have been considered moot and no 
longer have a vested interest in the outcome. Justice William 
Rehnquist pointed out that the United States was still an 
279 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 429 (1976). 
280Ibid., p. 425. 281Ibid., p. 429. 282Ibid. 
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interested party that joined the litigation at an early 
, 283 stage. 
In answering the petition to dissolve the injunc­
tive order which required that no school in the Pasadena 
School District have a majority of any minority students 
enrolled, the Supreme Court pointed out that the district 
court's decision was largely based on the fact that the system 
284 had "failed properly to comply with its original order." 
The 1970-1971 school year racial ratios went beyond the pre­
vious years as four schools exceeded 50 percent of enrollment. 
That year the litigation was initiated in five schools out 
of the thirty-two which were in violation of "no majority of 
.. ,,285 . . any minority" provision. 
The Court decision was delivered by Justice William 
Rehnquist, in which Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices 
Potter Stewart, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis Powell 
joined. Justice Thurgood Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, 
2 86 in which Justice William Brennan joined. The Supreme 
Court stated that consideration was only given to the ques­
tion of whether the district court had exceeded its authority 
when it denied relief in the modification of the "no majority" 
provision. The Court deemed the meaning unclear to the 
parties. In response to argument, district court said in 1970 
TOO 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spanqler, 
427 U.S. 431 (1976). 
284Ibid., p. 424. 285Ibid. 286Ibid., p. 427. 
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that "at least during my lifetime there would be no majority 
287 in any school in Pasadena." However, the Supreme Court 
288 
relying on Swann, insisted the district court had an inflex­
ible requirement "that was to bear an adjustment within each 
school in the system annually." The Supreme Court maintained 
289 that limits must be recognized in such instances. The 
Court continued by quoting from Swann that "absent any 
constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially 
290 ordering assignments of students on a racial basis." As 
the Court stated, the Pasadena system was found in violation 
in 1970. However, the Court saw the Pasadena system as hav­
ing adopted its plan at that time and establishing a "racially 
9 
neutral system of student assignment in Pasadena United States 
291 District." The Court then revealed its decision by 
stating: 
. . .  W e  t h i n k  t h a t  i n  e n f o r c i n g  i t s  o r d e r  s o  a s  t o  
require annual readjustment of attendance zones so 
that there would not be a majority by any minority in 
any Pasadena Public school, the District Court exceeded 
its authority.292 
287 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
288 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
289 
Ibid., p. 28. 
290 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 434 (1976). 
?91 29? 
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The Court pointed out that the school authorities 
were not required to submit a "step at a time" plan that 
would be determined as incomplete at its implementation. The 
Court continued to specify that the plan did not include the 
alteration of attendance zones of the schools as well as an 
assessment of such alterations in achieving a "unitary 
System." 
The Court assessed "white flight" by pointing out 
that the district court had stated that the "trends evidenced 
in Pasadena closely approximate the state-wide trends in 
293 California schools, both segregated and desegregated." 
The Court recognized the demographic changes as resulting 
from "people randomly moving into, out of, and around the 
294 Pasadena United States District area." The Court then 
observed that this was a normal pattern of migration with the 
295 
residential changes reflected m the school system. 
For school systems that had not yet totally achieved 
unitary status, the Court revealed that this act did not 
"undercut" Swann's restriction on making the year-to-year 
296 adjustments. The Court felt that the implementation of 
an approval plan had not met requirements. Moreover, barring 
pQO 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
375 F. Supp. 1306, p. 436. 
OQA 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spanqler, 
427 U.S. 43* (1976). " 
295Ibid., p. 436. 296Ibid., p. 423, 
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any further segregative attempts by government agencies, 
no requirement for demographic adjustment was necessary. 
This judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was 
vacated and remanded for decision on the question that included 
whether Judge Reel1s order from the district court should 
297 
be lifted or modified. 
Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan filed dissent­
ing opinioni The two Justices stated that the official 
racial discrimination had not been eradicated from the school 
system; therefore, the district court was not in error in 
298 refusing to modify the order. In concurring with the 
lower court, Justice Marshall cited Judge Ely's statement: 
I agree with Judge Ely that there is abundant evidence 
upon which the district judge, in reasonable exercise of 
his discretion, could rightly determine that the danger 
which induced the original determination of constitu­
tional infringements in Pasadena have not diminished 
sufficiently to require modification or dissolution of 
the original order.299 
Justice Marshall saw the Court's decision as unwar-
rantingly extending the Court's statement in Swann; 
Neither school authorities nor district courts are con­
stitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments 
of the racial composition of student bodies (then empha­
sis is added as the point of contention) once the affirm­
ative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial 
discrimination through official action is limited from 
the system. 
297 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
427 U.S. 442 (1976). 
298Ibid., p. 441. 299Ibid., p. 442. 
300Ibid., p. 424. 
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The difference between the majority Court and the 
dissenters lay in interpretation of what point the "unitary 
system" was established, rather as in Swann, when "the affirm-
301 ative duty to desegregate has been accomplished." How­
ever, the Court's majority stated that the adoption of a plan 
and initiation was enough to satisfy the "affirmative duty" 
when: 
. . .  t h e  u n a p p e a l e d  f i n d i n g  a f f o r d e d  a  b a s i s  f o r  i t s  
initial requirement that the defendants prepare a plan 
to remedy such racial segregation, its adoption of the 
Pasadena Plan in 1970 established a racially neutral 
system of student assignment in Pasadena United States 
District. Having done that, we think that in enforc­
ing its order so as to require annual readjustment of 
attendance zones so that there would not be a majority 
of any minority in any Pasadena public school, the Dis­
trict Court exceeded its authority.3°2 
The Pasadena case was important in answering several 
questions concerning busing: 
(1) When the United States was a party to the plain­
tiff the case was not considered moot, even though the student 
respondents had graduated from the school system. 
(2) Once a school system had adopted a plan for 
desegregation, there was no need for further annual adjust­
ments of attendance zones because of population shifts. 
However, there were several broad questions that were 
left unanswered: 
301 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spanqler, 
427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
302Ibid., p. 427. 
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(1) The Supreme Court did not speak to the question 
of the length of time a school system remained under the super­
vision of the Court. 
(2) The Supreme Court did not determine whether a 
particular degree of racial balance was required by federal 
courts. 
Again the Court did not determine whether a partic­
ular degree of racial balance was required by the federal 
courts. In numerous cases the Supreme Court had failed to 
answer the question of balance while upholding lower courts 
that had ordered racial percentages on the one hand and still 
only referred to the balance and ratios as "starting points 
303 in the process of shaping a remedy." 
EXTENT OF THE REMEDY 
Austin Independent School District 
v. United States, 429 U.S. 991 (1976) 
On December 16, 1976, a decision from the United 
States Supreme Court indicated a shift in the opinion of the 
Court. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit. The rejection of a plan that called 
for the busing of from 18,000 to 25,000 students in Austin 
rested on the Court1s philosophy that the remedy must be 
limited to those conditions that are caused by unconstitutional 
303 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 25 (1971). 
f 
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acts of local officials, and, in this case, the Court did 
not find such violations. 
The Austin case dates back to an earlier case where 
304 district court found segregative intent. District court 
ordered a plan that was designed to achieve racial balance in 
the Austin School System. This plan was endorsed by the 
court of appeals. The plan included busing of kindergarten 
through the eighth grade students in schools over 50 percent 
minority or 90 percent Anglo. The East Austin kindergarten 
through fourth grade were to be bused through a congested 
center to the west side of Austin. In grades four through 
eight, students in west Austin were to be bused to the eastern 
side of Austin. The plan for secondary school students con­
sisted of a system of "feeder" schools. The overall plan 
required busing of 18,000 to 25,000 students, which was 
32 to 42 percent of the Austin city school population. 
The extensive busing plan was predicated on findings 
of the district court that Mexican-American children in 
Austin schools received an education that was inferior 
to the white students, and thus there was a violation of the 
equal protection clause. Moreover, action of school author­
ities caused or contributed to school segregation and/or 
continued the segregation practices that existed. The final 
304 United States v. Texas Educational Agency, 
467 F 2d 848. 
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charge against the school board was based partly on a 
finding of fact that ethnic segregation did result from the 
305 natural cause of events such as predictable segregation. 
The district court ruled that proven intent was not 
a necessary part of the process on discrimination where there 
was a resulting discriminatory effect. Thus the district 
court found segregation of Mexican-Americans within the Aus­
tin system that had resulted from the Austin School Board's 
neighborhood school pupil assignment policy. 
Most of the city of Austin had ethnic segregation 
in housing patterns. The district court referred to this as 
307 a natural, forseeable, and inevitable result. Thus, the 
court saw a segregated school system throughout most of the 
308 
city of Austin. The court also found the school system's 
affirmative action efforts resulting in directions contrary 
to desegregation. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld district 
309 court's judgment. It relied, in part, on Keyes, beyond 
310 
the requirements of Brown that extended the violation of 
305 United States v. Texas Educational Agency, 
467 F 2d 848. 
306Ibid. 307Ibid. 308Ibid. 
309 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
310 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
199 
311 
segregation to Mexican-Americans. The Supreme Court pointed 
out that the violation of the equal Protection Clause was a 
result of "state action." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision recalled the definition of de jure segregation by 
the Supreme Court as "a current condition of segregation 
resulting from intentional state action directed specif-
312 ically to the (segregated) schools." The Court then 
reasoned that to establish the burden of proof that a school 
system had unlawful segregations (1) there must be segre­
gation: (2) the state officials intended segregation by not 
acting: and (3) there was a segregated school system as a 
result of the above. 
United States v. Texas Educational Agency, 467 F 2d 
848 and Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dis­
trict, 467 F 2d 142 (1973) were relied on by the court of 
Appeals as in ruling that a violation of equal protection 
would only result from the action of school authorities that 
maintained or caused additional segregation. The earlier 
Court had held that discriminatory motive and purpose were 
313 not necessary to a constitutional violation. 
311 Austin Independent School District v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 992 (1976) 
312 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 208 (1973). 
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The Court pointed out that Keyes supervened Cisneros 
by insisting that before an order to desegregate a de facto 
school system there must be proof of intent of segregation 
314 practices by state's action. The Court of Appeals acknow­
ledged that Keyes was additional reasoning for finding the 
Austin school system in violation and segregation was an 
"inevitable result" and a "forseeable consequence" of the 
315 actions of the Austin School Board. 
Additionally, the Court ruled that the responsibility 
of state officials "should reasonably foresee segregation" 
as a result of the acts. The Court pointed out that there 
was difficulty in gathering evidence of a state official's 
intent, as was found in Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
Monroe rejected specific intent as a necessary action under 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
The Supreme Court found difficulty in establishing 
intent by state officials. However, the Court did see a con­
tinuing school system that employed a policy of neighborhood 
school assignments with an inference of intent. This, there­
fore, established a prima facie evidence of de jure segrega-
316 tion of Mexican-Americans in the Austin School District. 
314 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 208 (1973). 
*31 ̂  
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The United States Supreme Court heard the case and 
rendered its decisions by vacating the judgment of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. The case was remanded for further 
consideration. Justice Lewis F. Powell, along with Chief 
Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, spoke for the 
Court. In the memorandum order, Mr. Justice Powell related 
that he could speak to the "issue of remedy in the remand 
order because of what appears to be a misapplication of a 
317 core principle of desegregation cases." He cited Swann 
and Milliken by saying that the obligation of the Court was 
to make corrections by a balance of "the individual collec­
tive interests." Justice Powell pointed out that federal 
courts' remedial powers could only be used when there was a 
constitutional violation and equity case, but the "nature of 
3XS the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Justice 
Powell stated that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals may 
have erred in its "readiness to impute to school officials 
segregative intent far more pervasive than the evidence jus-
319 tifled." Furthermore, the Court of Appeals erred in order­
ing a desegregation plan far exceeding any identifiable vio-
320 lations of constitutional rights. 
In speaking of residential segregation Justice Powell 
pointed out that most of the large cities with "large minority 
317 Austin Independent School District v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 991 (1976). 
318Ibid., p. 993. 319Ibid., p. 995. 
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population" had "problems for school officials" who were attempt­
ing to attain a nonSegregated school system, and Austin had a 
problem that worsened an attempt to desegregate because of 
population distribution. Justice Powell noted that even the 
Court of Appeals had recognized the problem when stating: 
Countless efforts by school officials, consultants, 
and visiting teams have found it impossible to produce 
significant desegregation by boundary line changes, 
contiguous pairing of schools, magnet schools, or other 
effective means short of cross-town busing incident to 
contiguous pairing of . . . schools.321 
However, Justice Powell concluded the Court of 
Appeals decided that only cross-town transportation would 
remedy the segregative problem. Justice Powell evaluated the 
plan approved by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as 
"remarkably sweeping."' The Court insisted the lower court 
was apparently "misconceiving the import of language in 
Green to the effect that there should be no 'Negro1 school 
322 or 'white1 school." This, Justice Powell said, caused the 
Court of Appeals to believe that every school must achieve a 
racially balanced status to a degree. However, Justice Powell 
concluded that Green was a case involving a rural community 
with sparse population and only two schools, and this lan­
guage did not apply to a large urban school district. 
321 Austin Independent School District v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 992 (1976). 
322 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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Justice Powell viewed this plan as "designed to achieve 
some predetermined social and ethnic balance in the schools 
rather than to remedy the constitutional violation committed 
323 by the school authorities." Justice Powell said the plan 
324 was "impermissible" because of the holdings of Pasadena. 
Justice Powell stated that whether Austin authorities 
discriminated with intent against the minorities or just 
failed to "fulfill alternative obligations" to desegregate, 
the remedy ordered by the Court of Appeals exceeded that 
which was necessary to alleviate any effects from official 
325 
acts. Justice Powell observed 
. . .  t h e  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l s  d i d  n o t  f i n d  a n d  t h e r e  i s  
no evidence in the record available to us to suggest 
that, absent those constitutional violations, the 
Austin School system would have been integrated to 
the extent contemplated by the plan."326 
Finally Justice Powell said that extensive busing 
would be possible only where there was evidence that the 
scale of integration sought to be achieved by busing would 
have been accomplished by the school authorities carrying 
out the "constitutional obligation" from the beginning. Mr. 
Powell further classified busing as a remedial measure as 
opposed to punitive measure. 
323 Austin Independent School District v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 993 (1976). 
324 
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 
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According to Justice Powell the remedy had to be 
equivalent to the wrong. Justice Powell also acknowledged 
that lower courts were inclined to interpret the obligation 
as punitive. This was a different philosophy for the Supreme 
Court, whereas earlier cases were indeed punitive in nature. 
Justice Powell did not indicate that a change of 
magnitude had occurred, although there was some shift in 
the Court. The shift was seen: (1) in Keyes where the plan 
amounted to some rather extensive busing because of a proven 
constitutional violation by school authorities: (2) in Austin 
where the remedy was limited to those conditions that caused 
the violations: and (3) in Austin where the Court felt that 
the school authorities did not cause the racial imbalance. 
Thus the extreme remedy of extensive busing, in the Court's 
opinion, exceeded that necessary to correct the condition. 
Dayton Board of Education v. 
Mark Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). 
In June, 1977, the United States Supreme Court deliv­
ered an opinion that vacated an order by district court that 
would have transported 15,000 students in a massive busing 
plan for Dayton, Ohio. The Supreme Court stated the enjoined 
remedy would be "out of proportion to the constitutional 
Q O £v 
violations" that were the findings of the district court. 
Dayton Board of Education v. Mark Brinkman, 
97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). 
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Litigation was begun in April, 1972, by the parents 
of black children. After a hearing by the district court in 
1972, the court ordered a desegregation plan for the public 
schools of Dayton. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
327 Appeals reversed and remanded the plan. A new plan was 
drawn up, and once again the Court of Appeals reversed and 
directed the district court to "adopt a system-wide plan for 
328 
the 1976-1977 school year." The new plan was affirmed by 
the court of appeals. The approved plan involved system-wide 
racial distribution requirements. The plan directed that in 
the 1976-1977 school year the racial distribution of each 
school in the school system would be within 15 percent of 
the 48 percent, 52 percent citywide black-white population 
ratio. The techniques involved in the plan included pairing, 
redefinition of attendance zones, numerous special programs, 
329 and "magnet schools." 
The Supreme Court saw the importance in this case 
because of the disparity between the district court and the 
court of appeals with the federal judicial system. The Court 
pointed out that the case was important because the Court was 
asked by the plaintiffs, as students in the school system, 
330 
to "restructure the administravion of that system." 
O97 
Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F. 2d 684 (1974). 
328Ibid., 518 F. 2d 853 (1975). 
329Ibid., 589 F. 2d 1984 (1976). 33°Ibid. 
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In 1972 the district court found "isolated but re­
peated instances of failure by the Dayton School Board to 
meet the standards of the Ohio law mandating an integrated 
331 school system."" Vague and historical violations emerged. 
In the 1920's there was physical segregation of black stu­
dents, segregation of athletic teams, and racial imbalance 
within schools. During the 1960's school board policy 
established "freedom of enrollment" and "optional attendance 
zones." The district court concluded that racially imbalanced 
schools, optional attendance zones, as well as recent school 
board action, created "cumulative violations" that violated 
332 the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court insisted 
the district court's use of the term, constitutional viola-
333 tion, was "not free from ambiguity." A newly elected 
board of education had, in 1972, rescinded resolutions that 
were passed by the previous board. The district court saw 
this action as creating segregative racial patterns. In 
dealing with the rescission the court of appeals decided: 
The question of whether a rescission of previous 
Board action is in and of itself a violation of appel­
lants ' constitutional rights is inextricably bound up 
with the question of whether the Board was under a con­
stitutional duty to take the action which it initially 
took. ... If the Board was not under such duty, then 
the rescission of the initial action in and of itself 
OOl 
Dayton Board of Education v. Mark Brinkman, 
97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). 
332Ibid., p. 2770. 333Ibid., p. 2772. 
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cannot be a constitutional violation. If the Board was 
under such a duty, then the rescission becomes a part 
of the cumulative violation, and it is not necessary to 
ascertain whether the rescission ipso facto (self-
evident ) is an independent violation of the Constitu­
tion. 334 
The court of appeals found it unnecessary to "pass 
on the question of whether the rescission (of the board reso-
335 
lutions) by itself was a violation" of the Constitution. 
The Court reversed the district court1s approval of the plan 
because "the remedy ordered ... is adequate, considering 
336 the scope of cumulative violations." It did uphold the 
three-part "cumulation violation," however. Actually the 
court of appeals gave no direction to the district court in 
adopting a new plan on remand. The district court was left 
without direction: 
The Court now reaches the reluctant conclusion that 
there exists no feasible method of complying with the 
mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit without the transportation of a sub­
stantial number of students in the Dayton school 
system.337 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in order to "consider the propriety of the court-ordered 
remedy in light of the constitutional violations which were 
338 
found by the courts below." Justice William H. Rehnquist, 
334 Dayton Board of Education v. Mark Brinlottan, 
97 S. Ct. 2772 (1977). 
335Ibid., p.. 2773. 336Ibid., p. 2774. 
33^Brinkman v. Gilliqan, 518 F. 2d 353 (1975). 
338 
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in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that the rem-
339 edy as based on the three-part "cumulative violation" was 
not based on an understanding of the authority of the district 
courts. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that by the 
court of appeals the remedy for the plan was out of propor­
tion to the constitutional violation that the district court 
340 had found. The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded 
to the district court for more definite findings and the pos-
341 sibility of taking more evidence. This stemmed from the 
Court's assessment of the cumulative violation being described 
342 as an "ambiguous phrase." The Court saw that such an 
extreme remedy did not result from the meager evidence as 
found by the district court. 
The Supreme Court directed the lower court to make 
"new findings and conclusions as to violations .in the light 
343 of this opinion." The district court was then ordered to 
344 "fashion a remedy" that was in compliance with Swann. A 
Supreme Court further cautioned the lower court by saying 
that the power of federal courts was not to restructure the 
operation of local governments and that "it is not plenary 
339 
Dayton Board of Education v. Mark Brinkman, 
97 S. Ct. 2773 (1977). 
340Ibid. 341Ibid. 342Ibid., p. 2775. 
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and power is to be exercised if a constitutional violation 
345 
exists." If the constitutional violation was found, then 
the Court was to fashion the "scope of the remedy to fit the 
346 nature of the violation." 
Justice William H. Rehnquist continued by outlining 
further the duty of the district court and the court of 
appeals. Justice Rehnquist insisted: 
The duty of both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals in a case such as this, where mandatory 
segregation by law of the races in the schools has long 
since ceased, is to first determine whether there was 
any action in the conduct of the business of the school 
board which was intended to, and did in fact, discrim­
inate against minority pupils, teachers or staff. If 
such violations are found, the District Court in the 
first instance, subject to review by the Court of Appeals, 
must determine how much incremental segregative effect 
these violations had on racial distribution of the Dayton 
school population as presently constituted, when the dis­
tribution is compared to what it would have been in the 
absence of such constitutional violations. The remedy 
must be designed to redress that difference, and only 
if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a 
systemwide remedy.34^ 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan acknowledged 
that district courts and courts of appeal had a difficult 
task with deliberation of desegregation cases, yet those 
courts had gone beyond the remedy necessary for such vio-
i • 348 lations. 
Justice Brennan also maintained the constitutional 
violation was insufficient to support such a widespread 
345Davton Board of Education v. Mark Brinlanan, 
97 S. Ct. 2775 (1977). 
346Ibid. 347Ibid., p. 2726. 348Ibid 
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remedial action as a remedy. However, Justice Brennan did 
indicate that school board action showed an indication of 
intent. Once intent of school authorities was established 
in creating a segregative system, the Court considered 
349 assessing a remedy. The action in such findings was 
not only considered blatant, but also subtle. In such a 
situation, if proven, there would be redressing by the 
extensive busing plan such as the one ordered by the lower 
court's plan. If, as Justice Brennan expanded the hypothesis, 
the violation included a "systemwide impact," there should 
350 
be a "systemwide remedy." He continued that under Keyes 
the school board must find that there is an "affirmative 
351 duty to desegregate the entire system 'root and branch.'" 
Justice Brennan pointed out an additional citation when stat­
ing that as in Milliken and Swann the obligation of the school 
board was to "take the necessary steps to eliminate from the 
352 public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 
This portion of Mr. Justice Brennan's concurrence outlined 
the levels of remedial action in relation to the level of 
the violation. 
349 Dayton Board of Education v. Mark Brinkman, 
97 S. Ct. 2776 (1977). 
350Ibid. 
351 Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U.S. 213 (1973). 
352 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. llTTl971). 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The early period of desegregation prior to the Brown 
decision was punctuated with three distinct phases of history. 
Those phases included the doctrine of Plessy, the graduate 
cases, and finally, the Brown case. Each of these periods 
of history was distinctive in the approach to eliminate exist­
ing injustices at the time. 
The period from 1896 to the 1930s relied entirely 
on the doctrine that if public facilities were equal the 
races could legally be separated, whether in schools, rail­
road cars, or at water fountains. The early school cases 
wer^ decided on the basis that the "separate but equal" 
doctrine was legal. Some of the early cases included chil­
dren of races other than Negro. 
However, by 1927, there was a change of attitude by 
the courts: at least there was an apologetic attitude within 
the high Court. The strategy of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People was to attack the grad­
uate schools of certain selected colleges. This venture was 
moderately successful because admission was gained by Negro 
students in several instances, even though some restrictions 
were placed on the students. 
I 
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The final thrust came in the form of a victory for 
students finally admitted to all-white schools in four sep­
arate cases that were referred to as Brown. In this momen­
tous series of cases the Court declared the "separate but 
equal" doctrine could no longer be legally justified. The 
Court further dictated that separate educational facilities 
were unequal because of the generations of feelings of infer­
iority by the minority races. This series of decisions relied 
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
One year later the Court ordered that a "prompt and reasonable 
start" be initiated in order to comply with the original Brown 
ruling with "all deliberate speed" in desegregation of dual 
school systems. 
After Brown I and Brown II had established a legal 
basis for the desegregation of public schools, a period of 
history followed in which many school systems originated 
what the Supreme Court considered delay tactics. These 
tactics ranged from the actual closing of entire school sys­
tems to plans allowing students to choose the school of choice. 
However, the Supreme Court saw these as delay tactics and soon 
became impatient to the point of issuing orders that included 
the phrase "at once" and at the same time placed the respon­
sibility of dismantling a dual school system directly on 
school boards. Public school desegregation included: 
(1) students, (2) transportation, (3) buildings, and (4) fac­
ulty and staff. 
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Research answered the following questions: 
1. What did the United States Supreme Court consider 
reasonable in cross-district busing? 
The United States Supreme Court considered busing as 
a reasonable tool for desegregation as long as restrictions 
included distance traveled, and the amount of time did not 
infringe on educational standards. Consideration was also 
made concerning the system's intent to desegregate since 
this required a remedy of considerable busing. 
2. What was required by the United States Supreme Court in 
busing across administrative lines in order to correct 
an inequity in a segregated school system? 
Administrative systems adjacent to a segregated school 
system were not involved in a remedy unless the system had 
had a history of segregation. 
3. What was expected from the United States Supreme Court 
when a school system's white population had been signif­
icantly depleted? 
The study found that the United States Supreme Court 
saw no necessity in making annual adjustments to attendance 
lines once a system had adopted a plan for desegregation. 
4. How had the Supreme Court implemented busing in cases 
of de jure segregation? 
It was the finding of this study that the United States 
Supreme Court constantly ruled against any school system 
having de jure segregation. The remedy usually included 
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extensive busing in cases where the Court considered busing 
to be an appropriate remedy. 
5. How had the Supreme Court reacted to cases of de facto 
segregation? 
Research revealed that in cases prior to 1976, the 
Supreme Court required some busing as a punitive remedy. 
However, the latest cases having no history of segregation 
were not required to bus because of segregative housing 
patterns. The remedy was also restricted to an equivalency 
to the wrong. 
6. How had the Suprerhe Court ruled in cases where the 
intent to segregate by school officials was proven? 
The United States Supreme Court's philosophy included 
a consideration of the intent to segregate by governmental 
agencies. When the intent to segregate was found, the 
extent of the remedy often included extensive busing as a 
remedy for highly segregated school systems. 
7. To what extent did the United States Supreme Court man­
date remedial plans to desegregate school systems? 
The Court1s most drastic remedy included extensive 
cross-district busing. This extensive mandate resulted from 
proven intent to segregate by school systems. The extent of 
this remedy was found to be proportional to the intent of 
the school system. 
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Conclusions 
The recommendations of this study must necessarily 
be in the form of certain principles as derived from selected 
court decisions that can be outlined to the school authori­
ties. These principles can be the considerations necessary 
to make sound decisions by school authorities. These legal 
principles have evolved from the many court decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court dealing with desegregation and, 
more specifically, busing. As the court's evolutionary pro­
cess continues, these principles have become more of a foun­
dation upon which future cases would be decided by both lower 
courts as well as the United States Supreme Court. 
The following principles have evolved from the most 
significant court decisions: 
(1) It is within the power of the courts to order 
"equitable relief" by using bus transportation as a tool to 
desegregate a school system or remedy a constitutional viola­
tion even if the rights of the majority race children are 
violated. 
(2) The Constitution does not dictate a plan for 
desegregation that must always reflect the racial composition 
of the community in the school system. 
(3) Once a school system has initiated a plan that 
will achieve a unitary system, the school authorities are 
not required to make year-by-year adjustments. 
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(4) Creation of new school systems will not be tol­
erated by the courts if they have a detrimental effect on a 
school system in the process of dismantling its dual system. 
(5) Minority race children, such as Hispano students# 
are placed in the same category as Negro students if both 
groups suffer the same "educational inequities" as compared 
with the treatment afforded Anglo students. 
(6) The burden rests upon the school authorities to 
prove that there is no segregative attempt in either making 
policy or the failure to act. 
(7) An interdistrict remedy by the courts for proven 
de jure segregation is possible only if it has been shown 
that there was a constitutional violation within one of the 
affected districts. 
(8) State and local officials are held financially 
responsible for the cost of remedial educational programs, 
as well as the cost of busing, that are designed to eliminate 
school segregation. 
(9) A school system found in violation by the courts 
can expect the imposed remedy to be based upon the extent of 
the constitutional violation, and this would not exceed that 
which is necessary to eliminate the segregative effect of 
the officials. 
(10) The state is not immune to responsibility for 
policies and official acts that lead to constitutional viola­
tions . 
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(11) Courts have announced that the use of racial 
balance and ratios is merely a "starting point" used to rem­
edy a violation. 
(12) A neighborhood school policy by school authori­
ties must allow the Negro student a constitutional right to 
a nonsegregative education. 
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